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Abstract 
 
The setting of accounting standards in the Australian context has undergone significant 
change over the past few decades because of both the introduction of international accounting 
standards and the outcomes of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP). One 
major thrust of these reforms was to widen the breadth of participation and to introduce new 
voices into the Australian accounting standard setting regime. Though there have been recent 
changes to Australian accounting standard setting arrangements, due process still remains as 
the underlying procedure for incorporating stakeholder participation. 
 
Standard setting resides within a socio-political and economic realm which lies between a 
capitalistic economic individualism premised upon self-interest and interest group 
preferences, and an idealistic paradigm of the public interest (common good). Both notions 
are espoused within modern civil society and present in the formulation of policy and 
regulation through participation. Recent times have seen the promulgation of accounting 
standards given over by delegated legislation to private sector interests who compete for 
desired outcomes and more recently this has been entrenched within the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) which produces International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS).   
 
This research presents a two-fold investigation of the due process which is applied when 
developing accounting standards in Australia. Firstly, this study questions whether such 
standards provide an adequate avenue for incorporating both appropriate attributes of 
participation and accountability in line with the historical understanding of due process as 
developed through common law. Secondly, this study questions whether such standards 
provide an appropriate vehicle for widening  participation by introducing new voices into the 
Australian accounting standard setting process. On the former question, common law due 
process resonates within a paradigm that supports fair dealing and equity between individuals 
with themselves and with government. On the latter question, this research identifies low and 
declining stakeholder participation within the due process of accounting standard setting. 
This is accompanied by the declining interest of previous major participants. 
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In examining the longitudinal participation trends of submitters to the accounting standard 
setting regime, this research contends that the due process finds itself embedded within the 
confines of a procedural construct to the detriment of accommodating natural justice through 
a more enlightened substantive approach. As such, when considered in light of its common 
law roots, it fails both to provide an adequate level of openness along with accommodating 
only a limited opportunity to participate, specifically when taking into account opinions and 
interests.  
 
The very construct of common law due process rests upon its ability both to subsume 
participation within the decision-making process, and for that participation to be substantive 
in the outcome of the process. That is, such participation gives meaning to the outcome. 
Instead the current due process as applied within the accounting standard setting environment 
resonates such participation through abolitionist type approaches. Here self-interested parties 
compete for advantages from property rights and private benefits in line with the more 
modern interpretation of the public interest.  
 
The approach taken in this thesis is to consider the due process from a philosophical 
perspective by assessing the questions of accountability and participation within the due 
process in terms of civil society, the public good, economic individualism, libertarianism, 
liberalism, and agency, rather than to embed the discussion within the expansive existing 
studies concerning due process in the accounting standard setting process. The conclusion 
from this perspective is that due process is clearly a process past its due date. 
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Chapter One: Thesis Structure 
 
1.1: Setting 
 
History is often considered to be a reconstruction of its antecedents which encompasses a 
genesis of both prior experiences and regenerated ideas. For the most part, ideologies are 
contemporary versions of prior ideas reconstructed to explain today from yesterday. The 
common good and the public interest have been refashioned from the good of all to the sum 
of particular interests. Self-interest has found a friend in interest groups which have socio-
politicalised the economic discourse. Due process is now considered to be a procedure with 
its substantive nature given over to a notion of procedural fairness. Participation and 
accountability are now seen as nebulous concepts that are hard to reconcile in the processes 
and outcomes of political and economic consequences. 
 
These changing times and economic circumstances have given rise to a redefining of the 
public interest. Rather than protecting intrinsically underpinned values and duties, it now sits 
within a setting of protecting laissez-faire free-market environments. More recently, those 
remaining attributes prescribed by public interest theory (i.e. common good) have collapsed 
under the weight of economic individualism as critics assail it as being unrealistic, 
ambiguous, imprecise, impractical and devoid of meaning; not to mention being both 
metaphysical and unscientific. Bozeman suggests that “…public interest theory strikes many 
as an anachronism, a relic from another day’s Zeitgeist.”1 Schubert suggests that the public 
interest is “slippery, value-laden and vacuous.”2  
 
The rise of quantitative and behavioural approaches with their insatiable demand for 
empirical evidence, together with a shifting focus towards pluralism and interest group 
behaviour, has seen the concept of public interest prescribed as a footnote to the modern day 
demands of public policy and management. Sievers proposes in this respect, that 
“…distinctive social values and a creative tension between individual interests and the 
common good particularly characterize the (modern) world … it is the sphere in which 
                                                     
1 Bozeman, B., (2007), Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic Individualism, 
Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, p.2. 
2  Schubert, G., (1961), The Public Interest, Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, p.348. 
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privatised visions of the public good play out and interact with one another to shape the social 
agenda.”3 
Despite its decline in popularity, legislators, regulators and the courts continue to make laws, 
regulate and rule with reference to the public interest and common good. In legislation and 
statutes, the term public interest appears repeatedly and its aim for the most part is to 
protecting against capture by organised corporate and economic interests. This appeal to the 
common good or public interest often finds resonance in the procedures of the state through 
the construct and activation of due process mechanisms that accommodate public input. The 
inclusivity of the rhetoric of due process is seen to allay public concern by providing an 
image of public accountability and accessibility. 
 
Modern proceduralist views argue that substantive public interest does not exist but is only a 
procedural principle. As such, it rests within the political process rather than “…being a 
substantive goal of public policy.”4 Likewise with substantive due process, its reality can 
only be accommodated in the new world within the confines of procedures. 
 
The concepts of public interest and substantive due process both come under most criticism 
in that their underlying principles are seen as being overly expansive and almost always 
imprecise. Their terms are generally ambiguous and vague with both focusing on an ideal 
rather than an identifiable content.5 In one sense, both are too impractical and idealistic (e.g. 
moral theories) and, in another sense, they are sufficiently un-attentive to community and 
public values, (i.e. economic individualism). Of public interest theory Bozeman suggests that 
it “…seems at odd with the pace, demands, and give and take of today’s public policy and 
management. Public interest theory seems out of place in politics dominated by fractious, 
interest group-based politics.”6 
 
Simon, Smithburg and Thompson dismiss the public interest as being only a rationale “for 
one’s private view of the world.”7 
                                                     
3  Sievers, B., (2010), Civil Society, Philanthropy and the Fate of the Commons, Lebanon: University Press of 
New England, p.1. 
4  ibid.: Bozeman (2007), p.94. 
5  Sorauf, F., (1957), ‘The public interest reconsidered’, Journal of Politics, Vol.19, No.4. See also:  Downs, A., 
(1962), ‘The public interest: Its meaning in a democracy’, Social Research, Vol.29, No.1.  
6  ibid: Bozeman (2007), p.2. 
7  Simon, A., Smithburg, D., and Thompson, V., (1950), Public Administration, New York: A.A. Knopf, p.551. 
See also: Bozeman, B., (2007), Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic 
Individualism, Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press. 
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When one looks in the mirror, one sees one’s own image. Responsiveness to public 
interest, so defined, is responsiveness to one’s own values and attitudes towards 
social problems.8 
Tool, in quoting John Dewey, states the problem of the public (i.e. public and its interests) as 
follows: 
What is the public? If there is a public, what are the obstacles in the way of its 
recognizing and articulating itself? Is the public a myth? … What after all is the 
public under present conditions? What are the reasons for its eclipse? What 
hinders it from finding and identifying itself? By what means shall its inchoate and 
amorphous estate be organised into effective political action relevant to present 
social needs and opportunities? What has happened to the public in the century and 
a half since the theory of political democracy was urged with such assurance and 
hope?9 
 
Journalist Walter Lippmann questions the concept of the public as it was found in democratic 
theory. He argues that it consists of Omni competent citizens who, when taken as a whole, 
represent a super individual with one mind and one will which directs the course of events. 
Lippman alludes to the myth of the Omni competent sovereign democratic citizen; that 
individuals do not have executive capacity in all instances. He divides society into two 
separate groups of people – bystanders and agents. Agents, who use their own opinions to 
analyse issues of consequence and propose solutions, are seen as being capable of acting 
executively, whereas the public, for its part, is merely a bystander or spectator of the action. 
“For Lippmann, the public was a theoretical fiction and government was primarily an 
administrative problem to be solved as efficiently as possible, so that people could get on 
with their own individualistic pursuits.”10 
 
Von Mises takes this ‘phantom public’ further by referring to the fallacy of talking in 
collectives as a viable concept. He suggests that “only individuals act” and “society does not 
exist apart from the thoughts and actions of people” and society “…does not have ‘interests’ 
and does not aim at anything.”11 
 
From this perspective of dismissing the public interest, economic individualism is seen to 
encapsulate society as a collection of self-contained individuals. Therein it is human-centred 
                                                     
8  loc.cit.: 
9  Tool, M., (1988), ‘Evolutionary Economics: Foundations of Institutional Thought’, Journal of Economic 
Issues, Vol.1, p.438. 
10 Bybee, C., (1999), ‘Can Democracy Survive in the Post-Factual Age?’, Journalism and Communication 
Monographs 1:1 Spring, p.48. See also: Jaspers, K., (1978), Man in the Modern Age, New York: Routledge 
Revivals, p.41. 
11 Ludwig von Mises Institute, (2005), The Quotable Mises, Alabama:  von Mises Institute, p.40. 
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with values premised on human needs; not society. Government and societal institutions are 
at best a means to which individual needs are satisfied with individuals, rather than society, 
being of utmost value. Incorporated within is the belief that all individuals are of equal moral 
value and that the best society is one in which individuals are permitted to exercise maximum 
freedom of choice and are best capable of exercising judgement of their self-interests. 
Inherent within this notion of individualism is the implied presumption of a self-organising 
cooperative society predicated upon persons working together to achieve their individual 
goals, and in so doing, will cooperate with others as it is mutually beneficial to do so. 
 
The common good of the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, so enunciated through the 
works of Thomas Aquinas, now sees itself merely as the source of debate between modern 
individualistic and collectivist ideologies. Likewise, the due process of antiquity developed 
through the common law and elaborated so manifestly within the great documents of history, 
now sees itself as being the product of a procedural process that is far removed from the 
substantive heights so enunciated in the maxims audi alteram partem (to hear the other side; 
no person should be judged without a hearing) and nemo iudex in re sua (every judge must be 
free from bias).  
 
How then do the seemingly disparate and divergent notions of economic individualism, the 
public interest and both procedural and substantive due process coexist in an age given over 
to the ascendency of individualism? The answer to this can be best gleaned through an 
understanding of public interest theories and how they accommodate these nuances.  
 
Cochran12 assists here by providing a spectrum of public interest theories that resonates 
between normative approaches at one end and pluralistic approaches at the other. The former 
normative approaches suggest policy outcomes take consideration of that which offers the 
greatest common good whilst the latter, more pluralistic approaches suggest policy outcomes 
should be premised more upon solving interest group conflict. Of these later pluralistic 
approaches, the most extreme version concerns an ‘abolitionist’ approach which views 
society through a lens of interest groups pursuing their interests associated with both property 
rights and private benefits. 
 
                                                     
12 Cochran, C.E., (1974), ‘Political Science and The Public Interest’, The Journal of Politics, Vol.36, No.2.  
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Typically, this spectrum is portrayed in light of three normative models which are briefly 
defined here, and which are discussed in detail in Section 5.3. First, a standard model wherein 
an informed policy maker delineates the best decision as being premised upon what is 
considered to be best for the overall good of the public. This model recognises that although 
people may not always agree about what constitutes the best outcome, a decision by someone 
in authority will need to be made. Second, a competing interests model refers to situations in 
which the common good is negated and subjugated in the pursuit of an outcome which best 
accommodates the resolution of conflicting and competing interests. Third, an ideal but 
somewhat naïve consensus model suggests that finding and determining the common good 
resonates through the ability of the process to accommodate participation. Participants learn 
through involvement and come to see beyond their own self-interest and so discern a sense of 
what the common good is. Inherent within these three models lies a construct of participation 
in the due process mechanism as applied within the accounting standard setting environment 
which will be drawn out throughout this research.  
 
1.2: Introduction 
 
During the early 2000s, a series of legal, financial and corporate law reforms were 
promulgated under the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP). Significant 
among these were amendments to the accounting standard setting regime and the way 
accounting standards would be produced. Previously, the Australian accounting professional 
bodies, CPA Australia and the Institute of Chartered Accountants had held a more significant 
role and exerted greater influence through the Australian Accounting Research Foundation 
(AARF) which provided technical support to the standard setter. The CLERP report 
illustrates the shifting tide of the accounting professions involvement within the development 
of accounting standards. 
In contrast with the position of most overseas jurisdictions with standard-setters, the 
AARF itself is not directly accountable to the boards it services, but to the 
professional accounting bodies. This has led to the perception in some quarters that 
the accounting profession may be in a somewhat privileged position in terms of 
potentially influencing the outcome of standard setting. Whether this influence is 
actual or perceived, it is important for the credibility of the standard-setting process 
that it is seen to be in fact independent and not subject to undue influence by any 
one group of interests.13 
                                                     
13 Commonwealth of Australia - Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP), (1997), Accounting 
Standards: building international opportunities for Australian business, Proposal for Reform: Paper 1, 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, p.39. 
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Following implementation of the CLERP recommendations in 2005, Australia adopted 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) prepared on the behalf of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards Board (IFRSB) through its standard setting body, 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The primary mission of the IFRSB is 
to develop a single set of high quality, understandable, enforceable and globally 
accepted IFRS.  
 
Traditionally, the development of accounting standards has been predicated on constituent 
input and participation through a formal due process procedure said to accommodate the 
various nuances of those effected. In its simplest guise, accounting standards have economic 
consequences concerning wealth distributions which impact differently on users and 
producers of accounting information. Consequently, those so affected will attempt to have 
standards set that are to their benefit, or at least to limit any detrimental consequences. 
 
The notion of due process has a long-distinguished association with the idea of fair 
participation in institutional arrangements and resonates within the ambit of the two great 
maxims audi alteram partem and nemo iudex in re sua. Historically, due process was 
encapsulated within a duality of both procedural and substantive aspects but has more 
recently been entrenched within the confines of a procedure aimed at accommodating 
competing views by the right to equal treatment through a defined set of procedural steps. 
 
Due process is when both users and preparers can express their viewpoint and generally 
precedes the promulgation of the standard. It is initiated with the publication of an exposure 
draft (labelled ‘ED’ followed by issue number) and which sets out a specific proposal in the 
form of a proposed standard. An exposure draft is the IASB’s conduit for consulting the 
public. It presents the proposed standard and includes an invitation to comment, and 
generally identifies the main issues that the IASB has identified as being of particular 
interest. The IASB normally allows a minimum period of 120 days for comment on an 
exposure draft. 
 
Following closure of the comment period, IASB technical staff provide a general summary of 
the major points raised in the comment letters for the IASB to consider. Acceptance or 
rejection is premised upon a ballot of members of the IASB. In this respect, it does not 
operate as a consensus body requiring a unanimous vote, but rather requires a ‘super-
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majority’ of at least nine members for approval. Investigation into participation and 
participatory involvement would suggest a narrowing of involvement and perhaps a lessening 
rather than broadening of voices within the standard setting arrangements which appears 
somewhat heightened with acceptance of international accounting standards.  
 
From the outset of this study, an approach was taken not to embed the discussion within the 
expansive existing studies concerning due process in the accounting standard setting process. 
Instead, the approach taken was to consider the due process in the more general terms of civil 
society, the public good, economic individualism, libertarianism, liberalism, agency, and 
consider a spectrum of philosophical approaches in an attempt to assess accountability and 
participation within the due process. Pertinent to this approach was an attempt to discern an 
ideal concept of due process and compare it with its actuality. Hence the literature review is 
presented as the bulk of this thesis.  This was deemed important as it sought to understand the 
due process in terms of the competing and common goals that are fashioned from within the 
socio-economic environment within which participants reside. On many occasions, the extant 
literature has analysed the efficacy of the due process and aspects of lobbying. Many of the 
early studies had been identified by Hurst14 and it was considered appropriate to approach the 
process from a more general philosophical approach, rather than to extrapolate from more 
recent similar studies.  
 
Further, the two research questions examined have been distinguished according to how they 
have been examined. The first research question was considered according to empirical 
material and focused purely on the number of submissions and who submitted them. The 
intention was to examine whether the move to international accounting standards broadened 
the participation base. The second research question was premised upon the surrounding 
environmental conditions and attributes in which participants reside.  
 
1.3: Research Questions 
 
The research is concerned with participation trends associated with the due process of 
accounting standard setting to discern if and how it has changed following the 
implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005. 
 
                                                     
14 Hurst, G., (2007), Not So Due Process: The Case against the Due Process applied within the Australian 
accounting standard setting arrangements. Unpublished Working Paper, University of Ballarat. 
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The first research question of this thesis is: 
1. Has the move to international accounting standards broadened participation in the due 
process and introduced new voices into the Australian accounting standard setting 
regime as espoused by CLERP? 
Given the answer to the first question, the second research question aims to address the 
philosophical issue related to the nature of the accounting standard setting process in terms 
of:  
2. Is the due process employed to develop accounting standards into an appropriate 
conduit for fair and equal stakeholder participation within the standard setting 
environment? 
  
1.4: Thesis Considerations 
 
Any consideration of the second research question requires an understanding of the historical 
and philosophical antecedents that underpin the current notion of due process that is 
described in the accounting setting standard in Australia, as identified in the first research 
question. Critical to the answers is the standard aspired to within modern civil society, and 
how civil society incorporates such diverse notions of the common good and economic 
individualism within an economic paradigm given over to the economic nuances and 
consequences of market orientated systems. The connotations of due process are many and 
varied and should be seen in its application rather than in any dormant or stagnant definition 
of what it is or should be. Consequently, any discussion must allude to both its substantive 
and procedural constructs yet also consider these within the confines of the systems it is 
employed within. Moreover, and pertinent to this research, is that above all else due process 
connotes an element of participation and therefore is defined by both the nature and purpose 
of participants. 
  
Consequently, this thesis considers the following six propositions:  
1. How the intermeshed principles of modern civil society are incorporated within a 
meaning of due process now seen to encompass both the competing ideologies of the 
common good and economic individualism. 
2. The extent to which the setting of standards is a product of the economic consequences of 
competing constituents and fermented within a political paradigm as opposed to a process 
based on neutrality and the quest for the common good. 
17 
 
3. The extent to which due process, as applied in the setting of accounting standards, aligns 
with the construct of due process which has developed over time through the concept of 
natural justice and the common law.  
4. How the substantive nature of due process now sits within a procedural domain said to 
incorporate democratic participation and the natural justice maxims, audi alteram partem 
and nemo iudex in re sua. 
5. The extent to which due process, as applied in the development of Australian accounting 
standards, follows normative models of rule-making which suggest that the common good 
is best achieved through participant involvement. 
6. How public accountability and stakeholder participation is perceived within the new 
economic realm of economic individualism, self-interest, specific interest groups, and 
accountability in the age of delegated legislative responsibilities to private institutions.  
 
To appreciate the implications that are reflected in the above six propositions concerning 
input into the Australian accounting standard setting due process, an analysis has been 
undertaken of submissions to exposure drafts (ED) from ED99 issued in December 1999 
through until ED200 issued in July 2010. This descriptive question has to be answered first in 
order to provide context to the philosophical underpinnings of due process addressed in the 
second research question.  
 
1.5: Research Paradigm 
 
The flow of the research paradigm can be seen in Figure 1.1 and it utilises a methodological 
schematic based on Crotty15 which places objectivity as an epistemology and positivism as a 
theoretical perspective. The upper tier provides a framework from which to undertake the 
research. It helps determine the methodologies and methods that will be utilised, together 
with a justification for the choice and use of those methodologies and methods. The lower tier 
identifies the appropriate methodology and method used in this research to answer the 
research questions. 
 
                                                     
15 Crotty, M., (2003), The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 
3ed, London: Sage Publications. 
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Epistemology is concerned with “…the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and 
general basis.”16 Maynard, as cited in Crotty, suggests that epistemology helps provide “…a 
philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can 
ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate.”17 
 
Figure.1.1: Research Paradigm Construct 
 
 
 
The epistemological focus of this study is called ‘modified objectivity.’ Firstly, the validity of 
the research can be established independently (thus objectively), and secondly the results are 
probably true but pure objectivity is impossible. Ontologically, the researcher believes there 
is a real objective reality which unfortunately cannot be known for sure (thus modified). 
 
The traditional view of positivism suggests that: 
Science was seen as the way to get at truth, to understand the world well enough so 
that we might predict and control it. The world and the universe were deterministic -
- they operated by laws of cause and effect that we could discern if we applied the 
unique approach of the scientific method. Science was largely a mechanistic or 
mechanical affair.18 
 
Inherent in this view is a belief that knowledge is acquired from both our sensory experiences 
and our interaction of the world and that any claims to knowledge are predicated upon 
observations of objects which are testable by experience. 
 
                                                     
16 Hamlyn, D., (1995), Epistemology, History of, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.242. 
17 Maynard, M., (1994), Methods, practice and epistemology: the debate about feminism and research, p.10. 
Cited in Crotty, M., (2003), The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research 
Process, 3ed, London: Sage Publications, p.8. 
18 Troohim, M., (2006), Positivism & Post-Positivism, Research Methods Knowledge Base, accessed 12 April 
2015, retrieved from http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php 
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Historically, research in accounting has been predicated on an understanding of accounting as 
a science and, for the most part, investigated using scientific evaluation techniques such as 
deduction and induction in attempts to describe reality. Such research lends itself neatly to a 
positivist design in that such an approach helps one to focus on both measurable and 
observable events. Positivists believe that social science can be scientific in “…the same way 
as the physical sciences such as physics or chemistry and that there is a cause and effect 
based on an intervention.”19 Godfrey et al, suggest that positivist research has dominated 
accounting research since the 1980s and that the thrust of this positivist research has been to 
describe, explain and predict the role of accounting rather than make “value-laden 
prescriptions.”20  
 
When research requires a methodology through which independence and separation from bias 
is paramount, a positivist approach appears best suited for describing and explaining 
observable measurable data, which reflects a world view of reality which is both fixed and 
observable. This approach relies upon observation of real world phenomena and is not 
without inherent flaws, including problems associated with the observation itself. To glean 
participation input into the Australian accounting standard setting due process, an analysis 
has been undertaken of submissions from December 1999 (submission ED99) to July 2010 
(submission ED200), which enables a five-year pattern of pre and post acceptance of 
international accounting standards in 2005 to be discerned. Statistically, 1,215 submissions 
were made to these exposure drafts and after classification, represent the input of 407 
submitters, suggesting that certain stakeholders have submitted to more than one exposure 
draft.  
 
More recent research approaches have taken a social construct view of accounting and 
question the appropriateness of the scientific method in researching social sciences. 
Arguments supporting this latter approach suggest that it is not possible to understand the 
nature of accounting completely through merely observing accounting practice due to the fact 
that accounting is premised upon conventions rather than any irrefutable laws.21 Therefore, to 
explain concepts such as due process, public interest, accountability and accounting standards 
                                                     
19 Liamputtong, P., and Ezzy, D., (2005), Qualitative Research Methods, 2ed, Melbourne: Oxford University    
Press, p.15. 
20 Godfrey, J., Hodgson, A., Tarca, A., Hamilton, J., and Holmes, S., (2010), Accounting Theory, 7ed, John 
Wiley & Sons Australia, p.29. 
21 Hussey, J., and Hussey, R., (1997), Business Research. A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Graduate 
Students, Bristol: Macmillan Business.  
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adequately, it is necessary to consider and incorporate factors concerning social behaviour 
within any methodology developed. In this respect, a post-positivist approach was deemed 
better suited, as it entailed a need for a critical analysis which recognized, “…that all 
observation is fallible and has error”22 and that the researcher is critical of their own ability to 
know for certain what reality is.  
 
1.6: Methodology and Method 
 
Karl Jaspers considers that the study of man and his environment involves two distinct 
methodological approaches that require unification. The first is to observe and investigate 
how man is and how he behaves in real life; the second is to examine potential behaviours 
that might be actualised in the future; that is, to project possibilities of actions into the future. 
“Our questions and answers are in part determined by the historical tradition in which we find 
ourselves. We apprehend truth from our own source within the historical tradition.”23 In this 
context, Chapters Two to Five contextualize the research questions within their historical 
setting so as to provide a backdrop for the actions of participants within the standard setting 
process. 
 
Ex-post facto research premised upon archival data has been utilised to observe participant 
input into the accounting standard setting regime. Overall it is a descriptive study which 
considers that the social world can only be understood from the standpoint of the individual 
actors and that their actions cannot be observed in the same way as natural objects. In this 
light, rather than reinterpreting an actor’s actions and experiences, this research is aimed at 
providing a systematic representation of the events. In recognising that complete objectivity 
is extremely difficult to attain, the methodology chosen recognises the difficulty both in 
making sense and construing meaning from historical events. 
 
The analysis concentrates on the central information source of written submissions into the 
due process of accounting standards setting within Australia with the focus being a 
longitudinal understanding of the types and nature of those who participate. Given this 
perspective, a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative methods is utilised but in any true 
                                                     
22 ibid.: Troohim (2006). 
23 Gatta, G., (2008), Theorizing Among Ruins: Karl Jaspers and the Political Theory of Boundary, US: Ann 
Arbor, p.68. 
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sense this does not suggest the use of a mixed method. A purely quantitative approach was 
deemed inappropriate as the research is not seeking quantified relationships or significance 
between variables nor is a completely qualitative approach desired, due to investigator biases 
associated with the possible classification of participants. 
 
To answer the first research question, so as to enable interpretation and understanding of 
trends, a quantitative analysis was chosen to allow the researcher to place measurable 
findings within the construct of the social world from which they derive. Such an approach 
recognises the simplicity of elaborating one type of data with data of another but was 
considered appropriate to extract any meaningful relationship of trends. In a broad sense, 
quantitative analysis is seen as an appropriate research method capable of presenting an 
objective and systematic means for quantifying and describing phenomena.24 In this light, it 
was felt to be a sufficient approach. General descriptions of this method encompass some 
form of textual analysis being undertaken which raises issues of trustworthiness concerning 
the credibility, dependability, conformability, transferability and authenticity of the processes 
employed. In this respect, the content was limited to its base level in that the act of 
submission by itself formed the content rather than inferring any other meaning to the 
participants and why they submitted. 
 
To answer the second research question a qualitative approach was thought best as it enables 
the researcher to analyse data by searching for themes and patterns across the data set. 
Moreover, it originates from within natural settings to the extent it considers participants in 
their communities and enables the researcher to give voice to their actions.  
 
1.7: Limitations of the Research 
 
The research presented here does not consider the expanding number of studies on due 
process which proliferate in the research literature. Instead, the research embeds the study in 
a body of literature more general to issues surrounding civil society, economic individualism, 
the public good, libertarianism, liberalism, and principle-agent relations. This broader 
research canvas gives philosophical meaning to the descriptive outcomes from the 1,215 
submissions examined. Being fundamentally descriptive in nature, the first research question 
                                                     
24 Downe-Wamboldt, B., (1992), ‘Content analysis: Method application and issues’, Health Care for Women 
International, Issue 13. 
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ignores the intention (reason) of the submitter (favour or disagreement) and considers only 
that they have submitted. Herein the research did not analyse the content of the submissions 
but it provides context to the underlying issues of due process.  
 
The data collected for the first research question is time constrained as it relates specifically 
to an equal number of submissions five years before and after the introduction of 
international accounting standards in 2005. Being within such close proximity to the change 
allows clear identification of the changes involved, but a study over a longer period may 
reveal variations to what is presented here. 
 
Although the classification was deemed to be appropriate, the research relied on a 
classification regime of grouping submitters which with further analysis could have provided 
a greater in-depth understanding. Particularly pertinent here is the difficulty in distinguishing 
between small accounting firms and consultants, which further analysis may provide insights 
that would be more appropriate to a deeper PhD study. 
 
1.8:  Ethical Considerations / Consent 
 
This study is based on secondary data for the first research question, while the second 
research question is based on deep analysis of the relevant historical and philosophical 
seminal literature. As a result, there was no requirement of ethics clearance. No consent form 
was required for this study. All exposure drafts are public documents, which are open to 
public scrutiny; therefore, no prior consent is required. However, all information gained will 
be dealt with in a considerate manner, taking account of fair representation of all issues 
discussed. 
 
1.9: Structure of the Thesis  
 
The discussion revolves around several key understandings and is organised into chapters, as 
follows. Chapters Two to Five set out the crucial conceptual elements of the study 
underpinning the empirical analysis in Chapter Six. Chapter Two considers the nature and 
antecedent characteristics of civil society as it is understood in the modern western world and 
the characteristics that enable a synthesis between the competing notions of economic 
individualism and the public (common) good. Our contemporary world is characterised and 
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shaped by our beliefs and institutional practices and consequently our notions of due process: 
what it is and how it works resonates within our patterns of social coordination. 
 
Chapter Three highlights the political nature of accounting standard setting and its economic 
consequences. It investigates models of accounting regulation pursuant to the nuances of both 
stakeholders and regulators. Pertinent to the discussion is the intermesh of politicalisation, 
neutrality and participation and their implications within an emergent theory of economic 
theory heavily predicated on the incentives and motivation of both economic individuals and 
interest groups. 
 
Chapter Four looks at how the concept of economic individualism now remains as the core 
attribute of determining the public (common) good. It investigates the rise of economic 
individualism and how it has shaped the recent concept of the common good. First it 
considers the historical nature of individualism and its development as a core ideal from the 
Renaissance period. Secondly, it identifies the hybrid nature of individualism as it has 
evolved through the fertile fields of liberalism, libertarianism, neo-liberalism and neo-
conservatism. Thirdly, it defines the nexus between individualism and mainstream economics 
that ultimately gave impetus to the economic individualism that dominates modern economic 
policy making. It concludes with the antecedents of this change as espoused by property 
rights, the principal-agent relationship and the roles of market and government failures. 
 
Chapter Five introduces the nature of due process as historically and traditionally discerned 
through its common-law roots and posits a notion of both substantive and procedural due 
process which has now given over to an acceptance of a procedural fairness far removed from 
its antecedent philosophy. The chapter develops the nexus between the due process 
mechanism and participatory input and delineates the more modern understanding of 
accountability as it exists in the New Public Management (NPM) environment. This 
accountability is intrinsically embellished with the need for participation which is discussed 
in terms of how participation is incorporated into the policy mechanism. The chapter 
examines the models of participation before describing and explaining the actual due process 
of accounting standard setting and how it incorporates stakeholder participation.  
 
Chapter Six describes the current state of play in terms of participant actors and their 
involvement within the due process with findings from the empirical content analysis.  
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Chapter Seven addresses the research questions and elaborates on the nexus between the 
research questions and the findings in the context of the historical settings discussed 
previously.  
 
Chapter Eight concludes with a discussion on the importance of the study and suggests 
proposals for continued research on this topic and policy implications. 
 
1.10: Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has provided the modern setting of both due process and the public interest. 
Substantive due process now resides within a construct of procedural fairness, whilst the 
public interest is now defined in terms of interest groups and the sum of particular interests. 
Secondly, it contextualised the notion of due process and how it is applied within the changed 
Australian accounting standard setting environment pursuant to the move to IFRS. 
 
Given that historical due process is heavily predicated upon notions of participation and 
accountability premised upon the traditional ideal of the public interest, two research 
questions and thesis considerations were provided in this chapter to enable an examination of 
due process in light of the modern interpretation and application of participation and 
accountability. A research schematic was then presented that considers an appropriate avenue 
from which to address the research questions. From here, the next chapter presents the 
background of and the environment within which both the due process and the public interest 
inhabit.  
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Chapter Two: Civil Society  
 
2.1: Self-Interest/Individualism – Public Good/Public Interest 
 
The idea of civil society is rooted in the antecedents of cooperative behaviour required by 
human communities for survival. Originating through political thinkers such as John Locke, 
Baron Montesquieu, George Wilhelm Hegel, and Alexis de Tocqueville, a notion of civility 
crystallised. These authors spawned different notions of civil society, and the most notable 
differentiations occurred between the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu. Locke sought to 
differentiate between society and the state although he identifies with the concept of one 
politic society which presupposes that society has set government over itself and therefore, 
the ability to act as one body rests within the legislative power of government.25 
Montesquieu’s concept of civil society encapsulated the 18th century ideas of both 
governmental and social contracts which he premised upon the Roman law distinctions 
associated with civic and political (public) law. Civic law dealt with regulating interactions 
between members of society with one another, whereas political law regulated the 
relationship between those governing and those being governed. Kessel offers the following 
differences between both – Montesquieu understood civil society in terms of the political 
space of the citizens whereas Locke saw “…civil society as the private space of the free 
citizens beyond the political space.”26 Locke identifies distinct and autonomous spheres of 
civil society and the state, thus locating the state opposite civil society. Montesquieu discerns 
a more integrative relationship between society and the state. 
 
Modern political inquiry has placed civil society as a condition of society with much of the 
debate distinguished between a procedural position and a communitarian position. The 
former presupposes a common legislative framework that empowers individuals to participate 
in the public sphere. The latter champions active civic participation and political community 
as a fundamental requirement for democracy.  
 
Overall the contemporary world is shaped by beliefs and institutional practices imprinted 
with ancient patterns of social coordination. The concept of what civil society is has been 
                                                     
25  Cohen, J., and Arato, A., (1994), Civil Society and Political Theory, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
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debated by scholars, commentators and political actors who have universally acknowledged 
the centrality of civil society to modern democracy on one hand and on the other disputing its 
definition and function. What is definitive however is that we all are members of civil society 
and that we are all actors in the civil sphere of the society and are interconnected through a 
network of values and institutions. Moreover, our actions within civil society are closely 
intertwined by the quality of our participations in private and public life.27  
 
In the economic sphere, we act as investors, consumers and producers; in the political arena, 
we act as public administrators, voters and lawmakers and likewise within civil society we 
act as civic actors, members and volunteers. Civil society itself is characterised by 
“…pluralism, distinctive social values and a creative tension between individual interests and 
the common good.”28 A community’s social agenda is shaped when privatised visions of the 
public good play out and intersect with one another. “Participating in civil society involves 
the pursuit of a mixture of public and private goals, of social problem solving and individual 
expression.”29  
 
Civil society finds its most distinctive expression in the mediating realm between individuals 
and the state which resonates within the complexities associated with both pluralism and 
social benefit. Taken together they reflect the myriad identities present in contemporary 
society who are tasked with improving conditions in the world. In a social environment seen 
increasingly accepting of intolerance, with threats to both freedom of belief and action and a 
perceived inability to pursue the common good, the chance of bolstering civil society 
suggests a ray of hope.  
 
Historically, a deeper understanding of civil society, premised on the belief that it can deliver 
more harmonious relations, has played a significant role in the creation of a modern western 
liberal democracy capable of dealing with the intrinsic tensions inherent in balancing both 
private and public interests. Maintaining this balance in turn has provided a solution to many 
vital challenges facing modern democracy that demand public resolution. Issues concerning 
challenges associated with socio-economic and environmental impacts and the deterioration 
of public decision-making systems are often described as issues of commons. 
                                                     
27 Sievers, B., (2009), What is Civil Society?, GIA Reader, Vol.20, No.1, (Spring), accessed 23 July 2015, 
retrieved from http://www.giarts.org/article/what-civil-society 
28 loc,cit.: 
29 loc,cit.: 
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Commons is defined generally as resources belonging to a group of people or community that 
are subject to social dilemmas. An integral understanding of civil society rests within the 
concept of commons and its reference to the “…central traditional western thought of a 
shared sphere of communal life where collective goods reside.”30 The works of Elinor 
Ostrom and her input into the debate concerning the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ which is 
popularly interpreted to mean that “…private property is the only means of protecting finite 
resources from ruin or depletion”31 are intuitive in this respect. Ostrom suggests that rather 
than common pool problems being solved primarily by a coercive state, such problems can be 
solved similarly through voluntary organisations.32  
 
Underpinning the commons is the belief that public benefit ideals such as social justice and 
civic commitments cannot be achieved by individual decision-making processes alon,e but 
rather are created and sustained by common action through a framework of institutions and 
norms that make such action possible. In this respect several principles for managing ‘a 
commons’ have been attributed to Ostrom. These are as follows:33 
1. Define clear group boundaries. 
2. Match rules governing use of common goods to local needs and conditions. 
3. Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules. 
4. Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside 
authorities. 
5. Develop a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’ behavior. 
6. Use graduated sanctions for rule violators. 
7. Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution. 
8. Build responsibility for governing the common resource in nested tiers from the lowest 
level up to the entire interconnected system. 
 
2.2: Attributes of Civil Society - Seven Strands 
 
Sievers suggests several attributes underpin the shape of how civil society developed and 
how these constructs now enable parties with competing political and social values to 
mediate and balance the pursuit of individual interests and the common good. Utilising 
Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, Sievers constructed a web of concepts that 
                                                     
30 loc.cit.: 
31 On the Commons, (2011), Elinor Ostrom's 8 Principles for Managing A Commons, 2 October, accessed 28 
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32 Ostrom, E., (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: 
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33 ibid.: On the Commons, (2011).  
28 
 
“…share interwoven meanings in such a way that there is not … one fibre (that) runs through 
its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.”34 He suggests that at its heart, civil 
society relies upon the rule of law, individual rights, norms of the common good, private 
associations, free expression, philanthropy and tolerance.35 These seven concepts are broken 
into divisions of institutional structures and normative traditions and are set out in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Attributes of Civil Society: Structures and Traditions 
Institutional Structures Normative Traditions 
Philanthropy The Common Good 
Rule of Law Individual Rights 
Private Associations Tolerance 
System of Free Expression  
Source: Civil Society, Philanthropy and the Fate of the Commons, pp.4-8. 
 
Legal and philanthropic (institutional) structures have existed in some form since antiquity 
whilst freedom of expression and private associations are the product of more recent 
Renaissance and Enlightenment thought and endeavour. The normative traditions of the 
common good, individual rights and tolerance are social norms which are more the product of 
a prolonged and sequential development process.  
 
Sievers suggests that a synthesising of the seven strands (as set out in Table 2.1) through their 
basic and associated components creates the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
successful functioning of contemporary civil society and that they serve as foundational 
institutional elements and key norms in that they act as a primary vehicle outside the state 
which citizens interact and collaborate to achieve common purposes. Anheier suggests of 
civil society that it is “…the arena outside family, government, and market where people 
voluntarily associate to advance common interests based on civility.”36 
 
In civil society, these strands complement and reinforce each other. The development of the 
rule of law, for example, is a precondition for the protection of individual rights and the trust 
necessary for the pursuit of the common good. A tradition of tolerance acts as a mediator 
                                                     
34  ibid.: Sievers (2010), p.107. 
35  loc,cit.: 
36 Anheier, H., (2008), ‘The CIVICUS Civil Society Index: Proposals for Future Directions’, CIVICUS Global 
Survey of the State of Civil Society, Heinrich, F., and Fioramonti, L., (eds). Vol. 2, Comparative 
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between the defence of individual rights and pursuit of communal ends. Private association; 
that is, the ability to associate with and freely advocate points of view depends on individual 
rights and the legal protection of those rights.                                                                                    
 
Similarly, free expression is underpinned by an ethic of tolerating diverse points of view and 
legally sanctioned individual rights. The ability to create private organisations for 
philanthropic purposes, in the pursuit of the common good through the contribution of money 
and time and tolerance for divergent or opposing philanthropic purpose are the factors on 
which institutions rely.  
 
Inherent within the construct of civil society is its significant commitment to both individual 
rights and to the common good which leads to a dualism that can create fundamental tensions 
between individual and communal impulses. Formation of any coherent social agenda 
requires a congruence between these tensions which is found in the intermesh of democracy 
within civil society. 
 
2.3: Civil Society and Democracy  
 
It is impossible to disentangle the development of modern civil society and liberal 
democracy. Post and Rosenblum describe this nexus as follows:  
That democracy depends on the particularist, self-determining associations of civil 
society, where independent commitments, interests, and voices, are developed…. 
Civil society is the precondition for democratic decision-making, whether 
democracy is conceived as deliberation or as interest group pluralism, and this is 
true even if the goal of democracy is to transcend particularism and arrive at 
uncoerced agreement or a common will.37  
 
It is not unsurprising that the concepts of the individual and of individual rights emerged at a 
stage when the very idea of government was being reconstructed in the clash between 
democratic and absolutist theories of the state. Harrington suggests that in the 17th century, 
government was an “…art whereby a civil society of men is (was) instituted upon the 
common foundation of common right or interest, or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) it is the 
empire of laws and not of men.”38 Harrington was referring to the idea of government, which 
was emerging out of the work of non-traditional political writers. Locke refers to the 
                                                     
37 Post, R., and Rosenblum, N., (2002), ‘Introduction’, Civil Society and Government, Rosenblum, N., and Post, 
R., (eds), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.16. 
38 Harrington, J., (1992), ‘The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656)’ The Commonwealth of Oceana and a System 
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formation of a civil society through the process of consenting as a creation of the founding 
framework of the government. Both acceptance of the rule of law and an associated 
acceptance of individual rights presented a framework for the formation of a liberal 
democratic state and the idea of a new theory whereby government was grounded in civil 
society. For Locke, civil society was the stage in which the inherent tensions “…between the 
defense of individual rights (in the forms of private association, free expression, and other 
freedoms), on the one hand, and the power of the state to pursue its mandate to achieve the 
well-being of the community on the other,”39 was played out. In this arena individuals would 
come together: 
Through civil interactions based on trust, tolerance, and a shared sense of public 
purpose to form a natural community of common interest to pursue collective 
purposes. Radically differing visions of spiritual or political ideals could co-exist in 
this arena because it was the realm in which the free play of ideas produced public 
consensus that then produced the basis for ultimate action by the state. Civil society 
organizations could propose, but only the state could dispose.40 
Miller states the requisite condition of civil society: 
In order for civil society to exist and thrive, certain preconditions must be met. First, 
there must be tolerations of a diversity of views: religious, cultural, scientific, 
aesthetic, and so forth. Second, there must be protection of private property and 
contracts to enable individuals to cooperate in a variety of different associations and 
to coexist peacefully as they pursue their respective goals. Third, and most 
importantly, there must be the rule of law, so that the objectively defined laws that 
prevent them from doing whatever they please restrain the government officials as 
well as private individuals.41  
To sustain these conditions, civil society requires the protection of governmental authority 
and law; conversely, liberal democratic government requires a robust civil society capable of 
balancing both private and public interests.  
 
Liberal democracy is often associated with two essential features. Firstly, “…it is a mode of 
social decision making that flows from the popular will and (secondly) that it limits the scope 
of government by protecting pluralism individual rights.”42 Overall it is said to embrace the 
notion of political pluralism. Galston suggests concepts of both political pluralism (the 
recognition and affirmation of diversity), and expressive liberty (freedom for individuals and 
groups to lead lives they choose) are protected through the limitation of government power. 
                                                     
39 ibid.: Sievers (2010), p.10. 
40 loc.cit.: 
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Rosenblum, N., and Post, R., (eds) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.195. 
42 ibid.: Sievers (2009). 
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The challenge for liberal democracy being to reconcile both by legitimately using public 
power.  
 
Inherent within liberal democracy is the clash between the state’s need to provide and achieve 
goods that benefit the entire community as opposed to protecting the rights of private beliefs. 
Galston suggests that “…in a society that accepts and even promotes diversity and pluralism, 
the norm of tolerance is elevated to …a core attribute of liberal pluralist citizenship.”43 
Particularly civil society is a conduit for fostering institutions in such ways as to entice an 
environment in which “…a variety of conceptions of the good - including many that deviate 
widely from the beliefs of the mainstream majority- may be freely enacted.”44 The seven 
strands are relied upon by civil society to accomplish this task. Their collective aim is to 
balance against any exaggerated individualism born from any growing impetus to protect and 
invigorate individual preferences.   
 
2.4: Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter sought to provide a social environmental setting wherein political and social 
values compete and complement each other to mediate and balance the pursuit of individual 
interests and the common good. Concepts such as due process resonate only through a 
construct of a civil society wherein the nuances of liberal democracy play out between those 
attributes of a civil society: namely, freedom of speech, a rule of law, individual rights, the 
common good, private associations and a tolerance to accommodate these within its means of 
making decisions. The next chapter places these notions of civil society in the context of 
accounting standards as they have been generated within western political and economic 
thought.  
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Chapter Three: Accounting Standards in Civil Society 
 
3.1: The Political Nature of Accounting Standard Setting and its Economic 
        Consequences 
 
Given an understanding of the framework of how modern western civil society works, this 
chapter delineates the nature of the accounting standard setting regime within the social 
domain of civil society. In the first instance, it considers both the role and nature of the 
standard setter as gatekeeper of the standard setting process and then discerns several models 
of standard setting. Following an understanding of the standard setter, the chapter then 
describes models of stakeholder behaviour in terms of economic theories of regulation and 
how they help to explain regulatory activity. This is followed by a discussion on the political 
nature of accounting standard setting and how the standard setter subjugates both the 
economic consequences and behavioural implications of accounting and accounting standards 
under a notion of neutrality in setting standards.  
 
Historically, the promulgation of accounting standards has resonated through delegated 
legislation from Parliament enabling a subordinate body to design accounting rules and 
regulations as it best sees, subject to an overriding condition that it balances the competing 
demands of relevant stakeholders whilst also being aware that its activities reside within the 
political sphere of its benefactors. Mitnick defines regulation as “…the intentional restriction 
of a subject’s choice of activity, by an entity not directly party to or involved in that 
activity.”45 In this respect Horwitz has identified the growth over the past two centuries of 
new regulatory forces that “…employ the coercive power of the state in a new and modern 
way.”46 Such regulatory agencies now create substantive rules and policies and provide 
regulation concerning economic development. Horwitz sees these agencies as representing 
“…the modern form of state intervention to reconcile the expanded and complex needs of 
capital (accumulation) with the democratic demands for social controls of corporate activity 
and of fairness generally (legitimation).”47 
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3.2: The Standard Setter (Gatekeeper) 
 
Early systems research work by Cobb and Elder attempts to explain how wants and demands 
are converted into issues which become inputs into the political domain and identifies the 
existence of gatekeepers as “…those persons, institutions or groups whose actions determine 
the success or failure of a demand or issue entering into the system.”48 Such gatekeepers 
include formal regulatory bodies such as standard setters who collectively govern and oversee 
how issues are resolved. Importantly, however they also exercise significant power that 
derives from their position.  
 
Bachrach and Baratz49 suggest this power resides in two forms. First, they have the ability to 
select and choose between alternatives, and second, they have the ability in the first instance 
to control the alternatives under consideration. Milne suggests that “…for legitimacy, the 
standard setter needs to decide on the appropriate response to an identified accounting 
problem, whether or not that solution is sufficient or simply reflects form rather than 
substance.”50 Authors such as March and Olsen infer the use of a logic of appropriateness 
where human action is “driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized 
into institutions.”51 Young suggests that accounting standard setters try “…to eliminate what 
accounting should not be.”52 In this respect Young argues that the response to issues by 
standard setters is not a “simple response to pressures from interested actors” but “…includes 
also the interpretation of expectations about the role and purpose of the standard setters.”53 
 
Several contentions have been made concerning the role of the standard setter with the major 
two being as follows. The first refers to an aim to resolve conflicts between interest groups by 
attempting to build consensus. Alternatively, they are seen as “…partisan bodies acting for 
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the interest of the few groups embedded in their membership (e.g. large professional 
accounting firms and large multi-national companies).”54  
 
3.3: Models of Standard Setting (the Standard Setter) 
 
Generally, the literature abounds with models of the standard setting process which will be 
briefly discussed below. Most suggest the process is heavily predicated on the notion that 
accounting standards are determined by political outcomes rather than as the result of a 
technical or economic process. 
 
A commonly applied model considers the public interest in justifying its choice of standards. 
Herein, the standard setter appears benevolent in making decisions that are socially efficient, 
even if it is somewhat subjective in assuming a nexus between the promulgation of an 
accounting standard and the maximisation of social welfare. The pretext here is that 
accounting regulations are public goods and that either market failure, the under-production 
of such public goods or externalities exist within the current market. 
 
A second model considers the issue of regulatory capture and suggests the capture of the 
regulator by firms within that industry so that favourable standards are set for these firms. 
Within the Australian context, the work of Walker concerning the Australian Standards 
Review Board (ASRB) is instructive on this matter.55 
 
A third model discussed by Watts56 sees the development of accounting standards being the 
outcome of a market driven process wherein the outcome is a product of appeasing and 
incorporating both financial reporting objectives with market-based objectives. In this 
context, the setting of standards may reflect the interplay of political and special interest 
groups with the former reflecting legal, economic and social values and the latter lobbying 
for their own self-interest. 
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A fourth model entails the beliefs or ideologies of the standard setter that underpin their 
decisions. Such can be gleaned in this respect from the preference of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to maintain a rule-based approach over a principle-
based approach to setting accounting rules. The US experience tells much about the changes 
in the setting of accounting standards as they have moved over time from being an amalgam 
of best practice, towards being a regulatory driven process heavily predicated upon 
compliance.  
 
The best that can be said of these models is that given the complexities of the economic 
environment and its political landscape, no single fit would seem representative of current 
accounting standard setting institutions. To counter these problems, various researchers have 
attempted to investigate the issues that are present within standard setters’ agendas, even if 
this too shows scant respect to determining the influence of both formal and informal 
lobbying, specifically in terms of the political and economic forces at play. Although a little 
dated now, Beresford57, in discussing the balancing act in setting accounting standards, 
suggested the FASB consider four criteria when accepting projects for its agenda. These are 
the pervasiveness of the problem, the availability of alternative solutions, technical 
feasibility, and practical consequences. The then mission statement of the FASB considered 
two pertinent precepts. Firstly, to “…weigh carefully the view of its constituents in 
developing concepts and standards.”58 A clear distinction was afforded as to who the 
constituents were. “To improve standards of financial accounting and reporting for the 
guidance and education of the public including issuers, auditors and users of financial 
information.”59 The second precept entailed only setting accounting standards when their 
perceived benefits outweighed the perceived costs. In considering the difficulties faced by the 
standard setter, reference needs to be made to the difficulties associated with responsiveness 
to constituents’ views, maintaining consistency and balancing conceptual purity with 
practical considerations. 
 
These models aside, accounting standards and regulation generally seek to restrict the choice 
of accounting methods available to management and consequently, their impact often results 
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in widespread and significant social and economic implications for a range of stakeholders, 
who in turn then seek to influence legislative outcomes to their advantage.  
 
3.4: Models of Stakeholder Behaviour 
 
Two preeminent models are used to explain the behaviour of relevant stakeholders. ‘The 
Economics of Regulation’ attributed to Stigler60 and the ‘Theory of Economic Consequences’ 
attributed to Watts and Zimmerman.61 The former is predicated on the notion that regulation 
benefits those that are regulated and is often cited as an interest group capture theory in that 
proposed regulations are supplied to meet the demands of special interest groups who 
participate to improve or maintain their wealth position by attempting to influence the 
regulatory process. The latter theory of economic consequences is heavily predicated on the 
agency theory of Jensen and Meckling62 and its underlying precept is that accounting 
numbers find significance in the contracts entered between management and owners given 
the separation of resource ownership from control and the existence of bonding and 
monitoring costs associated with obtaining congruence between agents and their principals. 
 
The former economic theory of regulation is discussed here with the latter theory of 
economic consequences discussed later following an explanation of the political nature of 
accounting standards and how accounting standards are promulgated. An integral component 
in understanding standard setting is also understanding the economic theory of regulation. 
 
Gaffikin63 suggests that the ambit of mainstream economic theory rests in the many 
variations of economic theory, private interest theory, capture theory, special interest theory, 
and public choice theory. A core connection between these theories is the relationship they 
rely on between the assumptions of homo oeconomicus and catallactics. In the underpinning 
economic theory is also the overriding assumption that participants (actors) to the regulatory 
processes are utility maximisers. This is clear within public choice theory “…which stresses 
the extent to which governmental behaviour is understood by envisioning all actors as 
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rational individual maximisers of their own welfare.”64 Inherent within is the acceptance of 
the neo-classical assumption of self-interested rational choice which is then utilised to predict 
the behaviour of regulators/actors and as such it is highly predicated on serving private 
interests rather than the public interest.  
 
Without trying to cover all the variations between the clusters of economic theories, a short 
discourse on both capture theory and public choice theory should assist with the main 
attributes. Capture theory applies economic principles associated with individual wealth 
maximisation models to political behaviour to predict and understand political responses. In 
its simplest construct, capture theory is described as a situation over time when regulated 
industries or associations come to dominate regulatory agencies. It is premised on the 
influence of interest group behaviour and predicts that the ensuing struggle for influence will 
ultimately thwart or distort the regulation originally proposed in their favour. Posnor65 
identifies two flaws in capture theory. Firstly, he sees it as somewhat akin to much of public 
interest theory. Secondly, he considers that it focuses too much on only regulated interest 
groups, failing to account for other influences affecting the regulatory body. Both capture 
theory and public interest theory were perceived as failures due first to not considering 
explicitly the relationships between the participants (actors) in the regulatory process, and 
second, ignoring consideration of the “…mechanisms by which the acts of regulators are 
made to conform to the desires of organized subgroups.”66  
 
Now with a rationale in terms of economic theory, private interests are willing to expend 
resources in their efforts to persuade regulators to reach favourable outcomes. However, 
when considering collective action, problems are most efficiently overcome by small groups. 
Privileged and interest groups, such as professional associations, unions and industry cartels 
would organise and generate pressure to garner regulation that best served their interests. 
Posner saw the economic theory of regulation better placed to provide an understanding of 
the regulatory process. He suggests that it refined capture theory by downsizing the capture 
influence and replacing it by a less subjective, or more neutral, use of demand and supply.  
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One further insight into the intricacies of economic theory can be gleaned through public 
choice theory. Public choice theory finds most traction through the works of Buchanan and 
Tullock and particularly the journal ‘Public Choice’ which had its antecedents in the mid-
1960s. Buchanan suggests of public choice theory that it was politics without romance in that 
it provided a more skeptical view of what government and governors will do. Heavily 
predicated on the theory of market failure he believes it to be “…more consistent with the 
political reality that we all observe about us.”67 The dark side of public choice theory rests 
with the heavy reliance it attaches to the goals of legislators (regulators). Such emphasis 
places enormous weight on the self-preservation (job security) of administrators and as such 
public choice theory sees legislators (regulators) “…ever willing to meet the highest bidder’s 
regulatory demands.”68 Critics question this over emphasis on job security and suggest it to 
be implausible as the legislator’s only goal. Croley suggests that public choice theory 
standardised regulatory decision making within the confines of market decision making and 
as such: 
It treats legislative, regulatory, and electoral institutions as an economy in which the 
relevant actors – including ordinary citizens, legislators, agencies, and organised 
interest groups most affected by regulatory policies- exchange regulatory goods 
which are demanded and supplied according to the same basic principles governing 
the demand and supply of economic goods.69 
 
Difficulties arise in the alignment of regulatory decision making with market decision 
making. Croley sees regulatory decision making as all-or-nothing propositions that are more 
permanent than market place decisions and are collective decisions that are made 
simultaneously. Market place citizens on the other hand have choice in patronage and 
discretion of involvement. Croley suggests that “…because regulatory decisions are, relative 
to market decisions, infrequent, simultaneous and global, regulatory outcomes are 
undisciplined.”70 He suggests also that regulatory trades are entered into because they 
enhance the economic interest of both the private political interests of those supplying 
regulation and also the private economic interest of those demanding regulation. “The 
resources necessary to meet suppliers’ political needs constitute the ‘price’ of regulatory 
goods.”71 
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Levine and Forrence propose that a new post-revisionist notion has emerged in response to 
the inability of the above economic theories to consider the processes of politics adequately. 
That is, whilst economic theory might shed light on the incentives and motivation of 
participants (actors), outcomes to test motivations cannot be used “…if a given motivation 
does not reliably cause a given outcome.”72 This new post-revisionist perspective utilises 
economic behavioural assumptions incorporating both agency and information theory to 
assert how participants’ interests and concerns are precipitated by the political process into 
regulation or policy. Particularly pertinent is how these post-revisionist theories demonstrate 
how democratic governments allows many political actors, such as a regulator, to be free 
from oversight by either the public or those who answer to the public. 
 
Levine and Forrence also suggest that economic theories, and particularly the aspect of 
capture theory therein, has provided an important heuristic in helping to explain regulatory 
activity. Interestingly they pose the question of how to reconcile the useful attribute of 
capture with the persistence of the continued rhetoric of public interest and suggest such 
reconciliation is possible with a more complete understanding of the political economy of 
regulation. What is required is the assignment of public and private interests to relevant 
spheres of a new meta-theory. Such a theory would need to: 
Differentiate … not only between public and private interest, but also between 
regulatory policies and practices designed to pursue the other-regarding (public) 
interests of a general polity and those designed to advance the other-regarding 
(public) convictions of regulators themselves.73 
 
3.5: The Political Nature of Accounting Standard Setting 
 
In light of the aforementioned theories, various authors have discussed the political nature of 
accounting standard setting. Gerboth, for instance, suggested that “…politicization of 
accounting rule-making (is) not only inevitable, but just. In a society committed to 
democratic legitimization of authority, only politically responsible institutions have the right 
to command others to obey their rules.”74 Likewise, Solomons discribes the political nature of 
accounting standards as follows: 
Accounting can no longer be thought of as non-political. The numbers that 
accountants report have, or at least are widely thought to have, a significant impact 
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on economic behaviour. Accounting rules therefore affect human behaviour. Hence, 
the process by which they are made is said to be political. It is then only a short step 
to the assertion that such rules are properly to be made in the political arena.75  
 
 
Belkaoui76 identifies the period that has developed since the mid-1970s as being overly 
political in nature. Mathews and Perera argue that numbers in the financial statements have 
“a social impact because they affect the expectations and behaviors of many people … what 
accountants do and fail to do, is … of interest to the public.”77 May and Sundem identify a 
social welfare aspect of accounting reports and suggest that the standard setters should 
“…consider explicitly political (i.e. social welfare) aspects as well as accounting theory and 
research in its decisions.”78 Likewise, Mautz79 sees accounting standards as being social 
agreements and only effective to the degree in which they are acceptable to the majority. 
Horngren suggests that the development of accounting standards is as much “…the product 
of political action as of flawless logic or empirical findings. Why? Because the setting of 
standards is a social decision.”80 
 
Further to Gerboth’s perspective on democratic legitimisation of authority81, Mautz argues 
that “…accounting legislators have to learn to develop and maintain a broad point of view. It 
is not enough to be an expert accountant. They must be expert accountants with an 
appreciation of the environment in which accounting functions and of the impact that 
accounting decisions have on that environment.”82 However, Forgarty, Hussein and Kertz 
suggest there to be “…great confusion about the role of politics in accounting standard setting 
despite broad tactic awareness that the process is political”83 and suggest that a lack of 
accounting doctrine has allowed accounting to become political. Georgiou further suggests 
that the standard setting process followed (i.e. due process) could not be pluralistic because:   
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The process is seen as designed to promote the interests of a few powerful interest 
groups (e.g. large accounting firms and large companies) to the detriment of the 
interests of other groups (e.g. employees and the society in general).84  
 
Consequently, accounting standards for the most part, have an impact on wealth distributions 
by precluding or imposing procedures or policies available to management. As a result, it is 
not unsurprising that the development and setting of accounting standards resonates within a 
political environment given certain standards would be supported by those perceiving it to be 
beneficial and unsupported if otherwise.   
 
3.6: The Economic Consequences of Accounting Standards 
 
Implicit within the contextual meaning of politics within the standard setting environment is 
an appreciation that the process must defer to procedures that incorporate notions of 
consensus development, which considers matters such as socialisation, participation and 
efficacy. Fogarty, Hussein and Ketz suggest that “…the emergence of a broad range of 
political factors in standard setting derived from the recent recognition of the importance of 
the economic consequences as (resulting from the) reallocative outcomes of accounting rules, 
and hence form the central political outcome.”85 Zeff believes economic consequences to be 
“…the impact of accounting reports on the decision-making behavior of business, 
government, unions, investors and creditors.”86 He further suggests; 
 
That the resulting behavior of these individuals and groups could be detrimental to 
the interests of other affected parties. And, the argument goes accounting standard 
setters must take into consideration these allegedly detrimental consequences when 
deciding on accounting questions.87 
 
Zeff identifies several reasons for the rise of economic consequences. First, has been the 
emergence of society wishing to hold organisations responsible for the social, economic and 
environmental consequences of their actions. Second, a realisation that outsiders could 
influence the outcome of accounting decisions. Accounting standards have had a huge impact 
on key financial variables and the intractability of economic consequences within the current 
standard setting arrangements is evident under the guise of costs versus benefits within the 
Australian Conceptual Framework’s Statement of Accounting Concepts 3. In the process of 
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setting standards, standard setters seek to consider all costs and benefits in relation to 
financial reporting generally and not just as they pertain to individual reporting entities. 
 
Despite strong suggestions by authors such as Beaver,88 Hawkins,89 and May and Sundem90 
for standard setters to consider economic consequences, Collett argues that whether the 
accounting standard setters should be required to consider the economic consequences of 
their decision remains a contentious issue, due particularly to the trade-off association with 
recognising economic consequences to the detriment of following the more desirable 
qualitative characteristics of financial information espoused under the Conceptual Framework 
being developed by the standard setters.91 Likewise, Collet questions the problematic nature 
of assessing the impact that a potential standard could have on the efficiency of resource 
allocation let alone the ability of standard setters to provide criteria from which conflicting 
economic consequences could be balanced against each other. Moreover, authors such as 
Solomons argue that irrespective of whether there is a recognition of the political nature of 
accounting, this does not necessarily result in an acceptance of such a situation.92  
 
Prior to considering economic consequences, for the most part accounting had been examined 
and understood in its relationship to capitalism, industrialisation or ownership. Stewart 
suggests that this is a limited view, which did not consider that “…the emergence and 
functioning of accounting in its various contexts was a complex phenomenon due to the 
interplay of many different influences.”93 Consequently, the acceptance of the rational 
underpinning economic consequences saw an emerging recognition of the behavioural 
implications of accounting numbers. Implicit in this recognition of the behavioural 
implications of accounting numbers is that they have imposed themselves as an instrument of 
social control. 
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3.7: The Behavioural Implications of Accounting and Accounting Standards 
 
Rappaport identifies the behavioural impact of accounting standards quite succinctly: 
Information prepared in accordance with standards affects the behaviour of the 
intended recipients of financial reports such as shareholders and other investors, 
whose decisions, for example, influence security prices and therefore affect the 
wealth of market participants. The information also affects the behaviour of "free 
riders" such as unions, competitors, suppliers and customers for whom reports are 
not primarily intended but who nevertheless have access to them. Finally, standards 
affect the behaviour of the managers of reporting entities. For example, they may 
alter their investment strategies in anticipation of an adverse reaction to information 
that will have to be supplied to comply with a new standard.94 
In this respect, accounting is perceived as “…a way of intervening, a device for acting upon 
activities, individuals and objects in such a way that the world may be transformed.”95 
Chambers identifies accounting as “…an instrument … for making clear and precise some 
feature of objects and events.”96 In this context accounting is seen to give selective visibility 
to organisational outcomes and actions and plays an important role in influencing what comes 
to be seen as possible, problematic, desirable and significant. Moreover, accounting is seen as 
being able to create varying directions of social and organisational functioning through its 
ability to emphasise the particular. Accounting is seen as shaping organisational reality 
through its ability to highlight selected paths and take account of selective consequences. In 
this light, accounting has the potential to create seemingly specific and precise quantitative 
facts that differentiate between what is beneficial, costly and of value. 
 
Giovannoni, Maraghini and Riccoboni argue that accounting has influenced the very structure 
of organisations by setting “…values and ideals concerning what ought to count, what ought 
to happen, and what is thought to be important, while providing the moral underpinning for 
power and relationships of dependence and autonomy within the organisation.”97 
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3.8: The Notion of Neutrality  
 
Professional leaders such as Armstrong, Kirk and Wyatt suggest that the setting of accounting 
standards should be insulated from such politics thus alluding to an idea of neutrality. 
Consequently, an acceptance of recognising economic consequences impedes upon the notion 
of providing neutral information. 
 
Ensconced within the rhetoric of standard setting, the standard setters have perhaps implied 
the adoption of neutrality in formulating and implementing accounting standards and to this 
position have subordinated the effects of economic consequences these standards may 
produce. Arguments for this approach rest on an attempt to isolate the process from the 
political aims of government institutions and from the lobbying of special interest groups.98 
This approach though raises several contentious issues. First, it is questionable that a course 
of neutrality does not have economic consequences and second it would appear to be a 
haphazard approach not to be directly influenced by “…concerns over the unintended 
economic effects of their rules.”99 
 
The underlying tenet of this debate sits between views which express the subjectivity of 
accounting as opposed to a more objective outlook. Morgan presumes a subjective posture in 
that accountants and accountings are constructions of reality.100 Hines supports this precept 
arguing along lines of reality construction wherein “…in communicating reality, we construct 
it;”101 that is, rather than a science, accounting is a craft or art practised by people. Solomons 
took a more objective perspective by arguing that accountants should be more like reporters 
with accounting reports more attuned to that of a newspaper: report what is happening instead 
of building it to be the reality and in this respect, he advocated the need for both neutrality 
and impartiality of accounting standards and particularly that they should be unbiased and 
help produce insights or maps of economic reality.102 
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Chairpersons from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Schapiro, Hills, Pitt and 
Ruder), FASB (Herz) and the IASB (Tweedie) have in various public comments made 
remarks along the lines “…that the accounting standard setting process should and must be 
insulated from the lobbying of special interest groups and the meddling of government 
institutions.”103 Albrecht suggests that the underlying premise argued in favour of such an 
insulation posits on the following four attributes: 
1. Accounting standards are designed to benefit all users and interests. 
2. There is a best accounting rule for every occasion. 
3. Accounting standards are economically neutral. 
4. Selecting accounting standards because of their economic impact is “the devil’s work.”104 
 
Albrecht’s critique of this provides a subtle but insightful dialogue on these issues. The 
FASB stated that “…the benefit from financial reporting lies in its ability to make a positive 
difference in reaching decisions”105 and particularly “…setting accounting standards involves 
making a choice among alternatives, each of which has a unique mix of perceived costs and 
benefits. Those perceived costs and benefits reflects judgments about the consequences of 
each accounting alternative, and, like all evaluations, judgements will vary from one observer 
to the next.”106 
 
Albrecht questions the fundamental issues of neutrality and the subjugation of economic 
consequences. Firstly, he argues that accounting standards do not equally benefit all affected 
parties and secondly, all accounting standards have an economic consequence. On the former, 
he suggests that given the inherent disparity between producers and consumers of financial 
information (i.e. “…metaphorically speaking, investors want an open window into the 
corporation, corporate executives want a closed door”107) it is not possible for both parties to 
be simultaneous winners in such a zero-sum game. On the latter, he suggests that the very 
decisions made from the use of financial information are themselves economic consequences 
and that given the persuasive nature of human communication, unbiased facts do not exist. In 
this respect different perspectives are derived from different vantage points. 
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As a qualitative characteristic of financial information identified under Statement of 
Accounting Concepts (SAC3), neutrality has been defined under the Conceptual Framework 
in terms of providing information that should be free from bias. Collett suggests that the 
SAC3 neutrality definition implies that financial reports should not be presented in a way that 
is designed to generate particular behaviour in the users of the reports. Rather, it would be 
better if the ethical responsibilities of the standards setter were explicitly identified. 
Solomons sees it as “…perfectly proper for measurements to be selected with particular 
political ends in mind or to be adapted to a particular end if it is made clear to users of the 
measurement what is being done.”108 Collett however felt such an admission would be self-
defeating for the standard setter to do so given they would then have to defend measurement 
issues which have for the most part been both problematic and decisive.  
 
Bednar and Welch suggest that if “…designers were able to exclude bias from informing 
systems then this would maximize their effectiveness.”109 They described the notion of bias 
as subjective descriptions intended to mislead to achieve a certain perspective. Objectivity or 
attempting to be transparent or neutral, on the other hand, was regarded as being free of bias. 
They suggest that claims of objectivity presuppose an understanding that any inherent 
subjective values or variables have been considered. Moreover, when such claims are made, 
they rarely include efforts in making the subjective bias transparent. Consequently, while 
claims of objectivity may be regarded as a denial of bias, overt attempts to admit subjectivity 
can introduce bias. 
 
If the focus of accounting is to provide information in a form that maximises effectiveness, 
the concept of bias may significantly vary between an understanding of what is meant by 
‘effectiveness’ and ‘providing information.’ For example, from a logical empiricist 
perspective (which mainly connotes the influence of denotational (naming) features of 
language), messages transmitted need only to be decoded to transfer information. The focus 
would emphasise technical constructs concerned with the coding, decoding and transmission 
of the message. Alternatively, from a hermeneutic dialectic perspective, in which mainly 
connotational (association) features are deemed to be more significant, a technical focus 
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would be inadequate, with meaning being determined by the extent to which the message or 
communication seeks to align individuals with the context of the message. 
 
Historically, an inherent notion of neutrality had been assumed to offset the overtones of 
political bias within the development of accounting policies and practice. To confer the 
accounting profession with a perceived legitimacy as Hines suggests, underlying the 
provision of applying accounting information is an idea that events and transactions should 
faithfully represent what they are, and should be both neutral and verifiable. Zeff sees this 
assumed neutrality as being inherently encompassed within accounting policy; it was 
“…assumed to be neutral in its effects or, if not neutral, it was not held out to the public as 
being responsible for those effects.”110  
 
Cooper and Shearer argue for the recognition of an explicit political economy of accounting 
suggesting “…social welfare is likely to be improved if accounting practices are recognised 
as being consistently partial; that the strategic outcomes of accounting practices consistently 
(if not invariably) favor specific interests in society and disadvantage others.”111 Hines argues 
that reconciling neutrality with reality was problematic given the conflicting interests and 
views of stakeholder irrespective of the diligence and expertise applied in developing 
accounting rules. Therefore, to remain politically viable the processes of the regulator must 
be seen to be, and be, neutral and if not then at least “…the process that gave rise to the issue 
of regulation must, at least, be seen to be neutral.”112 Stakeholder participation in the process 
was not to be purely symbolic but to also have the ability to directly influence the process 
outcome. 
 
Solomon suggests there are few areas of human knowledge that are devoid of political 
significance, arguing that given this position accounting must seek to be neutral. He believes 
that information would not be relied upon unless it could be neutral stating “…if it ever 
become accepted that accounting may be used to achieve other than purely measurement 
ends, faith in it would be destroyed.”113 This aside, he was not proposing that accounting 
standards could ever be neutral per se, trades-offs between differing preferences and among 
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alternative consequences could not be avoided – some would be granted preference, others 
not. Rather he saw neutrality within the accounting setting as implying representational 
accuracy or faithfulness. 
 
Modern accounting has mostly avoided the term truth in favour of an idea of faithful 
representation. Collett suggests that this emanates from the notion that perhaps truth “…is too 
vague and subjective to have operational usefulness in the context of accounting.”114 Gerboth 
considers it a somewhat “…naïve notion that accounting is a search for a unique truth.”115 
Buckley suggests that the development of accounting policy was hampered to the extent that 
policy makers groped “…for truth when none exists.”116 
 
Russell considers that the most common view of truth is that it consists “in some form of 
correspondence between belief and fact.”117 Likewise Devitt sees something as true to the 
extent it corresponded to the reality or to the facts.118 Rorty argues that the starting point to 
understand the state of the accounting in contemporary society is to “…realize that ‘truth’ is 
not found but made.”119 Further, McIntosh notes that: “Scientists, for example, do not 
discover the truth, rather they invent and create narrative descriptions of the physical world 
which are, nonetheless, useful for predicting, controlling (and also even destroying) the 
natural world.”120 
  
Pollock agrees suggesting about accounting truth that “it is never, and never can be, simply 
the facts.”121 Rather those facts, and the result of those facts are the produce and outcome of a 
theory. Of these theories, he suggests that, “they are debated for many years without a clear 
demonstration of being correct;”122 … “they are like neither the mathematical nor the logical 
proofs, nor like the results of scientific experiments” … “[making] them intellectually 
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intriguing (at least to some of us) and apt to inspire ardent advocacy and opposition, as well 
as leaving them subject to volatile fashion.”123 
 
The dilemma facing the standard setter of the overall implications of politicisation, neutrality 
and participation was well recognised in the deliberation of the Financial Accounting 
Foundation’s ‘The Structure of Establishing Financial Accounting Standards’, in that: 
The process of setting accounting standards can be described as democratic 
because, like all rules-making bodies, the Board’s rights to make rules depends 
ultimately on the consent of the ruled. But because standards’ setting requires some 
perspective, it would not be appropriate to establish a standard based solely on a 
canvass of the constituents. Similarly, the process can be described as legislative 
because it must be deliberative and all views must be heard. But the standard setters 
are expected to represent the entire constituency as a whole and not be described as 
political because there is an educational effort involved in getting a new standard 
accepted. But it is not political effort involved in getting a new standard accepted. 
But it is not political in the sense that an accommodation is required to get a 
statement issued.124 
 
Particularly pertinent is an understanding of the perspective embedded in this statement and 
some understanding of how this perspective is now accommodated with the accounting 
standard setting process; that is, to glean and understanding of whose perspective. 
Consequently, the discussion in Chapter Four seeks to illuminate the nature of economic 
individualism and how it is now the core attribute in determining the common good.  
 
3.9: Chapter Summary 
 
Given the economic consequences associated with the outcomes of accounting standards, it is 
not surprising that their promulgation resonates within a political environment in which both 
private interests and the public good may clash. There will need to be a conduit for resolving 
these tensions and consequently there will need to be an arbitrator and a means of 
accommodating participation, these being the standard setter and a due process. 
 
This chapter has examined the political nature of accounting standard setting, the arbitrator 
(standard setter) and considered models of both standard setting and models of how 
stakeholders behave in such an environment. It has considered the inherent biases of both the 
standard setter and relevant stakeholders, and considered how standards which have 
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economic consequences can also be attributed a notion of neutrality. It was hoped through 
this discussion to describe the dilemma facing the standard setter of the implications for 
politicalisation, neutrality and participation in setting accounting standards. Further, it also 
hoped to provide an understanding of the economic, political and behavioural perspectives of 
those stakeholders and participants. The principles which the standard setters have used as 
guides to address any dilemmas that emerge is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Economic Principles to Accounting Standards 
 
4.1: Economic Individualism and the Public (Common) Good  
 
The shifting nature of due process, as historically recognized, needs to be reconfigured in 
light of the paradigm shift associated with the rise of economic individualism and its 
influence on the public interest and public (common) good. Hazlitt defines this shift as the 
“central sophism of the new economics” where the focus is “…on the short-run effects of 
policies on special groups … [which] … ignore(s) or belittle the long-run effects on the 
community as a whole.”125 The rise of ‘new economic’ individualism finds significant 
traction as it relates to government direct legislation, delegated rule-making and the role of 
the private sector in public policy. Economic individualism is often cited as a key component 
in the support of laissez-faire and capitalist ideals which in themselves support the notion of a 
limited role of government influence in the economy. 
 
The rise of new economics with its philosophy of economic individualism has resulted in the 
pervasive influence of NPM in public management. NPM gives precedent to the market and 
supports the achievement of public ends through the use of market-related approaches to 
governance. The more recent construct of Managing Publicness (MP) focuses more broadly 
on integrating public value into both management and policy which entails the principle of 
managing for citizens, not customers. Bozeman delineates the difference between NPM and 
MP as follows: 
NPM moves from theory to prescription to action; Managing Publicness moves 
from problem specification (public value failure) to action (pursuit of public value) 
to provisional theory (context-specific concept of the public interest).126 
 
One way to make these differences clear is to examine the arguments for both in light of the 
notion of public interest. Bozeman suggests that a “…pragmatic public interest is about 
deliberation, fairness and the discovery of the public interest, a process begun with a public 
problem or public value pursuit.”127 NPM has been widely characterised as a marketised 
approach, signifying market-orientated governance, undertaken by government in its 
provision of services, which embraces the role of government as being a facilitator of public 
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services, rather than a direct or sole provider. The market theoretic of NPM is premised upon 
the ideal of perfectly competitive markets and utilises performance and efficiency values 
when attempting to measure problems such as market failures. NPM in its myriad guises 
gives little recognition to accountability and even less to fairness, by any definition. In 
contrast, MP in its quest for public values, fashions public interest into its search for 
solutions. What then are public values? 
A society's ‘public values’ are those providing normative consensus about (a) the 
rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be 
entitled; (b) the obligations of citizens to society, the state, and one another; and (c) 
the principles on which governments and policies should be based.128  
 
To enable further elucidation on these matters, the next three sections delineate the construct 
and changing evolution and devolution of individualism. First, the historically construed 
nature of individualism in relation to united pursuits of bodies like the accountancy 
profession is considered. Second, individualism in the modern meaning of economics is 
discerned. Finally, the modern meaning of economic individualism as discerned by 
mainstream economics under the banner of ‘new economics’ is considered. 
 
4.2: Historical Individualism 
 
The central tenet of this discussion begins with an understanding of how self-interest and 
individualism manifest themselves in civil society. A first reference of individualism would 
be that referred to by Alexis de Tocqueville who describes it as “…a calm and considered 
feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and 
withdraw into the circle of family and friends.”129 Historically, in this respect he sees self-
interest properly understood as a mostly positive force which prompts individuals to work 
together in common to combat the tyranny of the majority. Alternatively, he considers 
unenlightened self-interest in the negative as it alludes to a selfishness that seeks self-
advantage at the expense of others. Contextually, de Tocqueville when writing his 
‘Democracy in America’ was in America at a time of growing antagonism between private 
bodies (associations) wishing to pursue their own private ends, and public authorities. Sievers 
suggests that de Tocqueville’s view on individualism was somewhat altruistic in that he 
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considered “…autonomous private citizens acting together in voluntary associations 
dedicated to public purposes.”130  
 
Important here is the connection he makes between private interests and the general good: 
The principle of this one seems to be to make private interest harmonise with the 
general interest. A sort of refined and intelligent selfishness seems to be the pivot on 
which the whole machine works. These people here do not trouble themselves to 
find out whether public virtue is good, but they do claim to prove that it is useful.131 
Since de Tocqueville, a plethora of authors have proposed various definitions of 
individualism. These authors include Emile Durkheim, Herbert Spencer, Immanuel Kant, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, Geoffrey de Mandeville, David Hume, Adam Smith and 
Edmund Burke. For ease of comparison with de Tocqueville, the work of Austrian economist 
Frederick Hayek provides further insights. Hayek distinguishes between true and false 
individualism. True individualism for Hayek has two principle notions. Firstly, he refutes 
individualism as being concerned with self-contained or isolated individuals but rather that 
individuality is referenced to man’s nature and character as postulated within their existence 
within society. Here, “…true individualism is one of humility towards the processes by which 
mankind has achieved things which have not been designed or understood by any individual 
and are indeed greater than individual minds.”132  
 
Garrett elaborates this theme and suggests that “…the great theme of true individualism is 
that in the spontaneous collaboration of many free minds there is a mysterious creative power 
far greater than the power in any individual mind.”133 Intuitively here Hayek clarifies what he 
sees as the misconception associated with Smith’s “economic man’ (homo economicus). 
Smith’s two major works ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ and ‘The Wealth of Nations’ lend 
guidance here as the former denotes at the heart of the Smithian economy certain propensities 
of the human nature whereas the latter derives it dynamics from self-interest. Hayek agrees 
with the former view of the propensities of human nature over the rational behaviour usually 
associated with the concept of homo economicus. At issue here is the assumption that a self-
interested, rational being will maximise his or her utility and that individuals seek “to attain 
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very specific and predetermined goals to the greatest extent with the least possible cost.”134 In 
this light, Hayek suggests that Smith’s main concern was “…not so much with what man 
might occasionally achieve when he was at his best but that he should have as little 
opportunity as possible to do harm when he is at his worst.”135 Garrett further elaborates on 
this theme and suggests a setting: 
Under which bad men can do least harm. It is a social system which does not 
depend for its functioning on our finding good men for running it, or on all men 
becoming better than they now are, but which makes use of men in all their given 
variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, sometimes intelligent 
and more often stupid. Their aim was a system under which it should be possible to 
grant freedom to all, instead of restricting it136 
Hayek writes from within an anti-rationalistic setting which views man as being irrational 
rather than rational, fallible and not so intelligent and whose individual errors are corrected 
by a society trying to do best with imperfect material.  
 
Secondly, Hayek suggests that true individualism requires a system premised upon principles. 
Herein he questions the legitimacy of expedience over principle and how the interests of 
society can be legitimised under the guise of expediency. For Hayek, true individualism held 
little regard for equalitarian traits:  
If all men were completely equal in their gifts and inclinations, we should have to 
treat them differently in order to achieve any sort of social organisation. 
Fortunately, they are not equal; and it is only owing to this that the differentiation of 
functions need not be determined by the arbitrary decision of some organizing will 
but that, after creating formal equality of the rules applying in the same manner to 
all, we can leave each individual to find his own level … There is all the difference 
in the world between treating people equally and attempting to make them equal.137 
 
False individualism, on the other hand, was flawed to the extent of its equalitarian pedigree 
and more importantly its “…exaggerated belief in the powers of individual reason.”138 Under 
such a rationalistic approach, Hayek questions its failure to accommodate the unpredictability 
of man’s nature. 
 
For further clarity of the concept of individualism the works of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes 
and Samuel von Pufendorf are instructive. Locke believes that man has inalienable rights 
associated with the right to life, liberty, property and the right to rebel against unjust rulers 
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and laws. In his ‘Second Treatise of Civil Government’ Locke argues that men are born free 
and equal. “Man is free and in this condition, all men are equal.”139 Rommenn suggests that 
the Hobbesian view saw, “Man in the depths of his being is what the state of nature shows 
him to be: a wolf, wicked, devoted solely to self. In the state of nature, consequently, there 
exist only lawless individuals, in whom is found no natural tendency to live in society.”140 
Much like the views Plato and Aristotle had in antiquity, Hobbes sees individualism needing 
to be fettered by the state and so proposed the social contract which would deliver order. 
Pufendorf considers man as not being essentially social and would only develop socially if it 
was advantageous to do so.  
 
This idea would later inherit a utilitarian interpretation through the works of Thomasious and 
his pupil, Heineccius. “Do that which makes human life as long-lasting and happy as 
possible, and avoid that which makes life unhappy and hastens death”141 In expanding on this 
view Rommen suggests that “It is no longer sociality … that is the source of natural law, but 
rather … it is the happiness of the individual. Instead, the forms of community life appear as, 
not as essential perfections of man.”142 Immanuel Kant would later exhort individualism to its 
greatest height in setting freedom of the individual as the starting point of his system. 
“Liberty or autonomy is the sole right that belongs originally to every man in virtue of his 
humanity.”143 
 
Two points of clarity need to be expressed at this point. First, within this context, the 
purported meanings of these texts need to be considered in light of the two broader principles 
that occupied the era. These being the issues of the best form of the state and the extent of 
state powers. Consequently, discussion about individualism was inherently rationalised in 
terms of the national interest being seen as a whole and that all individuals had similar or the 
same major interests. Moreover, for them all, the important matter was to determine “…a 
terrestrial origin for governmental authority.”144 
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Second, modern literature and its extent of investigation into these classical pieces have for 
the most part classified the protagonists within the confines of positivism or metaphysics, 
although reinterpretation is not without favour in many instances. However, such 
classification rarely implies the expediency of their philosophies to incorporate elements of 
both. Russell gives a rather good account of this.  
Locke is as a rule, contemptuous of metaphysics. Apropos of some speculation of 
Leibniz’s he writes to a friend: ‘You and I have had enough of this kind of fiddling.’ 
The conception of substance, which was dominant in the metaphysics of the time, 
he considers vague and not useful, but he does not venture to reject it wholly.145 
 
Additionally, this metaphysical pragmatism is noted by Locke when commenting on political 
power: “…and all this only for the public good”146, yet he never questioned who was to 
determine what the public good was. One could surmise from his writings that he meant the 
majority of citizens, even if we consider a Hobbesian approach it would have been by 
sovereignty. Common among Locke, Hobbes and Pufendorf was an implied reasoning of the 
equality of individuals albeit justified within a bourgeois context of property rights and 
divisions of labour which for the most part alienated the poor. Rousseau rebutted the 
propositions of Locke, Hobbes and Pufendorf in his ‘Discourse on Inequality’ arguing 
instead that “man is naturally good, and only by institutions is he made bad … man is born 
free and everywhere he is in chains.”147 Unlike Hobbes, who saw the signing of the social 
contract as providing absolute power to the sovereign in return for protection, Rousseau saw 
such a relationship as voluntary slavery. He suggests that the social contract as applied within 
a Hobbesian context was devised to “…preserve the estates of some persons at the expense of 
others.”148 Wokler contextualizes Rousseau’s view in the following manner: 
By their own agreement, the poor (that is, the great majority of persons) would have 
been required to repudiate their right to share the wealth which men of property 
enjoyed, with the effect that in exchange for peace and the protection of their 
live.149  
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In effect, this ‘social contract’ can be summarised by the statement: “All ran 
headlong to their chains, believing they had secured their liberty.”150 
The idea of the social contract perhaps needs some elucidation here given its construction 
within the concept of political legitimacy. Particularly, why individuals would consent to the 
will of political authority and transfer their natural freedoms voluntarily in exchange for 
benefits from that political authority. In antiquity a fabric of the social contract can be seen in 
Socrates acceptance of his death due to his “…overwhelming obligation to obey the laws (of 
the state) because they had made his entire way of life, and even the extent of his very 
existence, possible.”151  
 
Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and 
Immanuel Kant were the pre-eminent post-Renaissance and age of Enlightenment theorists of 
natural rights and the social contract. Although all differed, the preamble to their focus was 
posited in a heuristic examination premised upon the individuality of man and how their 
actions are bound by their personal conscience and power only. More importantly, their 
theories offered a means of explaining the obligations of citizens (subjects) and the origin of 
government. 
 
Social contract theory emanated from a first proposition that man lived in a state of nature, 
without government, authority or laws to regulate them. To overcome associated oppression 
and hardships they entered into the agreements of pactum unionis and pactum subjecticus.  
Firstly, pactum unionis entails the formation of a society where people, in exchange for 
protection of property and life, undertook responsibilities to respect each other and live in 
peace and harmony. The second, pactum subjecticus sees people uniting with each other and 
surrendering all or part of their rights and freedoms with a pledge to obey an authority that 
offered protection of life, property and certain liberties. 
In other words, to ensure their escape from the State of Nature, they must both agree 
to live together under common laws, and create an enforcement mechanism for the 
social contract and the laws that constitute it.152 
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This enforcement mechanism is clearly evident within the view of the social contract 
espoused by Rousseau. (The social contract) “…act(s) of association create(s) a moral and 
collective body, which is called the ‘State’ when passive, the ‘Sovereign’ when active and a 
‘Power’ in relation to other bodies like itself.”153 (Here Sovereign does not refer to 
government but to the general will). More importantly, however, is that “…each of us puts 
his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will.”154  
 
Russell interprets Rousseau’s idea of the general will as not being identical to the will of the 
majority, nor the will of the citizens taken as a whole, but as a concept relating to the views 
of the body politic. Metaphysically, obedience to the general will implies obedience to a 
concept of common good: 
The conception in Rousseau's mind seems to be this: every man's political opinion 
is governed by self-interest, but self-interest consists of one of two parts which is 
peculiar to the individual, while the other is common to all the members of the 
community. If the citizens have no opportunity of striking logrolling bargains with 
each other, their individual interests, being divergent, will cancel out, and there will 
be left a resultant which will represent their common interest; this resultant is the 
general will.155 
 
What can be gleaned from this short discourse on historical individualism is a perceived 
dualism that self-interest is the cotton which binds together the fabric of the common good; 
particularly that individuals recognise a desired or favourable outcome and share a united 
pursuit which they are prepared to subjugate some of their personal self-interest to in 
achieving.  
 
The following discussion contained within the next few sections attempt to discern how the 
aforementioned threads of self-interest have been loosening over time. The discussion itself is 
designed to provide an overview of the hybrid nature of individualism and how the 
machinations of the new economic age have separated along lines of individual freedom and 
state intervention. In particular, it identifies the individual as an economic individual and the 
constraints and pursuits of that individual are the product of a market environment. 
Moreover, the discussion reveals a fragmenting of the common good in that the pursuits of 
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the economic individual are now justified by differing ideologies associated with the various 
nuances of shifting relations between the state, economy and capitalism. 
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4.3: The Hybrid Nature of Individualism 
 
Individualism is a philosophical and economic philosophy that posits the individual as the 
major agent in driving socio-political, economic and cultural dynamics. Since the 
Enlightenment, several major variations have appeared in the contexts of classical liberalism, 
libertarianism, neo-liberalism and the latter neo-conservatism, which are briefly described 
here.  
 
Liberalism 
 
In an economic sense, liberalism promotes and supports laissez-faire economics and the 
notion of private property in the means of production. It is dualist in nature in that it sees 
political and social freedom inseparable from economic freedom. Fundamentally it is 
premised upon both the self-interest (invisible hand) theory of Adam Smith and self-
organisation (spontaneous order) that without restrictions or state interference the best results 
will be produced, i.e. spontaneous emergence of order out of seeming chaos. Smith’s ideas 
sat within three major tenets Firstly, man being rational seeks maximum satisfaction of their 
economic wants. Secondly, for man to achieve the aforementioned satisfaction he is 
possessed of a superhuman power (invisible hand / natural law) and thirdly the consequences 
of man’s efforts result in a satisfactory outcome. (“A harmonious natural order.”156)  
 
Concerning its political or social attributes, Baggini suggests that “…liberalism allows 
humans to flourish to their full potential, by maximising (their) our capacity to enjoy freedom 
of choice.”157 In this respect society is seen as comprised of individuals, whose liberty is seen 
as the fundamental social good and any intrusion by government to restrict that liberty should 
be condemned.  
 
Baggini lends succinct clarity to this: 
People should not be forced to do things against their will for the common good. 
Nor should they be forced to do things for their own good if they don't want to. Nor 
should someone be forced to do something just because it is in the interests of a 
ruling class that they do it.158 
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Mills, in ‘On Liberty’, encapsulated that “…the only purpose for which power can be rightly 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.”159 The condition of no harm sits comfortably with most libertarian thought although 
several strands of libertarian thought have now been evoked such as monarchists and 
anarchists.  
 
Libertarianism 
 
Libertarianism finds its roots in liberalism and is often portrayed as being a fundamentally 
more extreme form of classical liberalism. Both were considered to be closely aligned until 
the late 19th century when liberalism shifted more towards greater state intervention to 
guarantee social justice. It is a political philosophy that holds at its core the primacy of 
political freedom and individual liberty. Along the spectrum there are extreme libertarians 
who believe that “…no state whatever can be legitimate, and that we are not obliged to obey 
any authority to which we have not given our actual … consent.”160 Alternatively, Long sees 
libertarianism as “…any political position that advocates a radical redistribution of power 
from the coercive state to voluntary associations of free individuals … whether voluntary 
association takes the form of the free market or of communal co-operatives.”161 
 
Criticism of minimal state theories depends on four undefined conditions within the theories. 
Firstly, the unparalleled degree of individual liberty that a minimal state would need to 
respect. Secondly, the extensive degree to which the population mutually respects each 
other’s liberty. Thirdly, a lack of consideration of how a minimal state can come to be and 
fourthly they ignore discussion on how power relationships impact on the state.162  
 
Neo-Liberalism 
 
Neo-liberalism is a modern concept that emerged during the 20th century as a movement that 
sought to reject the 19th and 20th century orthodoxies of liberalism. Whilst sharing a political 
philosophy with libertarianism, neo-liberalism was premised intensively upon economic 
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consequences. In its earliest manifestation, neo-liberalists sought recourse to unfettered 
capitalism and favoured a third or middle way between that unfettered capitalism and the 
classical liberalist doctrine of laissez-faire. Neo-liberalists were seen as promoting social 
market economies which envisaged “…government provision of welfare and educational 
services which are intended to make it possible for every member of society to participate 
fully in the advantages of the market economy.”163  
 
Shifting connotations of the term over the past four decades have seen the notion described 
negatively. Its new meaning resonates within a context of economic liberalism which heavily 
favours free markets and private ownership of property and fervently prescribes that 
economies should be organised around the individual. One possible explanation for neo-
liberalism lies in the prevalent contemporary acceptance of the dominance of the free market 
doctrine and the decline of available alternatives and the dismissal of political alternatives, as 
undemocratic. Brown suggests that “…as neo-liberalism converts every political or social 
problem into market terms, it converts them into individual problems with market 
solutions.”164 As well she considers that “as neo-liberalism produces a citizen on the model 
of entrepreneur and consumer, it simultaneously makes citizens available to extensive 
governance and heavy administrative authority.”165 
 
Neo-Conservatism 
 
Neo-conservatism is best understood as a loose coterie of politicians and intellectuals whose 
empathies lie “…on familiar themes of social cohesion and stability, national integrity and 
purpose.”166 At best it can be seen to provide a go-between in the context of capitalism and 
the welfare state. For the most part, neo-conservatives, whilst not tied to the apron strings of 
capitalism and economic affairs tend to defend it “…as an imperfect but manageable system 
which promotes or at least allows democratic forms.”167 What then does the portrait of the 
hybrid individual, with a self-interest predicated on market principles and outcomes look 
like? Most notable at first would be a canvas background permeated by the new age 
schematic of economics. 
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4.4: Mainstream Economics 
 
At the heart of these debates is the emergence and acceptance of economics as the core 
significant societally-based discipline. Lionel Robbins defined economics as “…the 
phenomena of the exchange economy itself can only be explained by going behind such 
relationships and invoking the operation of those laws of choice which are best seen when 
contemplating the behavior of the isolated individual.”168 Hutton argues that this 
individualistic choice-centric approach has dominated public policy post-World War Two, 
yet “the attempt to isolate economics from other disciplines – notably politics, history, 
philosophy, finance constitutional theory and sociology – has fatally disabled its power to 
explain what is happening in the world.”169 As a result of this individualistic approach, 
mainstream economics is what Hazlitt calls “new economics”.170 The focus is on short-run 
effects of public policies and their impacts on special (or group), while placing much less 
emphasis (or ignoring) the long-run community effects.171 In this setting, Samuelson would 
suggest economics was not a science. Hazlitt perhaps puts this definitional aspect of 
mainstream economics into context:  
Economics, as we have now seen again and again, is a science of recognizing 
secondary consequences. It is also a science of seeing general consequences. It is 
the science of tracing the effects of some proposed or existing policy not only on 
some special interest in the short run, but on the general interest in the long run.172 
 
What becomes evident before considering economic individualism is an understanding of the 
individual in modern mainstream economics. “Rhetorically, the individual is taken as the 
centre of analysis”173 and is said to possess qualities of rationality (consistent in behaviour); 
and interpretivity (interpret information in identical and similar manners). Individuals are 
seen as best able to judge his or her interests and any associated moral issues are reducible to 
the confines of individual utility or preference. From an analysis perspective, “…human 
decision making and computational capacities are regarded as massive and infinite … 
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preferences are taken as given … and for mathematical tractability individuals are mostly 
treated as similar or identical.”174 
 
How then is the market and its institutions presented to the individual? Markets are deemed 
to be the central depositary for individual interaction and are premised upon the outcomes of 
achieving equilibrium between demand and supply using the price mechanism. As such, free 
markets are assumed to provide economic development and for the most part are considered 
to be efficient and capable of self-regulation. Market institutions exist as required within the 
workings of the free market or emerge in response to rational individuals interacting with 
each other. 
 
4.5. Economic Individualism 
 
Economic individualism is seen as encapsulating society as a collection of self-contained 
individuals. Therein it is human centred with values premised on human needs. Society, 
government and societal institutions are at best seen as a means to satisfy individual. The 
historical antecedents of economic individualism and their role in public policy find fruition 
in the theory of property rights, the failure of markets and the traditional principal–agent 
relationship. Property rights and the principal–agent relationship are briefly discussed now in 
terms of how they lend support to private market institutions ahead of public institutions in 
the provision of goods and services as they are considered to offer greater efficiencies. 
 
Property Rights 
 
Property rights theory is premised upon an idea of owner-induced efficiency which draws 
upon “…an inevitable evolution of property rights towards economic efficiency”175 and is 
best explained through the work of Demsetz. It is premised upon the three criteria of 
universality, exclusivity and transferability that enable resources to be utilised most 
efficiently. The three taken together suggest that all scarce resources are owned by somebody 
with exclusive rights over them who is capable of transferring or trading them. In the private 
sphere, these are attributes that contribute to the creation of wealth and thus their 
intermeshing creates motivation. In the public sphere, the nexus between these three is 
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considered to be limited and constrained due to the separation of ownership in the first 
instance between the public and the public institution controlling and utilising those scarce 
resources and secondly, between the administrators of those public institutions and their lack 
of exclusivity of ownership of those resources. In light of these differences, property right 
theory would describe public institutions as being an inefficient means of authorising 
economic activity associated with scarce resources and that these activities are best attended 
to through privatising or contracting out those tasks given over to government and public 
bodies associated with economic activity. 
 
Principal-Agent Relationship 
 
The principal-agent relationship (agency theory), historically embedded within the separation 
of ownership from management associated with the post-Industrial Revolution era, has been 
somewhat refashioned in terms of efficiency through the works of Spence and Zechhauser176, 
Ross177 and Jensen and Meckling178. Miller179 discerns firstly the modern assumptions and 
attributes associated with agency theory and secondly in applying them identifies the need for 
different solutions for different cases concerning the agency problem. Much the same 
argument as with property rights can be seen when considering the traditional principal – 
agent relationship and the issue of agency costs. Jensen and Meckling have elaborated the 
issue succinctly for discussion here. The agency relationship between principal and agent 
involves two major precepts. Firstly, there will be some divergences between decisions made 
by the agent and those that may have maximised the principal’s welfare due to the differences 
between both in terms of preferences, motives and information. Kim180 suggests that the 
agency relationship is plagued with informational asymmetries that arise from the existence 
of private information which causes problems of both adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Secondly, the relationship generally entails agency costs associated with bonding and 
monitoring functions so to entice and motivate the agent to act in the best interests of the 
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principal. Considering these issues, the principal is confronted with the basic optimisation 
problem of how to minimise agency costs within a contractual framework setting. 
 
Within the private sphere, it is argued that the contracts drawn between both the principal and 
agent create an efficient equilibrium. In this respect, Miller181 suggests this is achieved 
through a balance of outcome-based incentives (performance measurements in the contract 
shift risk to the agent) and efficiency trade-off (bonus for agent for bearing more risk). When 
posited within government bureaucracies, both the information deficit and ability to achieve 
an optimal level of monitoring become more problematic. The private sector through market 
competition is seen as having the capability of reducing agency costs given their ability to 
monitor agent behaviours more fully through performance incentives in contracts. 
Consequently, support is again given that certain activities and process of government are 
more efficiently handled by either contracting out or privatisation of these activities. 
 
Pertinent to this discussion is an understanding of the individual as a free economic agent 
interacting within a market driven environment which is characterised by both market failure 
and government failure. In many ways, the former implodes due to its inability to heal itself, 
whilst the latter is considered to be an inappropriate cure in market terms. Given these 
imperfections, much is left to the power of economics to provide adequate recourse to the 
economic individual in their dealings with the state. What then does the mechanics of 
economics provide for the economic individual in the pursuit of his or her self-interest? 
 
Market Failure and Government Failure 
 
Market failure is often discussed in terms of legitimising government intervention and 
regulation and suggests that the efficiency of markets have been undermined or contain 
structural flaws that need correction. Perceived failures most commonly alluded to include 
external diseconomies, barriers to entry, monopolisation (i.e. price inequities), insufficient 
consumer information and protection against free-riders. Becker182 outlines four basic 
reasons for market failure. Historically, it was inferred that such imperfections could and 
should be corrected by government, albeit with the caveat that the market will not heal itself 
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first, i.e. “…self-interested market participants will correct mistakes.”183 It needs to be 
considered that some market failure may provide desirable outcomes and that failure may 
provide the least bad outcome. It may also be a mistake and inefficient to condemn an 
outcome due to its inability to meet an unattainable or impossible ideal, i.e. Nirvana Fallacy. 
Markets are assumed to be a means to an end and consequently if certain ends are not 
achieved “…a market deficiency is said to exist.”184  
 
Research into government activities using aspects of economic theory by Black185, Arrow186, 
Downs187 and Olson188 have laid the foundation for some attributes of public choice theory. 
Government inefficiencies were seen capable of being detected by utilising constructs such as 
game theory and decision theory in investigating the political process. Becker categorises 
these researchers into two groups. The first is centred on administrative failure. Downs, for 
example, suggests that public administrators are self-interested at the expense of the public 
good, but also suggests that the public are rationally ignorant when it comes to being 
informed, in that the costs to do so outweigh the benefits. Suggesting imperfect information, 
citizens who were not fully informed and administrators not knowing exactly the wants and 
needs of citizens, Downs finds that the democratic process cannot provide for the broad 
common good. The second group encapsulate failure of the democratic processes. Olson 
argues it is most difficult to achieve optimal results for the public because there are 
transaction costs associated with democracy. Consequently, it appears easier to form small 
groups demanding narrow benefits rather than large groups demanding broader benefits. 
Becker, utilising Rauch189 lends support of this argument: “The pile of small benefits for 
narrow groups stalemate large changes benefitting a broad group of citizens.”190   
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Dollery and Worthington191 have identified three strands within the literature concerning 
government failure. The first concerns Wolf’s theory of non-market failure. Wolfe identifies 
that the same inequalities resulting from market processes are similar to those resulting from 
government outcomes, only that the former inequities are present in terms of wealth and 
income distributions, whereas the latter are present in a context of privilege and power. Wolf 
suggested three fundamental factors that made government inefficient. Firstly, given the 
difficulty in identifying and quantifying non-market outputs, it was therefore problematic to 
measure if they were “…being created and distributed efficiently.”192 Becker goes on to 
argue that: “Non-market outputs are often hard to define in principle, ill-defined in practice, 
and extremely difficult to measure as to quantify or to evaluate as quality.”193 Secondly, 
consumer signals were often absent concerning the production of non-public goods therefore 
making it difficult to determine if the goods created were the ones desired by the public. 
Thirdly, non-market goods are usually produced in a non-competitive environment and 
therefore productive efficiencies are hard to determine. Generally, non-market outputs are 
produced in a monopoly setting by a single public agency. 
 
The second government failure issue is what Dollery and Worthington identify as Le 
Grand’s194 theory of government failure. Le Grand suggests government involvement in 
economic and social activities resides within three avenues. Using the tripartite classifications 
of provision, taxation or subsidy, and regulation, he examined state intervention from 
perspectives of allocative efficiency, X-inefficiency and egalitarianism. Being a monopoly 
provider in terms of the provision of good or services, the lack of competition was considered 
to render government inefficient. Here, both “…allocative inefficiency and X-inefficiency 
can be anticipated in excess of that which would obtain (be obtained) under private 
provision.”195 Likewise, allocative inefficiency and X-inefficiency would again be 
anticipated in those circumstances where competition to government posits in organisations 
that are not profit maximising. 
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The use of taxes and subsidies suggested prices would be divergent from their marginal social 
or correct production costs and thus create further inefficiencies. In competitive 
environments, taxation would raise prices whilst subsidies would lower them. Consequently, 
distortion of the price mechanism would generate allocative inefficiency. Le Grand questions 
the extent to which subsidies and taxation provide equity even if they can be seen as being 
either egalitarian or non-egalitarian in their outcome. Where regulation in markets occur, Le 
Grand suggests that the regulator faces significant difficulties in obtaining sufficient and 
appropriate information to operate efficiently. One impediment he suggests concerns 
regulatory capture by parties gaining control of the regulation, again generating both 
allocative inefficiency and X-inefficiency. 
 
A final government failure theory is embedded in the work of Vining and Weimer. They 
draw on insights into both the theory of contestable markets and the nature of industrial 
organisations. Baumol has identified a perfectly contestable market as having the prerequisite 
of no barriers of entry or exit. Equating contestability with competition, Vining and 
Weimer196 suggest there are further aspects of contestability that can be identified within an 
environment of public sector supply; namely, contestability of supply and contestability of 
ownership. Contestability of supply stems from competition, and given monitoring of 
government agencies is difficult, an element of trust is assumed in that the public agency will 
not engage in opportunistic behaviours. A good example of this trust can be seen in the 
provision of public goods such as the armed services. Vining and Weimer suggest here that 
when the risk of opportunism is high, this trust attribute gains importance and significance. 
Consequently, it is less likely that production of the good will be contestable, therefore 
supply by government would be an appropriate mechanism. 
 
In considering contestability of ownership, they postulate that the possible existence and 
credibility of organisational transfer of ownership will resonate with contestability at some 
level. The greater the contestability of both supply and ownership, the more likely it is that 
there will be greater motivation and incentive to facilitate allocative efficiency and ‘x-
efficiency’ (productive efficiency at minimal costs). Conversely, when contestability is low, 
converse conclusions may be drawn. 
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Friedman197 concluded that when faced with both government and market failure, the lesser 
evil was to accept the private monopoly and in these instances markets should be chosen by 
society over government. The theories of Wolfe, Le Grand and Vining and Weimer and the 
perception of Friedman would suggest an expectancy of government failure to some degree 
and to a certain level. Consequently then, are there consequences associated with government 
inaction and can such inaction also be considered a failure of government?  
 
Orbach198 presents a tidy disposition on this topic. He discerns there to be an artificial 
distinction between action and inaction, suggesting it much along Thomas Aquinas’ discourse 
on the differences between sins of omission and sins of commission. Perspectives taken on 
government action or inaction swing like a pendulum between providing either too little or 
too much regulation. These perspectives also resonate with those who consider the inability 
to scrutinise inaction and those who propose both action and inaction should be subject to 
similar rules. Orbach suggests that any distinction between either “…narrows the 
government’s fundamental duty to restrain men from injuring one another. … If government 
inaction cannot constitute a failure, then people are free to harm each other, including by 
imposing one’s costs on society.”199 
 
Orbach also considers the issue of “…what degree of imperfection (would/should) defines a 
government failure.”200 In its simplest form, there are two aspects of the ‘nirvana fallacy’. 
Firstly, it concerns the problem of comparing actual things with idealised, unrealistic 
alternatives. Secondly, perceptions exist that assume there to be a perfect solution for a 
particular problem. Likewise, the ‘perfect solution fallacy’ suggests that while a solution may 
exist, it may be rejected because parts of the problem may still exist after implementation of 
the solution. In this respect, Orbach distinguishes between perceptions about government and 
the broader economic environment and suggests that people place higher expectations 
concerning ideals and theoretical solutions when it comes to government actions. 
Governments are held more accountable for the pursuit of perfection, however impractical it 
is, and consequently levels of government failure are measured against such a criterion.  
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Government actions also suffer as a result of inappropriate comparisons premised on cost-
benefit analysis. In the pareto-optimised world, the domains of costs and benefits are more 
readily observed in price mechanisms, transferability of assets and profitability and wealth 
calculations. For governments, who take action and who are criticised if it is perceived to fail, 
the appropriation of market-like analysis are employed. For the most part, this analysis, 
cannot readily address issues such as budgetary constraints, available precautions and the ex-
ante knowledge governments may have of the risks.  
 
Highlighted within the discussion to date are two prominent propositions. First, the unfettered 
acceptance of the technical efficiency of markets and how economics “provides a powerful, 
well-articulated, and generally useful approach to analyzing allocation of goods and 
services.”201 Second, how public values have been subsumed in an acceptance that ‘…things 
public’ resonate within an ideal of private value. Bozeman presents the following 
justifications against this second proposition and suggests that “…public value is something 
more than collective private value … and that “much of importance is missing in market-
based expressions of public value.”202 
 
This clash between public interest theory and economic theory rests on the fundamental 
premise that the former seeks the protection and benefit of the public at large, whereas the 
later prefers that preference be given to the interest of groups in order to seek efficiencies. 
Concerning the public interest, three main strands of thought have been elucidated. Firstly, an 
idealist approach that proposes that “…the public interest consists of the course of action that 
is best for society as a whole according to some absolute standard of values.”203 In citing  
Downs, Mattli and Woods suggest that “…public opinion need not be consulted, though it 
should be educated to understand the wisdom of the policies arrived at.”204 This idealist 
approach recognises an understanding of the public interest in terms of economic efficiency 
within a construct of welfare economics. 
 
A second strand (aptly entitled rejectionist) denies any validity or meaning of a notion of 
public interest. Here the public interest cannot exist because there is no community or public; 
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only special interest groups or individuals exist “…with heterogeneous preferences over 
regulatory means and ends.”205 One needs only to recall the famous Thatcher quip “…that 
there was no such thing as society,”206  to discern this trend. Thatcher saw society as nothing 
other than a loose collection of self-interested individuals who interacted together for no 
other purpose than to protect both their persons and their property rights.  
 
Thirdly, a proceduralist approach espouses the use of due process to provide certain standards 
within the regulatory process. With appropriate avenues for both involvement and 
consultation, individuals and groups will accept outcomes premised on the public interest if 
they have the opportunity and capacity to participate and influence any proposed regulation 
in their favour whether successful or not.  
 
Important within this discussion is a clear differentiation between several notions and ideas. 
Clearly one is the need to understand the differences between public interest and public 
values. Despite previous reference to whether a public exists the concept of public has 
traditionally been denoted as a whole, rather than as its constituent parts, with a focus on the 
collective good. Public interest-based theories are usually articulated as vague and imprecise 
given their lack of a discrete construct, whereas public value theories are seen to have an 
identifiable and specific content.  
 
Looking first at public interest, Barry considers that at its core it represents the common 
interest of members of the public.207 Bozeman presents what he calls a working model of 
public interest as “…referring to the outcomes best serving the long-run survival and well-
being of a social collective construed as a public.”208 Inherent within these types of definition 
is a focus on the outcomes rather than on actions, policies or intentions. Bozeman suggests 
that as it is an ideal concept it therefore “…cannot then endorse any specific policy or action, 
only the public interest ideal.”209 Much of the literature on public interest identifies either a 
utilitarian viewpoint or alternatively a rights-orientated perspective. The former utilitarian 
perspective usually connotes public interest in terms of the sum of individual preferences 
whilst rights-premised approaches insist on the entitlement and rights of individuals thus 
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limiting any utilitarian considerations. Goodin suggests that the utilitarian approach when 
considered as the sum of individual preferences neatly aligns with the notions of common 
good and public interest.210 
 
Goodin presents an interesting differentiation of both by contrasting notions of what he calls 
least-common denominator and highest common concern. Within the former view, he sees 
the public interest in the interests of everybody and that which they have in common. In 
contrast, the latter concerns interests of a shared capacity resulting from being a member of 
the public and which require action by the public to promote them. A distinction between 
both alludes to a pursuit of public goods required by all as opposed to that which remains or 
is left over once all private interests have been accounted for. 
 
Public interest theories are often criticised as being part of welfare economics. For ease of 
discussion, welfare economics here entails quantifying a utility relationship between external 
consumable objects and man. Armed with a measure of individual welfare and assuming a 
notion of pareto optimum welfare economics sought to answer questions concerning the issue 
of efficient recourse allocation and who wins and losses and by how much. The principal 
criticisms of welfare economics are that it assumes well-being is identical to consumption 
choices and that the choices made are rational ones. 
 
Inherent within welfare economics is a set of value judgments that need to be made because 
the pareto principle cannot differentiate between pareto optima. Public choice theory 
advocates reject the construction within welfare economics of “organic decision making units 
such as “the people,” “the community,” or “society.”211, and suggest that only individuals, 
not groups, make choices. In effect, public choice theory “simply transfers the rational actor 
model of economic theory to the realm of politics”212 and suggest that within this new setting 
there are “stark differences in the incentives and constraints that channel the pursuit of self-
interest in the two settings.”213  
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Much of the demise of public interest theory rests with an insurgent focus on the politics of 
group interest that has developed over the past fifty years and particularly its behavioural 
political science perspective. Bozeman suggests that this increased focus on group interest 
“resulted in a view of the public interest less as a concept of collective good and more as an 
outcome of group process.”214 Sorauf thought of this view as “a surprising, and unbecoming, 
political Darwinism that naively presumes that the public interest will automatically be 
served if all men pursue their own interests … a sort of political and procedural invisible 
hand.”215 A final criticism posited by Posner is that public interest theories fail to indicate 
“how a given view on the public interest translates into legislative actions that maximize 
economic welfare.”216  
 
4.6: Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has sought to identify the nature of the new economic individual. Firstly, in 
terms of their self-interest and how both public interest and public value now are situated 
within its definition. Secondly, how she/he is located within a market-orientated environment 
predicated on the various nuances associated with liberalism, libertarianism, neo-liberalism 
and neo-conservatism. Particularly pertinent in this understanding is the assumed acceptance 
of the dominance of property rights, principal-agent relationship, and how they have both 
provided the impetus and backbone in de-crediting government intervention in markets while 
perpetuating the notion of government failure. Notwithstanding these issues, the chapter has 
sought to disseminate the perspective, inherent within all of the above, that the notion of 
public interest is best served through maximising private interest and that the public is but the 
sum of individual preferences. Further, this new economics proclaims the idea that the public 
good is an economic outcome derived through competition in free markets. This completes 
the historical and philosophical context covered in Chapters Two to Four that forms the basis 
for addressing the second research question. Specifically, due process is addressed in the next 
chapter given the historical shift in focus towards the economic individual and her/his private 
interests. 
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Chapter Five: Policy of Due Process 
 
5.1: Due Process 
 
Having set out the philosophical framework for individual participation in a western 
democratic context in previous chapters, the task now becomes one of applying this 
framework to the regulatory due process procedure. The aim is to determine the role of due 
process as a conduit for the new economic individual to participate in protecting self-interest 
within the standard setting arena. Particularly important is an understanding of how their 
participation in the process represents a satisfactory avenue of influence and how those 
responsible for setting standards are accountable to the participant stakeholders in due 
process In simple terms, due process needs to deliver both sufficient accountability and 
participation, while adding substantive value to both individual interests and the common 
good. This chapter examines the modern procedures of incorporating procedural fairness in 
the affairs of delegated legislation to private interests as well as providing a substantive nexus 
across accountability, participation, and due process. 
 
For the purpose of introduction, due process and its major attributes (natural justice and 
equality) can be traced back to antiquity when Aristotle proposed that justice consists of 
treating ‘equals’ equally and ‘unequals’ unequally. In the view of legal experts, the ‘Rhetoric’ 
by Aristotle suggests that justice “…is a virtue through which each group of men retain their 
own things, in conformity with the law,”217 and also “…equity is right (justice) going beyond 
the written law.”218 Hurst explains that the Greeks “…saw the obligation to hear both sides of 
a case and to give an accused person a chance to exculpate himself as the most notable 
feature of natural justice.”219 For instance, the Athenian judicial oath contained a promise 
“…to listen to both the accuser(s) and defendant(s) equally.”220 In this traditional setting, 
these same legal experts note that justice was seen as a two-sided coin comprising both 
natural law and natural justice. Natural law was identified with substantive justice, which was 
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said to be self-evident; not requiring a statutory basis but rather those fundamental laws 
common to all mankind. These laws were seen as a means to an end rather than an end in 
themselves and provided the values which justified the rules and defined the rights and 
duties. On the reverse side, natural justice encapsulated procedural justice which comprised a 
formal essence which provided the procedures for enforcing rights and duties and its 
construct was not predicated on the justness of the laws themselves but rather on how the 
system upheld the laws.  
 
Due process was first expressly introduced into the common law through the Magna Carta, 
in clause 39 of the 1215 Charter, which provided that no one was to be imprisoned, 
disinherited, put to death or put out of land or tenement without being first brought to answer 
in due process of the law. It would later find reference within The Petition of Rights (1628); 
The American Constitution (1791); Declaration of the Rights of Man (1798) and The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
 
Historically, whilst due process comprised both procedural and substantive attributes, 
procedural due process was seen as being subordinate. The very construct of common law 
due process rests upon its ability to not only subsume participation within the decision-
making process but for that participation to be substantive to the outcome of the process. That 
is, such participation gives meaning to the outcome. Specifically, it draws on a notion of 
participatory citizenship that goes beyond self-interest and incorporates the idealistic notions 
of the common good and public interest. Golding suggests “…there is little point in devising 
standards or rules of fair procedure unless following them results in just decisions and 
outcomes. If the substantive law is unjust, it does not seem to matter much whether the 
procedural rules are fair or not.”221  
 
The substantive attribute of early constructs of due process was concerned more with the 
limitations of government power rather than with its procedural aspect. It was seen as 
providing an avenue for including laws which had not already been codified or promulgated. 
On the other hand, the procedural attribute of due process was seen as being useful in 
providing a conduit for enabling fair trials. Galligan notes that the “…early growth of the 
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common law was characterised not through abstract reflection on what the substantive rules 
ought to be, but by practical judgments about procedures.”222  
 
Underpinning the ideal of procedural fairness is the assumption that the manner of the fair 
treatment of a person depends on the extent to which they have a justifiable claim for such 
fairness. Procedures are fair to the extent that they constitute or lead to the fair treatment of 
the person or persons so affected. Golding argues that “…standards of … fairness are to some 
extent context-dependent … on the kind of the dispute settling taking place.”223  
 
Simply, substantive due process refers to the values which justify the appropriate substantive 
rules. Its focal point rests with defining the rights and duties of persons rather than to the 
rules of procedure. On the other hand, the procedures for enforcing those rights and duties 
reside within the notion of procedural due process. Different western legal systems have 
tended to delineate their own versions of due process but in the main they are closely aligned. 
In the US, for instance, procedural due process “…concerns the rights of an individual to an 
unbiased application of the law of the land”224 with substantive due process concerning the 
“…protection of minorities from biased rules and procedures established by the majority and 
a concern for the outcome of any set of procedures.”225 Inherent within the US substantive 
due process is a right to challenge procedures based on their effects. In Canada, the 
equivalent concept of due process is ensconced within an idea of fundamental justice which 
distinguishes between freedoms and rights. Fundamental here is seen to incorporate a notion 
of freedom and whose value are used to determine substantive due process whilst rights 
pertain to a person’s access to procedures. In the United Kingdom (UK) due process had been 
subsumed within an idea of procedural fairness.  
 
Of interest here between the US, Canada and the UK is the issue of substantive due process 
and its relationship to the powers of government. In the US, substantive due process lies at 
the very heart of persons’ rights and has been used to determine rights not specifically 
guaranteed within the constitution. In Canada, the notion of fundamental justice balances a 
person’s interest against protection of society thus requiring a balance between social and 
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private interests. In the UK, a concept of parliamentary supremacy subjugated the initial 
historical precepts of due process. American law professor John Orth would write of this that 
“…the great phrases failed to retain their vitality.”226 
 
By the beginning of the 20th century, the substantive part of due process had been subsumed 
within the rule of law itself; i.e. no action should be taken against a person without the 
authority of the law. In contrast, the procedural aspects of due process had become enshrined 
within the procedures of courts and irrespective of any defectiveness or deficiencies relating 
to these procedures, they were deemed to be due process. Galligan suggests in this respect 
that “…by and large the substantive ends of the law were not in doubt; they were to do 
justice, but justice was beyond human understanding and control; man’s task, therefore, was 
to provide as best he could the mechanisms of justice, the courts, and their procedures … the 
channels of justice.”227 In this respect, if it could not be done, justice was still delivered if it 
was seen to be done. Likewise, due process had been fashioned in a similar vein in that 
procedures were deemed appropriate for providing a suitable level of participation, 
irrespective of whether it provided that level encapsulated within the domain of substantive 
due process. Coming out of these notions, an idea of procedural fairness developed which 
considered that the fair treatment of a person rested on the extent to which they had a 
justifiable claim to that fair treatment. Procedures are fair to the extent that they constitute or 
lead to the fair treatment of the person or persons so affected. Hart explains that “…justice is 
traditionally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion.”228  
 
Golding observes that contemporary law literature espouses the similarities between natural 
justice and procedural fairness.229 Being somewhat interchangeable, natural justice is often 
portrayed through rules pertaining to hearing, bias and evidence which are commensurate 
with those associated with providing procedural fairness. Effectively this encompasses the 
right of any affected party to have the right to be heard (give their own side); to have any 
decision made premised upon logically probative evidence, and have a decision maker who is 
both unbiased and disinterested in the outcome. 
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The literature has for the most part considered natural justice to comprise the maxims audi 
alteram partem (to hear the other side; no person should be judged without a hearing) and 
nemo iudex in re sua (every judge must be free from bias). Commonly referred to as the 
hearing rule, no bias rule and no evidence rule, and Golding incorporates these under the 
guise of neutrality, persuasive conflict and neutrality.230 Firstly, neutrality infers that no 
person should be a judge in his or her own case and that the dispute settler should have no 
private interest in the outcome nor should be biased in favour of or against a party. Secondly, 
persuasive conflict infers that each party should be given fair notice of the proceedings, with 
the dispute settler hearing the argument and evidence of both sides only in the presence of the 
other party. Moreover, each party should be given a fair opportunity to respond to the 
arguments and evidence of the other party. Thirdly, the terms of settlement terms should be 
supportable by reasons premised upon the arguments and evidence presented. Ensconced 
within this three “guise” structure of natural justice is an implied right for a review premised 
upon a concept of legitimate expectation, which provides that “…a legal right or liberty will 
be obtained or renewed, or will not be unfairly withdrawn without a hearing.”231 In its 
simplest form, natural justice is said to incorporate values associated with fairness, 
transparency, equality, freedom from bias and the right to be heard 
 
In the 2003 High Court case of Re: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex 
parte Lam, Chief Justice Gleeson explained the notion of natural justice in reaching his 
decision. 
Fairness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially practical. Whether one talks in 
terms of procedural fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is to avoid 
practical injustice.232 
The Western Australian Ombudsman in his 2009 published guidelines on procedural fairness 
(natural justice) said of procedural fairness that it is “…concerned with the procedures used 
by a decision-maker, rather than the actual outcome reached.”233  
 
The New South Wales Ombudsman in Public Sector Agencies Fact Sheet No 14 ‘Natural 
Justice / Procedural Fairness’ emphasises “…the need for flexibility in the application of the 
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rules of natural justice, depending on the circumstances of each individual case. … In rare 
cases there may be an overriding public interest in short circuiting certain natural justice 
requirements.”234 
 
To be gleaned from the aforementioned is that by entwining procedural fairness with natural 
justice, modern interpretations do not have a fixed meaning nor strict definition of due 
process, even if there is an overriding premise that substantive due process can be aligned 
within the way persons are treated in legal processes. Galligan explains substantive due 
process in the following manner and suggests it comprises two parts: 
One is that the substantive law, which is of course meant to serve the ends of 
justice, should be upheld and properly applied. This aspect is closely intertwined 
with the procedural part and might well be included within it…  
 
The other element goes further and implies limitations on what laws may be made, 
by whom they may be made, and what content they may have. Since the implied 
limitations for their part derive from deeper constitutional and political values, it is 
to be expected that they should be the subject of argument and controversy.235 
From this, the crucial distinction between the interest of the individual who is affected and 
the collective interest of applying appropriate standards to provide natural justice and equality 
is derived. Barron’s Law Dictionary suggests that due process, unlike other legal rules, 
neither presents as a technical conception nor a mechanical instrument but rather resonates 
within a sphere somewhat removed from time, circumstance and place. Importantly, it is 
neither a measuring rod, benchmark nor barometer, but is rather the product of its past, 
reasoning, and the past course of decisions with its resonance incorporated within the law to 
the extent it provides, “…that feeling of just treatment … and profound attitude of fairness 
between man and man, and more particularly between individual and government.”236  
 
In this respect, due process resonates with the relationship between procedures, outcomes and 
values. Lord Denning said “…by ‘due process’ I do not mean rules of procedure.”237 On the 
difference between what is substance and what is procedure, Galligan suggests that “…the 
substance of a decision refers to the outcome sought, while procedures are steps leading to 
the outcome … Procedures are means, instruments, or mechanisms for giving effect to the 
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values pertinent to each form of process.”238 Bentham suggests that procedures are connected 
to values in two ways. Firstly, they advance certain general social values. Secondly, they 
protect certain values about the treatment of individuals. He explained the relationships as 
follows:  
Accurate outcomes serve the ends of utility … The task for rules of evidence and 
procedure is to produce accurate outcomes. The object is to advance certain social 
goals … The law and its processes are simply instruments for achieving some social 
good as determined from time to time by the law makers of the society.239 
 
Procedural fairness, much like due process, presents differences within the west, which need 
some consideration. The British approach to procedural fairness is premised upon the dual 
relationship between an idea of parliamentary democracy and that regulations made under 
delegated legislation are subjugated to the power of parliament and draw their legitimacy 
therefrom. This of itself though does not guarantee procedural fairness, hence reference can 
only be made to how participation, consultation and openness are attributed to the rule-
making process. Consequently, laws, practice and conventions premised upon ideas of 
democracy, participation and citizenship are utilised rather than a comprehensive legal 
framework defined.  
 
Other short-comings of procedural fairness appear to be its uncoordinated nature, where 
consultation is a chance event and the informality may lead to consultation and participation 
being partial and selective. Moreover, rules are often made in secret and behind closed doors, 
with administrators not necessarily expected to explain with justifications their reasons for 
choosing such rules. Galligan recognises a more pertinent failure of procedural fairness 
within the British system to be that: 
One can search in vain for clear public recognition that rule-making by 
administrative bodies is an integral part of modern government, that it is at least one 
step removed from the parliamentary process, and that it raises issues different from 
that of parliamentary legislation. Parliament in its watchdog role takes little interest 
in how the rules are made and, in general, the courts consider rule-making to be 
outside the common law principles of procedural fairness, so that any initiative to 
extend the principles to rule-making must come from Parliament. 240 
 
The American approach cushions procedural fairness within a structured legal framework 
even if clauses from the constitution relating to due process do not apply to issues of rule-
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making. Instead, legislation provides statutory schemes of procedures. Administrative 
agencies take their powers from statute with little direct influence by either legislature or the 
executive and is much more independent than its British counterparts. This absence of 
executive influence has seen a much heavier judicial activism within the process because of 
the general procedural framework. Procedural fairness as applied relies heavily on the notions 
of participation and consideration with participation often considered to be akin to voting. 
Galligan suggests that openness is limited, as it is not extended through the deliberation and 
decision-making stages. Furthermore, justification is not required and issues relating to 
impartiality concerning competing interests appear. Another concern is the lack of political 
scrutiny by the executive with recourse only available through the judiciary. Divergences 
appear with resultant fluctuations in judicial reviews. 
 
The issue and use of procedural fairness raises two issues. Firstly, it is concerned 
substantively with providing and expressing fairness of procedure rather than merely 
providing an impression of natural justice. “Treating persons equally badly is not necessarily 
giving them justice.”241  Procedural fairness should provide an avenue through which parties 
can objectively and rationally participate and which enables a fair and equitable outcome to 
be achieved rather than simply providing a conduit for completion of a dispute. 
 
Secondly, should the administration of laws merely consist of applying the laws correctly? 
That is, if the substantive law is unjust, does it matter if the procedural rules are fair or not? 
Inherent within the ideal of justice is the entitlement of individuals to have both that justice 
absorbed within any procedures applied, along with being governed by substantively just 
laws. Fair procedure, as it sits within current institutional design, resonates within the extent 
to which both are weighed against each other. In this respect, an individual’s claim for a fair 
hearing may be overridden by the desire for, or pursuit of a just resolution. 
 
However, before considering the value of participation in policy making, it is important to 
understand the nexus between accountability and participation in that they are opposite sides 
of the same coin. In particular, public accountability is inherently infused by the extent to 
which participation is incorporated into the workings and transparency of public institutions. 
The very ideal of accountability implies a notion of responsibility – a duty to identify and 
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explain actions of impact in a manner that has incorporated the participation of those so 
affected. Herewith a short discourse on accountability is undertaken. 
 
5.2: Accountability 
 
In a broad sense accountability is “…a synonym for a variety of evaluative, but essentially 
contestable concepts, such as responsiveness, responsibility and effectiveness.”242  
Historically derived from humble beginnings dating back to the ‘Domesday Book’, 
accountability “…has slowly wrestled free from its etymological bondage with 
accounting.”243 Bovens suggests that “…in contemporary political discourse ‘accountability’ 
and ‘accountable’ no longer convey a stuffy image of bookkeeping and financial 
administration, but rather now posits with strong promises of fair and equitable 
governance.”244 Furthermore, this relationship has been almost completely reversed. 
Accountability is now no longer seen as referring to the ability of a sovereign to hold subjects 
to account, but rather to the extent with which those same authorities are now held 
accountable by their citizens. 
 
The modern-day interpretation encompasses public accountability commensurate with the 
ideology of the NPM principles which emerged during the 1970s and has found significant 
traction in the west. As a concept, however, accountability is a rather elusive idea and, in 
many senses, it is an evocative word that can be used to evoke an image of trustworthiness, 
defend a rambling argument or detract critics. “In contemporary political and scholarly 
discourse ‘accountability’ often serves as a conceptual umbrella that covers various other 
distinct concepts.”245 Authors such as Mulgan,246 Behn,247 and Dubnick248 have attributed 
attributes of equity, transparency, efficiency, democracy, responsibility, integrity and 
responsiveness to accountability with Mulgan suggesting the term “…has come to stand as a 
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general term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their 
particular publics.”249  
 
Koppell250 suggests these different dimensions are each ideographs and umbrella concepts 
themselves. Since each of the various elements requires extensive operationalisation, they 
cannot be measured along the same scale thus making the conceptualisation of each concept 
impossible to establish empirically whether an organisation is accountable or not. Whilst 
dimensions like transparency serve as a means of pursuing accountability it is not 
constitutive, whereas responsiveness is more evaluative instead of analytical. Bovens 
specifies that “…accountability … in a very broad sense is evaluative rather than analytical. 
It comes close to ‘responsiveness’ and ‘a sense of responsibility’, a willingness to act in a 
transparent, fair and an equitable way.”251  
 
Taken in a more concise way, accountability is a commitment to justify and explain conduct 
which implies a relationship between both an actor (the accountor), and a forum (the account 
holder, or accountee). Justifications, reasons and explanations are discussed and debated, not 
from within a void, but in consultation with a significant other. Accountability in this limited 
sense is defined as a relationship between an actor and a forum. Herein the actor is 
considered to have an obligation to explain and/or justify his or her conduct. The forum, on 
the other hand, can both question and impose judgment on the actions and conduct of the 
actor.252  
 
By extension to private bodies that exercise public privileges, Mulgan contends that 
accountability is bound within the relationship between subordinate and superior in which 
“…the superior is expected to have an interest in assessing and improving the quality of the 
performance offered by the subordinate.”253 The accountable are “subject to … oversight.”254 
Thus, the relationship between the forum and actor can be segregated into three elements. 
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Firstly, the actor is obliged to inform the forum about his own conduct and performance. 
Performance here can be measured in terms of both success and failure and can accommodate 
procedures for explanations. Secondly it refers to a relation between accountability and 
answerability whereby there is a provision that the forum can interrogate the actor and 
question the legitimacy and adequacy of information. A third element is how a forum can 
pass a judgment, change or denounce a policy, or impose a sanction on the conduct of an 
actor. Mulgan argues that the possibility of sanctions is a constitutive element of 
accountability.  
 
Bovens provides a succinct discussion by suggesting what accountability is and is not. He 
suggests that: 
To qualify ... as a practice of public accountability … and not propaganda, or the 
provision of information or instructions to the general public. The explanation 
should be directed at a specific forum - and not be given at random. The actor must 
feel obliged to come forward - instead of being at liberty to provide any account 
whatsoever. There must be a possibility for debate and judgment by the forum … 
and not a monologue without engagement. Finally, to qualify as public 
accountability, there should be public accessibility of the account giving - and not 
purely internal discrete informing.255  
 
In many senses, accountability is seen as both a goal and an instrument and often lies across 
both broad and narrow dimensions. Here it is sufficient to consider accountability in the 
ideology of NPM and thus limit discussion on accountability to what is deemed to be public 
accountability. In considering public accountability in this context, Bovens suggest that there 
are different aspects which relate to public. Firstly, public “…should be understood to mean 
'openness'. Account is not rendered discretely, behind closed doors, but is in principle open to 
the general public.”256  Secondly,  
'Public' refers to the object of the account to be rendered. Public accountability 
mainly regards matters in the public domain, such as the spending of public funds, 
the exercise of public authorities, or the conduct of public institutions. It is not 
necessarily limited to public organisations, but can extend to private bodies that 
exercise public privileges or receive public funding. Public accountability implies 
the rendering of account for matters of public interest, i.e. an accounting that is 
performed with a view to the judgement to be passed by the citizens.257 
What can be gleaned so far in respect to public accountability is its nexus with participation; 
that it is interactive and is fairly constituted only when there is appropriate engagement and 
public accessibility. 
                                                     
255  ibid.: Bovens (2005), p.10. 
256  ibid.: Bovens (2005), p.11. 
257  ibid.: Bovens (2005), p.12. 
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As governments reconfigured their role and reinterpreted the importance of the state 
according to the principles of neo-liberalism, a coincident shift in the understanding of 
accountability and the relevant technologies of accountability emerges. Karan suggests that 
by “…reducing the primary focus to economic results, the reform has … allowed a 
substantial dilution and narrowing of public accountability.”258  However, public 
accountability is neither a concise nor a readily quantifiable outcome; rather it is a nebulous 
construct as will be shown below. Bovens discerns the issue of the problem of many eyes as 
it relates to the actor-forum relationship and to whom the actor is responsible. He also 
identifies the problem of many hands as it relates to the number of hands regulations or 
policies will pass through on their way to promulgation. 
 
The problem of many eyes relates to certain levels of public accountability that an actor (or 
regulator) may encounter. Firstly, there is political accountability through which the exercise 
of accountability is embedded in the various principal-agent relationships. Secondly, there is 
professional accountability through which actor members are also members of professional 
organisations and consequently face review of their performance by peers. Thirdly social 
accountability has been broadened with increased emphasis now being placed on actors (or 
regulators) in terms of corporate governance and corporate social responsibilities. The public 
at large are now seen as being quasi-stakeholders through the activities of certain interest 
groups. Fourthly, legal accountability has arisen in a more litigated environment as interested 
stakeholders place greater trust in their legal and court structures than in the actions of their 
parliaments. Lastly, administrative accountability has emerged through various quasi-legal 
forums, such as ombudsmen, audit offices, inspector-generals and anti-fraud departments 
being instituted. 
 
Given this plethora of responsibilities and their various nuances, overall accountability is 
witnessed through a hierarchical structure premised on a pyramidal framework which is 
tailored along lines of a chain of command. This is inherently observable within the 
Westminster system of government and its delegated structures which create the problem of 
many hands as it relates to accountability, blame and punishment. Bovens suggests the 
problem of many hands can be overcome by identifying different types of accountability 
                                                     
258  Karan, R., (2002), Selective Commercialisation of Public Sector Accounting and Its Consequences for 
Public Accountability, University of Ballarat, Unpublished Working Paper, p.7. 
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premised upon the nature of the actor, the nature of their conduct and who obligations are 
owed to. 
 
These perspectives aside, the issue of public accountability has a far greater reach and nexus 
with civil society. Overall, public accountability lies at the heart of the legitimacy of public 
administration and the trust of the public at large with the institutions of government be they 
either direct or delegated agencies wielding executive responsibilities and powers. 
Accountability is clearly part of the transparency of process; the inclusivity of participation 
and not least explanation and justification are predicated on debate by constituent 
stakeholders. 
 
5.3: Participation and Policy Making 
 
For ease of discussion here, notwithstanding the vagaries and variations of definitions 
pertaining to participation, a simple explanation that should suffice is that a person affected 
by a legal process is entitled to know the issue and have recourse to respond to and present 
both argument and evidence. Above all, participation connotes both an ability to be actively 
involved in the process, and through that participation, to be able to influence the outcome. 
 
The choice of this construct of participation is in line with the convergence in recent decades 
of a broadening citizen engagement in policy formulation which has included a search for 
new and more direct avenues through which governments or policy makers may be held 
accountable and influenced. The concept of participation has begun to “…move from one of 
users and choosers of services provided by others, to one in which people became actors and 
agents in the broader processes of government and administrative activities.”259 A broadening 
of the recognised constituent stakeholders in various economic, social and political activities 
has demanded a more radical version of participation that goes beyond the narrower 
consumer approaches previously applied.  
 
The relationship between participation and the common good has for the most part been 
redefined in the modern era in terms of its constituent stakeholders. Douglass describes the 
traditional view of the common good as consisting “…of a number of specific objectives 
                                                     
259  Cornwall, A., and Gaventa, J., (2001), From Users and Choosers to Makers and Shapers: Repositioning 
Participation in Social Policy, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper, No. 127, p.4.    
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designed to promote the general human well-being of all people – such as peace, order, 
prosperity, justice and community.”260 Herein the common good applied to all persons and 
subjugated and subordinated to a lesser level individual and group interests. This also entailed 
a belief that the moral and spiritual well-being of the people could be improved through the 
pursuit of the common good. 
  
Continued acceptance of the neo-classical mainstream economic principle of self-interest 
following the Industrial Revolution has seen well-being defined within an ‘individualistic’ 
paradigm premised on an emerging acceptance of private benefits and property rights which 
required protection. This change has resonated with a view of the public interest better 
understood as the sum of particular interests and particularly found traction in the 
development and outcomes of administrative processes.261 In many administrative situations, 
participation had become institutionalised, and the conduit for action only by professionals, 
managers, and politicians or other consultative mechanisms such as committees. Inevitably, 
critics of such approaches questioned the power differentials associated with these processes. 
A widening chasm was developing between those with the ability to influence and those 
neither engaged in the participation or who lacked sufficient power to express their 
preferences or views.  
 
Such has been the impact on participation in administrative decisions and outcomes, that in 
the 1960s, widespread use of the term ‘the democratic imperative’ came into vogue. The 
general thrust was a call that “…those who will be substantially affected by decisions made 
by social and political institutions must be involved in the making of those decisions.”262 At 
its heart was concern that the traditional guarantees of democracy required strengthening to 
check the increasing tendency for decisions to be made by small remote groups, in secret, 
which were not easily called to account or identified, since they acted in the name of the 
state, big business or delegated authority. Of concern was the underlying growth in 
concentration of economic power which was coupled with greater centralisation of political 
power and increased bureaucracy and how these interacted with the new larger and more 
complex modern mass societies. 
 
                                                     
260  Douglass, B., (1980), ‘The Common Good and the Public Interest’, Political Theory, Vol.8, No.1, p.104. 
261  Gunn, J., (1969), Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century, London: Routledge. 
262  Baron, G., (1981), The Politics of School Government, Oxford: Pergamon Press, p.8.  
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The writings of John Stuart Mill on the benefits of participation are instructive. He suggests 
that participation promotes the virtue and intelligence of the members of society because the 
citizen is “…called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in 
case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, 
principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good.”263 Mill 
also suggests that through participation, there is a better chance of creating good laws. 
Implicit here is an assumption that participation denotes more than simply casting a vote or 
providing an argument. The participation itself should give rise to the examination of 
alternatives through active and positive interactions in the pursuit of the most reasonable or 
best alternative. 
 
In terms of procedures, outcomes and values it is important to note that participation may 
serve values independently of outcomes. For instance, a dignitarian approach recognises a 
connection between participation in decisions and respect for persons premised on the 
Kantian notion that a person should not be treated as a means to an end, but as an end in them 
self. Rawls, in his Theory of Justice saw procedures as a means of showing respect and that 
participation does not depend on its contribution to outcomes.  
 
Authors such as Durocher, Fortin and Cote have classified participation in the standard-
setting process into three categories. Firstly, a positive accounting theory group perspective 
which saw participation driven by an individual’s “…acceptance or rejection of any form of 
regulation (accounting or otherwise) was dependent on whether the regulation was relatively 
more beneficial or costly to them.”264 Premised on the works of Watts and Zimmerman, this 
idea was commonly understood as the theory of economic consequences. Secondly, an 
economic theory of democracy group perspective that suggested participation was more 
likely to be affected “…by the perceived benefits expected from participation, the perceived 
costs, the perceived capacity to influence the outcome, by user's perceptions of the 
homogeneity and consensus of their group and how costs could be shared in view of the 
foregoing factors.”265 Thirdly they identified a coalition and influence group perspective from 
which prospective participants viewed their ability to influence the outcome premised upon 
                                                     
263 Mill, J.S., (1952), Considerations on Representative Government. Cited in Brittanica Great Books, Hutchins, 
R.M., (ed.), New York: Benton, p.349. 
264 Huang, S.J., and Tower, G., (1994), A Power Analysis of the Development of the Differential Reporting 
Statement (SAC1), Murdoch University, Working Paper, p.5. 
265 Durocher, S., Fortin, A., and Cote, L., (2007), ‘Users’ participation in the accounting standard setting 
process: A theory building study’, Accounting Organisations and Society, Vol.32, No.1-2, pp.29-59. 
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potential coalitions among other groups. Georgiou also identified similar reasons for non-
participation and discerned the following reasons for not participating: lack of potential 
benefits; probability of influencing; cost of participating; reliance on other means; non-
awareness of proposals; and accounting preference and lobbying behaviour.266 
 
What can be gleaned from this is that active participation is aligned with the making of good 
laws. Hence, the issue becomes one of how effective regulation setting can be achieved 
through concern for processes which should be responsive to the community in general and to 
those affected by it. Cochran267 assists here by providing a typology of public interest 
theories that range between normative approaches premised upon the utilitarian idealism of 
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill at one end, and pluralistic approaches at the other. The 
former normative approaches suggest policy outcomes take consideration of that which offers 
the greatest common good, whilst the latter, more pluralistic approaches suggest policy 
outcomes should be premised more upon solving interest group conflict. Of these later 
pluralistic approaches, the most extreme version concerns an ‘abolitionist’ approach which 
views society through a lens of interest groups pursuing their interests associated with both 
property rights their private benefits.268 Further process and consensualist approaches are less 
radical to the extent they define society, the public good, public interest and interest groups. 
 
Overall, the more normative models have a greater reliance on participation and as such have 
broader processes for incorporating stakeholder input. Moreover, they are also seen as 
providing more opportunities for participants to influence outcomes. Generally, existing 
policy making mechanisms involve an authority that has to draw on general considerations of 
a social, economic, or ethical kind in deciding an issue, and the decision is likely to affect a 
range of groups and interests. This means that different courses of action are available and 
that the policy maker has some freedom in deciding what to do. This said though, many 
aspects concerning the setting of policy are predetermined by participant lobbying and often 
resolved without reference to any public involvement. Public participation, in many 
instances, also tends to be garnered through networks and informal processes geared towards 
                                                     
266  ibid.: Georgiou (2002).  
267 ibid.: Cochran (1974). 
268 Cassinelli, C.W., (1958), ‘Some Reflections on the Concept of Public Interest’, Ethics, Vol.69, No.1, pp.48-
61. See also: Sturm, D., (1978), ‘On Meanings of Public Good: An Exploration’, The Journal of Religion, 
Vol.58, No.1, pp.13-29. 
91 
 
the involvement of interest groups who have previously expressed interest in the area being 
considered. 
 
Galligan suggests that under a normative policy making approach the “…main concern in 
deciding policy should be to act for the common good … while the interests and claims of 
individuals and groups are ingredients to be added to the cauldron of policy making, the final 
decision should reach beyond particular concerns to a broader sense of the interests of all.”269 
This suggests that procedures aimed at effective and efficient policy making should be 
premised upon what duties are owed to participants and how they should be incorporated and 
achieved. This suggests that any desired and appropriate outcomes should be premised on its 
ability to incorporate attributes of fairness which both are responsive both to the community 
as a whole, and to those who are affected by the outcome. 
 
Procedures for making such policies tend to cascade along a spectrum encompassing varying 
forms of rule-making and trial type adjudication. Rule-making procedures are for the most 
part based on giving notice of the terms of the proposed rule, including information about the 
material and the evidence relied on and inviting the public to make representations. In many 
instances consultation may mean little more than the opportunity to make written submissions 
without knowing what other submissions or information has been received and the various 
policy options being considered. Being mainly applied within administrative processes, the 
main aim is to settle general policy matters rather than to consider the fair or otherwise 
treatment of individuals. Trial-type adjudicative procedures, on the other hand, incorporate 
parties, evidence, examination and argument, as is found within the adversary system, when 
the object is to settle the case in question.  
 
Two issues present themselves here. First, even if participation appears to be a valued input, 
there are divergent and varied views as to the point and worth of such participation. Second, 
if the good of society is the focus of policy, there are different means and processes suited to 
achieving it. As Galligan notes, the following three normative models are generally 
considered when seeking resolution.270  
 
 
                                                     
269 ibid.: Galligan (1996), p.455. 
270 ibid.: Galligan (1996). 
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Standard Model 
 
In the standard model, the common good is specified within the boundaries that the issue will 
be defined by the policy maker who will then identify the different available courses, before a 
decision is made. This is premised upon investigating the relevant facts and evidence 
available before deciding which outcome provides the best overall good. Given that the 
governing criterion is the good of the community, the policy maker will incorporate values 
specific to the community by applying a framework which incorporates attributes of 
coherency, rationality and consistency. Whilst recognising that people of goodwill may 
disagree on what the appropriate outcome is, this model recognises that a decision will still 
need to be made by an appropriate authority. Herein, necessary procedures are those that 
provide an avenue to accommodate and incorporate differing interests and opinions through 
participation. 
 
Competing Interests Model 
 
In the competing interests model, the common good is fashioned to accommodate an outcome 
that best satisfies the competing and conflicting interests of involved stakeholders. According 
to Galligan, this is the least attractive model as “…the result is that either the more powerful 
interests prevail or the decision maker covertly appeals to some external principle.”271 
 
The Consensus Model 
 
This model, whilst incorporating aspects of both the aforementioned models, recognises 
attributes in access to both. It goes beyond merely embracing values specific or 
accommodating only specific interests. Rather, it draws upon “…a view of citizenship 
[where] the real citizen is not only interested in his own good, but wants genuinely to 
understand what is for the good of all and to act accordingly.”272 Galligan argues that 
“…participation and involvement are directed partly to finding the common good, but they 
are also partly a process of learning for the participant. It is through participation, through 
hearing the other side, and through the cross currents of debate, that citizens come to see 
beyond their own interests and develop a sense of the good of all.”273  
 
                                                     
271 ibid.: Galligan (1996), p.469. 
272 ibid.: Galligan (1996), p.468 
273 loc.cit.: 
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In many ways its overwhelming weakness is its naïve idealism in that it depends upon the 
momentary consensus of shifting alliances albeit the sense of seeking the common good 
through agreement appeals to noble ideas. Galligan sees the standard model appearing as the 
best fit. Firstly, because it recognises the necessity for a decision to be made and given the 
often-disparate interests of those involved, such a decision will be required to be made from 
somebody in a position of authority. Secondly, it recognises that for the most part, policy 
makers do attempt to explain their decisions in terms of the common good. 
 
With the participatory models for policy making set out above, the following section is able 
to delineate the current structure and procedure for participating within the Australian 
accounting standard setting regime and concludes with observations concerning participation 
therein. 
 
5.4: Due Process in the Accounting Standard Setting Environment 
 
Current arrangements for the setting of accounting standards rests with the International 
Financial Reporting Standards Board whose primary mission is to develop a single set of high 
quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) through its standard setting body, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB). The arrangements are part of a three-tier hierarchical structure which 
incorporates the following: 
 
1. Monitoring Board  
The Monitoring Board consists of capital markets authorities responsible for setting the form 
and content of financial reporting. Through the Monitoring Board, securities regulators that 
allow or require the use of IFRS in their jurisdictions will be able to carry out their mandates 
regarding investor protection, market integrity, and capital formation more effectively. 
 
The current members of the Monitoring Board are representatives of the Board and the 
Emerging Markets Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the European Commission (EC), Financial Services Agency of Japan (JFSA), US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM), and 
Financial Services Commission of Korea (FSC). The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision participates in the Monitoring Board as an observer. 
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2. Trustees 
The Trustees of the IFRS Foundation are responsible for the governance and oversight of the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and are accountable to the Monitoring 
Board. Six of the Trustees must be selected from the Asia/Oceania region, six from Europe, 
six from North America, one from Africa, one from South America and two from the rest of 
the world 
 
3. IASB 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent group of 14 experts 
with an appropriate mix of recent practical experience in setting accounting standards, in 
preparing, auditing, or using financial reports and in accounting education. Broad 
geographical diversity is also required.  
 
IFRS are developed over a three program six-stage cycle as follows. 
1. Research Program 
Research   >>>>> Discussion Paper   >>>>> Proposal 
2. Standards Program 
Exposure Draft >>>>> Published IFRS 
3. Review Program 
Post Implementation Review 
 
Due process is that point when both users and preparers can express their viewpoint and it 
generally precedes the promulgation of the standard. It is initiated with the publication of an 
exposure draft which sets out a specific proposal in the form of a proposed Standard. An 
exposure draft is the IASB’s main vehicle for consulting with the public and includes an 
invitation to comment, setting out the issues that the IASB has identified as being of 
particular interest. The IASB normally allows a minimum period of 120 days for comment on 
an exposure draft. 
 
Following closure of the comment period, IASB technical staff provide a general summary of 
the major points raised in the comment letters for the IASB to consider. Acceptance or 
rejection is based on a ballot of members of the IASB. In this respect, it does not operate as a 
consensus body requiring a unanimous vote, but rather requires a ‘super-majority’ of at least 
nine members for approval. 
95 
 
Understanding standard setting and the application of due process in the current Australian 
context is now somewhat of a paradox given the recognition, accommodation and application 
of IFRS. This is perhaps best understood in understanding the AASB’s influence on IFRS. 
The AASB Policies and Processes document offers insights into this position when 
discussing its contribution to international accounting standard setting and suggests that the 
AASB undertakes the following activities in contributing to international accounting standard 
setting: 
a) By endeavouring to act as a thought leader when contributing to the development of 
international standards by the IASB … 
b) By being involved in significant IASB projects as early as possible in the process by 
leading research projects … 
c) By being an active participant … with other national standard setters and groupings of 
standard setters 
d) By making submissions on IASB consultative documents that are likely to be significant 
in an Australian context and encouraging Australian constituents to participate in the due 
processes of the IASB and the IPSASB. 
 
Specifically, the document alludes to this situation when it acknowledges that the AASB 
itself: 
(is but) one of many participants in the international standard setting process, (and 
that) the outcomes of the process may differ from the preferred positions advanced 
by the AASB. However, in the interests of developing a single set of high-quality 
accounting standards for international use there is a presumption that IFRSs should 
be adopted for use in Australia unless to do so would not be in the best interests of 
the Australian economy. 
 
Prior to accepting IFRS, the AASB operated a standard setting arrangement documented in 
Policy Statement 1: ‘The Development of Statements of Accounting Concepts and Accounting 
Standards’274 which contained the due process applied to accommodate community 
participation. Figure 5.1 documents these procedures.  
 
  
                                                     
274  Australian Accounting Research Foundation, (1993), The Development of Statements of Accounting 
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Figure 5.1 Procedures for the Development of Accounting Concepts and Accounting 
Standards in Australia 
 
Source: Hurst, G. The Due Process of Accounting Standard Setting in Australia: The Case of AAS27: Financial 
Reporting by Local Governments, p.115. 
 
Following completion, the AASB would evaluate written submissions in their deliberations 
and conclusions and determine to either promulgate an accounting standard or not. 
Acceptance of IFRS and promulgation of new standards now leaves this responsibility with 
the IASB, although the AASB still applies its own acceptance of written Australian 
constituent submissions by issuing IFRS exposure drafts under its own name. This equates to 
a summarisation of responses by the AASB which then disseminates this outcome in its 
feedback to the IASB through its ability as a participant within the IASB due process.  
 
The IASB’s due process is documented within its Due Process handbook which espouses the 
following three significant principles: 
1. Transparency - the IASB conducts its standard setting process in a transparent manner; 
2. Full and fair consultation - considering the perspectives of those affected by IFRS 
globally.  
Users, Preparers, Auditors
Project Initiated and Regulators
Private Sector Reporting 
Project Advisory Entities including:
Panel Appointed           *    Companies
          *    Trusts
          *    Partnerships
Identification and Comprehensive Accounting Discussion General Public Sector Reporting 
Discussion of Issues by Staff, Paper/ Theory Monograph Distribution Entities including:
Project Advisory Panel and Board      *    Statutory Authorities
     *    Authorities
Key Decisions Questionnaire      *    Local Government Bodies
Accountants and Other
Tentative selection of applicability, Individuals including:
Scope, Accounting Policies         *    Public Practice
and Disclosures by Boards Draft Exposure Draft Selective         *     Industry
Distribution         *    Government
Refinement of Draft         *    Academia
Exposure Draft by Board
Exposure Draft General Regulatory Bodies Including:
Distribution       *    ASIC
      *   Treasuries
Collation, Summary and       *    Aust. Stock Exchange
Analysis of Responses Industry Organisations
Other Representative Bodies
Preparation of Proposed Exposure Draft Selective Auditors - General
Statement or Standard by Board Distribution User Groups
by Board Other Interested Parties
Statement / Standard
Approved by Board
Responses
Feedback to Respondents
Seminars and Public Hearings
Responses
Responses
Responses
      Media Release
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3. Accountability - the IASB analyses the potential effects of its proposals on affected 
parties and explains the rationale for why it made the decisions it reached in developing 
or changing a Standard. 
 
5.5: Chapter Summary 
 
Galligan, in his original work, describes the inevitability that “…principles of participation, 
consideration, and openness constitute the foundational standards of fair treatment in policy 
making … (and) create rights in citizens with respect to the policy process.”275 Evident 
within the discussion in this chapter, when considered in the context of the due process 
described above, there is a clearly defined differentiation between common law due process, 
and that espoused under any specific accounting standard setting environment. This is 
particularly as it relates to the relationship between procedures, outcomes and values. Thus, 
with due process explained in terms of accounting standards, and the extent of fairness and 
equity in participation discussed, the application of due process in exposure draft submissions 
in the Australian accounting setting environment is quantitatively analysed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Findings 
 
6.1: Overview of the Australian Market for Financial Reporting 
 
This chapter presents the quantitative findings associated with reviewing participant input 
through submissions to exposure drafts in the five years before and after acceptance of 
international accounting standards in 2005. These findings form the evidence to address the 
first research question in Chapter Seven. Chapter Seven also includes a philosophical analysis 
to address the second research question to explain how such a submission procedure as 
identified in this chapter for Australia reflects on due process for stakeholder participation. 
A preamble to the findings requires an understanding of the size and makeup of the 
Australian economy. As discussed above, financial numbers embedded in financial reports 
have economic consequences and as such, interested stakeholders will react to these 
consequences. 
 
Section 292 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act) requires the following entities 
to prepare financial reports: 
• all disclosing entities 
• public companies 
• companies limited by guarantee (except small companies limited by guarantee) 
• all large proprietary companies   
• all registered schemes 
• small proprietary companies that are foreign-controlled 
• small proprietary companies or small companies limited by guarantee that we direct to 
prepare financial reports 
• small proprietary companies subject to a shareholder direction under s293 of the 
Corporations Act 
• small companies limited by guarantee subject to a shareholder direction under s294a of 
the Corporations Act 
 
Table 6.1 shows data extracted from the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) annual reports and reveals some indication of the number of companies that prepare 
financial statements.  
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Table 6.1: Size Overview of Australian Companies and Markets 
 
 
Table 6.2 shows the ten-year movement of two major Australian share price indexes together 
with an indication of the market capitalisation of firms on those indexes. 
 
Table 6.2: All Ordinaries and S&P/ASX Price Index Movements Dec-Dec: 2002-2011 
 
 
 
A comparison of world stock exchanges in 2011 reveals that the Australian Stock Exchange 
was in the top ten stock exchanges, ranked 9th in market capitalisation terms (1,198 USD 
Billion) and also ranked 9th in terms of trade value (1,197 USD Billion). 
 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 offer only a very slight indication that there should be a large 
proportion of interested stakeholders in accounting numbers and financial reports. This aside, 
the AASB Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements identifies 
interested stakeholders as including investors, employees, lenders, suppliers and other trade 
creditors, customers, governments and their agencies and public entities. 
 
1999-2000 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Registered Companies 1195851 1224207 1251237 1299985 1359305 1427573 1480684 1572054 1645805 1700891 1768526
Company Auditors na na na 7025 6529 6163 5848 5658 5495 5345 5270
Financial Markets na na na 5 12 13 15 17 17 16 16
Financial Services Businesses na na na 3899 3853 4135 4415 4625 4768 4803 4874
Registered Managed Investment Schemes 2512 2778 3265 3487 3765 4093 4310 4680 5108 4651 4339
Years
All Ords S&P / ASX Domestic
Price 200 Equity
Index Price Market 
Index Capitalisation
($m)
Dec-02 2975.5 3007.1 672792
Dec-03 3306.0 3299.8 777100
Dec-04 4053.1 4050.6 990457
Dec-05 4708.8 4763.4 1109596
Dec-06 5644.3 5669.9 1390315
Dec-07 6421.1 6339.8 1478651
Dec-08 3659.3 3722.3 969046
Dec-09 4882.7 4870.6 1403117
Dec-10 4846.9 4745.2 1419001
Dec-11 4111.0 4056.6 1168712
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6.2: Exposure Drafts Considered 
 
Before discerning who is participating in the standard setting process, it is pertinent to 
consider the type of issues that appear in exposure drafts. Appendix 1 illustrates the nature 
and types of standards being proposed and illustrates the complexity and variety of issues 
interested stakeholders are faced with. An analysis has been undertaken of submissions from 
ED99 issued in December 1999 through until ED200 issued in July 2010, to glean 
participation input in the Australian accounting standard setting due process. This enables an 
examination of five years before and after acceptance of the international accounting 
standards in 2005. This selection period enables the researcher to consider shifts in 
participation before and after the shift to international standards. 
 
Statistically, 1,215 submissions were made to these exposure drafts and represent, after 
classification, the input of 407 submitters, suggesting that certain stakeholders submitted to 
more than one exposure draft. The study builds on previous research by Hurst276 who 
considered a similar analysis associated with exposure drafts 99-141 which covered the 
period December 1999 to July 2005. To identify the similarities and differences between the 
two quantitative data sets and their analyses, a summary of Hurst’s work is presented in 
Appendix 2. 
 
Hurst broke submitters in to the following categories which have been replicated here:  
1. Large Accounting Firms 
2. Smaller Accounting Firms 
3. Professional Accounting Organisations 
4. Business Associations 
5. Large Australian Corporations 
6. Other Corporations 
7. Consultants 
8. Governments Departments- Commonwealth 
9. Government Departments – State 
10. Local Government Departments and Councils 
11. Individuals: Educational Institutions 
12. Individuals: Others  
 
  
                                                     
276 ibid.: Hurst (2007) 
101 
 
6.3: Exposure Drafts 99-200 -The Overall Position 
 
Of the total of 1,215 submissions, 564 (46%) were considered pre-acceptance with the 
remaining 651 (54%) considered post as per Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Pre and Post – Total Submissions 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 breaks down the exposure drafts into the numbers of submissions received for each 
and reveals that overall 77 (77%) of the 100 exposure drafts examined had less than 15 
submissions each. Figure 6.2 shows the overall comparison. 
 
Table 6.3: Submissions per Exposure Draft 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Submissions per Exposure Draft 
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Pre and Post Submissions
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Exposure Drafts 27 22 26 10 12 3
Total submissions 76 145 306 167 266 255 1215
Submissions
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Broken down to a pre and post position, Table 6.4 and Figure 6.3 indicate that many more of 
the post exposure drafts received lower numbers of submissions than pre-exposure drafts. Of 
the 59 post exposure drafts, 39 (66%) had fewer than 10 submissions each compared to 9 of 
41 pre-exposure drafts (22%) 
 
Table 6.4: Submissions to Exposure Drafts – Pre and Post 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Submissions to Exposure Drafts – Pre and Post 
 
Table 6.5 shows the total submitters and submissions made.  
Table 6.5:  Submissions to Exposure Drafts 99 – 200 
                        (Excluding ED100 and ED104) 
 
 
 
Exposure
Drafts < 5  5 < 10 10 < 15 15 < 20 20 < 30 > 30
142-200 20 19 12 4 2 2
99-141 7 2 15 6 10 1
Number of Submissions per Exposure Draft
Submitters Number % %
Large Accounting Firms 10 2.5% 245 20.2%
Smaller Accounting Firms 117 28.7% 125 10.3%
Professional Accounting Bodies & Accounting Organisations 8 2.0% 126 10.4%
Business Associations 26 6.4% 110 9.1%
Large Australian Corporations 14 3.4% 112 9.2%
Other Corporations 87 21.4% 107 8.8%
Consultants 49 12.0% 65 5.3%
Government Departments - Commonwealth 6 1.5% 90 7.4%
Government Departments - State 30 7.4% 107 8.8%
Local Government Departments and Councils 21 5.2% 24 2.0%
Individuals: Educational Institutions 27 6.6% 77 6.3%
Individuals: Other 12 2.9% 27 2.2%
Total 407 100% 1215 100%
Submissions
Pre – Brown 
Post - Grey 
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Of significant note here however is the presence of ED148, Proposed Amendments to AASB 
101 - Presentation of Financial Statements: A Revised Presentation which garnered 184 
submissions (15% of all submissions) and impacts on the post analysis figures. Rather than 
treating it as an outlier it was considered to be best included in the analysis albeit the 
following analysis will be broken down to an inclusion and an exclusion commentary. Table 
6.6 identifies its major submitters. 
Table 6.6:  Submissions to Exposure Draft 148 
 
 
 
A general discussion provides an overall position broken down between the pre and post 
positions and considers both the change in the number of submitters and the change in the 
number of submissions. This is followed by a more detailed examination of the submitter 
categories. Table 6.7 reveals the number of submitters on a pre and total scale which 
indicates large increases in participation by Smaller Accounting Firms and Other 
Corporations albeit as a percentage change of total submitters from pre to post the change is 
more significant within the Smaller Accounting Firms who have jumped from 5% 
participation to 29% of total participation. 
 
Table 6.7:  Pre-Submitters to Total Submitters - Changes in Participation 
 
 
Submitters Sub Total %
Large Accounting Firms 5 245 2.0%
Smaller Accounting Firms 101 125 80.8%
Professional Accounting Bodies & Accounting Organisations 3 126 2.4%
Business Associations 1 110 0.9%
Large Australian Corporations 2 112 1.8%
Other Corporations 34 107 31.8%
Consultants 29 65 44.6%
Government Departments - Commonwealth 1 90 1.1%
Government Departments - State 1 107 0.9%
Local Governments Departments and Councils 0 24 0.0%
Individuals - Educational Institutions 4 77 5.2%
Individuals - Other 3 27 11.1%
Total 184 1215
Increase
Number % Number % Decrease
Large Accounting Firms 7 5% 10 2.5% 43%
Smaller Accounting Firms 8 5% 117 28.7% 1363%
Professional Accounting Bodies & Accounting Organisations 5 3% 8 2.0% 60%
Business Associations 20 13% 26 6.4% 30%
Large Australian Corporations 11 7% 14 3.4% 27%
Other Corporations 31 20% 87 21.4% 181%
Consultants 11 7% 49 12.0% 345%
Government Departments - Commonwealth 6 4% 6 1.5% 0%
Government Departments - State 19 12% 30 7.4% 58%
Local Government Departments and Councils 15 10% 21 5.2% 40%
Individuals: Educational Institutions 15 10% 27 6.6% 80%
Individuals: Other 7 5% 12 2.9% 71%
155 100% 407 100.0%
Submitters Pre Submitters All Submitters
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Table 6.8 shows the increase and decrease by grouping and interestingly reveals the decline 
in participation by Business Associations (36%) and Large Australian Corporations (27%). 
Note: Table 6.5 and Table 6.7 reveal that there were 407 total submitters, whereas the 
following tables take into account the total number of submitters for each of the pre and post 
period resulting in a higher figure. This is the result of some submitters submitting both pre 
and post. 
 
Table 6.8:  Pre-Submitters and Post Submitters - Changes in Participation 
                        (Including ED148) 
 
 
Table 6.9 presents the position excluding ED148. Of the 184 submissions, 163 were from 
once-only submitters. Clearly what shows out is a declining position of participation which is 
evidenced by the pre-position of 155 submitters to 43 exposure drafts compared to 134 
submitters to 59 post-position exposure drafts. 
 
Table 6.9:  Pre-Submitters and Post Submitters - Changes in Participation 
                        (Excluding ED148) 
 
 
Increase
Number % Number % Decrease
Large Accounting Firms 7 4.5% 9 3.0% 28.6%
Smaller Accounting Firms 8 5.2% 111 37.4% 1287.5%
Professional Accounting Bodies & Accounting Organisations 5 3.2% 6 2.0% 20.0%
Business Associations 20 12.9% 13 4.4% -35.0%
Large Australian Corporations 11 7.1% 8 2.7% -27.3%
Other Corporations 31 20.0% 59 19.9% 90.3%
Consultants 11 7.1% 41 13.8% 272.7%
Government Departments - Commonwealth 6 3.9% 3 1.0% -50.0%
Government Departments - State 19 12.3% 17 5.7% -10.5%
Local Government Departments and Councils 15 9.7% 7 2.4% -53.3%
Individuals: Educational Institutions 15 9.7% 16 5.4% 6.7%
Individuals: Other 7 4.5% 7 2.4% 0.0%
155 100.0% 297 100%
Submitters Pre Submitters Post Submitters
Number % Number %
Large Accounting Firms 7 4.5% 9 6.7% 28.6%
Smaller Accounting Firms 8 5.2% 13 9.7% 62.5%
Professional Accounting Bodies & Accounting Organisations 5 3.2% 6 4.5% 20.0%
Business Associations 20 12.9% 13 9.7% -35.0%
Large Australian Corporations 11 7.1% 8 6.0% -27.3%
Other Corporations 31 20.0% 28 20.9% -9.7%
Consultants 11 7.1% 13 9.7% 18.2%
Government Departments - Commonwealth 6 3.9% 3 2.2% -50.0%
Government Departments - State 19 12.3% 17 12.7% -10.5%
Local Government Departments and Councils 15 9.7% 7 5.2% -53.3%
Individuals: Educational Institutions 15 9.7% 13 9.7% -13.3%
Individuals: Other 7 4.5% 4 3.0% -42.9%
155 100.0% 134 100%
Submitters Post Submitters IncreasePre Submitters
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Table 6.10 considers the number and changes in submissions. As noted earlier with the 
increased number of submitters, particularly associated with the Smaller Accounting Firms, it 
is not surprising to find a significant increase in the number of submissions from that group. 
 
Table 6.10:  Pre-Submissions and Post Submissions - Changes in Participation  
                        (Including ED148) 
 
The position including ED148 is as follows 
 
The position excluding ED148 is as follows. When adjusted for the ED148 consequences 
where 184 submissions were received, it reveals that in the pre-position, 564 submissions 
were received for 43 exposure drafts whereas the post-position reveals 467 submissions for 
59 exposure drafts. 
 
Table 6.11:  Pre-Submissions and Post Submissions - Changes in Participation  
                        (Excluding ED148) 
 
 
 
The discussion to date has revealed an overall position of limited participation which has not 
shown any significant growth in participation rates associated with the due process of 
accounting standard setting in Australia. The following discussion now attempts to discern 
trends associated within each individual category. 
Number % Number %
Large Accounting Firms 117 20.7% 128 19.7% 1.1%
Smaller Accounting Firms 9 1.6% 116 17.8% 16.2%
Professional Accounting Bodies & Accounting Organisations 53 9.4% 73 11.2% 1.8%
Business Associations 75 13.3% 35 5.4% 7.9%
Large Australian Corporations 67 11.9% 45 6.9% 5.0%
Other Corporations 44 7.8% 63 9.7% 1.9%
Consultants 12 2.1% 53 8.1% 6.0%
Government Departments - Commonwealth 38 6.7% 52 8.0% 1.3%
Government Departments - State 59 10.5% 48 7.4% 3.1%
Local Government Departments and Councils 16 2.8% 8 1.2% 1.6%
Individuals: Educational Institutions 54 9.6% 23 3.5% 6.0%
Individuals: Other 20 3.5% 7 1.1% 2.5%
564 100.0% 651 100%
Submitters Pre Submissions Post Submissions Increase Decrease
Number % Number %
Large Accounting Firms 117 20.7% 123 26.3% 5.6%
Smaller Accounting Firms 9 1.6% 15 3.2% 1.6%
Professional Accounting Bodies & Accounting Organisations 53 9.4% 70 15.0% 5.6%
Business Associations 75 13.3% 34 7.3% 6.0%
Large Australian Corporations 67 11.9% 43 9.2% 2.7%
Other Corporations 44 7.8% 29 6.2% 1.6%
Consultants 12 2.1% 24 5.1% 3.0%
Government Departments - Commonwealth 38 6.7% 51 10.9% 4.2%
Government Departments - State 59 10.5% 47 10.1% 0.4%
Local Government Departments and Councils 16 2.8% 8 1.7% 1.1%
Individuals: Educational Institutions 54 9.6% 19 4.1% 5.5%
Individuals: Other 20 3.5% 4 0.9% 2.7%
564 100.0% 467 100%
Submitters Pre Submissions Post Submissions Increase Decrease
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Large Accounting Firms 
 
Table 6.12 reveals that of the 100 exposure drafts examined Large Accounting Firms (top 10) 
submitted a total of 245 submissions (20%) to 94 exposure drafts (94%). 
 
Table 6.12:  Large Accounting Firms - Submissions 
 
 
The Business Review Weekly rankings of the top 100 accounting firms offer the following 
rankings. 
1. PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
2. Ernst and Young 
3. KPMG Australia 
4. Deloitte 
5. Crowe Howarth (Formerly WHK) 
6. BDO 
7. Grant Thornton Australia 
8. Pitcher Partners 
9. RSM Bird Cameron 
10. KordaMentha 
 
Table 6.13 indicates the breakdown of submissions for these Large Accounting Firms 
Table 6.13:  Large Accounting Firms – Submissions Pre and Post 
 
 
ED
Number
1 25
2 31
3 11
4 15
5 10
6 1
7 0
8 0
9 1
10 0
94
Submissions
No % No %
1.                  PriceWaterhouseCoopers 64 27 23% 37 29%
2.                  Ernst & Young 37 24 21% 13 10%
3.                  KPMG Australia 29 20 17% 9 7%
4.                  Deloitte 49 29 25% 20 16%
5.                  Crowe Howarth (Formerly WHK) 1 0 0% 1 1%
6.                  BDO 3 1 1% 2 2%
7.                  Grant Thornton Australia 42 0 0% 42 33%
8.                  Pitcher Partners 18 15 13% 3 2%
9.                  RSM Bird Cameron 1 0 0% 1 1%
10.              Arthur Anderson 1 1 1% 0 0%
Total 245 117 100% 128 100%
TotalLarge Accounting Firms Pre Post
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There has been minimal change in submission input from Large Accounting Firms who on 
pre and post submissions represent about 20% of the total. The list reveals that submissions 
from Ernst and Young, KPMG Australia, Deloitte and Pitcher Partners have declined, with 
increases from both Price Waterhouse Coopers and Grant Thornton Australia. Had it not been 
for the recent activity by Grant Thornton with their 42 submissions in the post period, there 
would have clearly been a decline in Large Accounting Firm participation. 
 
Smaller Accounting Firms 
 
Table 6.14 reveals that of the 100 exposure drafts examined, Small Accounting Firms 
submitted a total of 125 submissions (10%) to 14 exposure drafts (14%). 
 
Table 6.14:  Smaller Accounting Firms – Submissions Pre and Post 
 
 
As revealed in Table 6.15, when adjusted for the 101 submissions associated with ED148 
there have only been minimal submissions from Small Accounting Firms who provide 
approximately 3% of all submissions. As a percentage of all submitters these Small 
Accounting Firms have declined slightly too around 5%. 
Table 6.15:  Smaller Accounting Firms – Submissions and Submitters - Pre and Post 
  (Including and Excluding ED148) 
 
 
 
ED
Number
1 8
2 2
3 2
4 0
5 0
6 1
101 1
14
Submissions
Number % Number %
Including ED148 9 1.4% 116 17.8% 16.4%
Excluding ED148 9 1.4% 15 3.2% 1.8%
Percentage of
Pre Submissions Post Submissions Increase
all (total) Submissions
Decrease
Number % Number %
Including ED148 8 5.2% 111 37.4% 32.2%
Excluding ED148 8 5.2% 13 4.4% 0.8%
Percentage of
all (total) Submitters
Pre Submitters Post Submitters Increase Decrease
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Professional Accounting Bodies and Accounting Organisations 
 
Table 6.16 and Table 6.17 reveal the position relating to submissions made by the major 
Professional Accounting Bodies. The three major Australian professional accounting 
organisations (CPA Australia, ICAA and the former National Institute of Australia (NIA) 
now the Institute of Public Accountants) have increased their submission activity to around 
15% of total submissions. Interestingly, the three now prefer to submit joint submissions 
which is undoubtedly the result of the change to international accounting standards and the 
demise of their influence in the actual setting of Australian accounting standards. Of the 100 
exposure drafts considered at least one of the major professional accounting organisations 
have submitted to 82 exposure drafts. 
 
Table 6.16:  Professional Accounting Bodies and Accounting Organisations –  
                        Submissions and Pre and Post (Including and Excluding ED148) 
 
 
Table 6.17:  Major Professional Accounting Bodies – Submissions Pre and Post 
 
 
Business Associations 
 
Table 6.18 reveals that of the 100 exposure drafts examined, Business Associations submitted 
110 (9%) submissions to 60 exposure drafts (60%).  
 
  
Increase Decrease
Number % Number %
Including ED148 53 9.4% 73 11.2% 1.8%
Excluding ED148 53 9.4% 70 15.0% 5.6%
Percentage of
all (total) Submissions
Pre Submissions Post Submissions
Number % Number %
CPA Australia 27 50.9% 18 24.7%
ICAA 21 39.6% 16 21.9%
NIA 3 5.7% 8 11.0%
Joint Accounting Bodies 0 0.0% 29 39.7%
Total 51 96.2% 71 97.3%
Pre Submissions Post Submissions
109 
 
Table 6.18:  Business Associations – Submissions to Exposure Drafts 
 
 
As revealed in Table 6.19 and Table 6.20 there has been a significant decrease in both the 
number of submitters and the number of submissions from Business Associations. Of 
significance here is the activity by Business Associations that have been dominated by the 
Group of 100 who have accounted for around 47% of all submissions. The post period 
reveals a drop in their activity by 55% yet they still represent approximately 46% of all 
submissions from this group. 
 
Table 6.19:  Business Associations – Submissions and Submitters - Pre and Post 
  (Including and Excluding ED148) 
 
 
Table 6.20:  Major Business Associations – Submissions and Submitters  
 
 
 
 
ED
Number
1 34
2 14
3 3
4 7
5 1
6 1
60
Submissions
Number % Number %
Including ED148 75 13.3% 35 5.4% 7.9%
Excluding ED148 75 13.3% 34 7.3% 6.0%
Number % Number %
Including ED148 20 12.9% 13 4.4% 8.5%
Excluding ED148 20 12.9% 13 4.4% 8.5%
Percentage of
all (total) Submissions
Percentage of
all (total) Submitters
Pre Submitters Post Submitters Increase Decrease
Pre Submissions Post Submissions Increase Decrease
Number % Number %
Group of 100 36 48.0% 16 45.7%
Institute of Actuaries of Australia 7 9.3% 2 5.7%
Securities Institute of Australia 6 8.0% 0 0.0%
Australian Institute of Company Directors 6 8.0% 3 8.6%
Australian Bankers Association 4 5.3% 1 2.9%
59 22
Pre Submissions Post Submissions
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Large and Small Australian Companies 
 
Table 6.21 reveals that of the 100 exposure drafts examined corporations submitted a total of 
219 submissions (18%) to 65 exposure drafts (65%).  
Table 6.21:  Large and Small Australian Companies – Submissions to Exposure Drafts 
 
 
Of these 65 exposure drafts to which submissions were made, 14 of the top 20 market 
capitalised corporations submitted 60. As revealed in Table 6.22, when adjusted for the 36 
submissions associated with ED148, there has been a decrease in the number of submitters 
and a consequential decrease in the number of submissions. 
 
Table 6.22:  Large and Small Australian Companies – Submissions and Submitters –  
                        Pre and Post (Including and Excluding ED148) 
 
 
 
Table 6.23 identifies submissions by larger Australian companies (2015 Rankings). Of the 
111 pre-submissions, 67 (60%) were from 70% of the top 20 market capitalised companies. 
Of the post submissions, 45 (42%) were from this group. If adjusted for the ED 148 impact,, 
these increase to 63% of total submissions from this group. As a percentage against all 
submissions this represents 12% on a pre-basis  and 7% on a post basis. 
ED
Number
1 18
2 21
3 7
4 6
5 5
6 2
7 2
8 1
9 1
10 1
36 1
65
Submissions
Number % Number %
Including ED148 111 19.7% 108 16.6% 3.1%
Excluding ED148 111 19.7% 72 15.4% 4.3%
Number % Number %
Including ED148 42 27.1% 67 22.6% 4.5%
Excluding ED148 42 27.1% 36 12.1% 15.0%
Percentage of
all (total) Submissions
Percentage of
all (total) Submitters
Decrease
Pre Submissions Post Submissions Increase Decrease
Pre Submitters Post Submitters Increase
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Table 6.23:  Large Australian Companies – Submissions: Pre and Post. 
 
 
 
Consultants 
 
Table 6.24 reveals that of the 100 exposure drafts examined, consultants submitted a total of 
65 submissions (5%) to 22 exposure drafts (22%).  
 
Table 6.24:  Consultants – Submissions to Exposure Drafts 
 
 
 
As revealed in Table 6.25, when adjusted for the 29 submissions associated with ED148 there 
has been a slight increase in the number of submitters and submissions made. 
 
Table 6.25:  Consultants – Submissions and Submitters - Pre and Post  
                         (Including and Excluding ED148) 
 
 
Market Market Market Pre Post
Ranking Capitalisation Weight Submissions Submissions
($M) %
1 CBA 133463.0 8.84 3 4.5% 1 2.2%
2 Westpac Banking Corporation 99908.1 6.62 0 0.0% 2 4.4%
3 BHP Billiton 91742 6.08 20 29.9% 2 4.4%
4 ANZ 88622 5.87 0 0.0% 19 42.2%
5 NAB 83241.7 5.52 4 6.0% 7 15.6%
6 Telstra 74576.5 4.94 19 28.4% 5 11.1%
7 Wesfarmers Ltd 47467.3 3.15 1 1.5% 0 0.0%
9 Woolworths Ltd 34692.6 2.3 1 1.5% 0 0.0%
10 Woodside Petroleum 29561.9 1.96 10 14.9% 0 0.0%
11 Macquarie Bank Limited 26581 1.76 0 0.0% 6 13.3%
14 Westfield Corporation Stapled (Westfield Holdings Ltd) 19367.8 1.28 1 1.5% 0 0.0%
16 QBE 19038.7 1.26 4 6.0% 0 0.0%
17 AMP Ltd 18722.5 1.24 3 4.5% 3 6.7%
19 Suncorp Metway 16957.4 1.12 1 1.5% 0 0.0%
Total 783942.5 51.9 67 100.0% 45 100.0%
% %Company
ED
Number
1 13
2 2
3 5
4 1
29 1
22
Submissions
Number % Number %
Including ED148 12 1.4% 53 17.8% 16.4%
Excluding ED148 12 1.4% 24 3.2% 1.8%
Percentage of
all (total) Submissions
Pre Submissions Post Submissions Increase Decrease
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Government (Commonwealth, State and Local) 
 
Table 6.26 reveals that of the 100 exposure drafts examined, Governments submitted a total 
of 221 submissions (18%) to 73 exposure drafts (73%).  
 
Table 6.26:  Government (Commonwealth, State and Local) – Submissions to  
                        Exposure Drafts 
 
 
 
As revealed in Table 6.27, there has been a slight increase in the number of submitters 
although the number of submissions has relatively declined. 
 
Table 6.27:  Government (Commonwealth, State and Local) – Submissions and 
                        Submitters - Pre and Post (Including and Excluding ED148) 
 
 
Increase Decrease
Number % Number %
Including ED148 11 7.1% 41 13.8% 6.7%
Excluding ED148 11 7.1% 13 4.4% 2.7%
Percentage of
all (total) Submitters
Pre Submitters Post Submitters
ED
Number
1 19
2 23
3 12
4 4
5 5
6 5
7 1
8 2
9 0
10 1
16 1
73
Submissions
Number % Number %
Commonwealth 38 6.7% 52 8.0% 1.3%
State 59 10.5% 48 7.4% 3.1%
Local 16 2.8% 8 1.2% 1.6%
Total 113 20.0% 108 16.6%
Number % Number %
Commonwealth 6 3.9% 6 1.5% 2.4%
State 19 12.3% 30 7.4% 4.9%
Local 15 9.7% 21 5.2% 4.5%
Total 40 25.8% 57 14.0%
Post Submitters Increase Decrease
Percentage of
all (total) Submissions
Pre Submissions Post Submissions Increase Decrease
Percentage of
all (total) Submitters
Pre Submitters
113 
 
Individuals 
 
Table 6.28 reveals that of the 100 exposure drafts examined Individuals submitted a total of 
104 submissions (9%) to 42 exposure drafts (42%).  
 
Table 6.28:  Individuals – Submissions to Exposure Drafts 
 
 
 
As revealed in Table 6.29, both the number of submitters and submissions have declined.  
 
Table 6.29:  Individuals – Submissions and Submitters - Pre and Post  
                       (Including and Excluding ED148) 
 
 
 
 
  
ED
Number
1 16
2 10
3 5
4 5
5 4
6 1
7 1
42
Submissions
Number % Number %
Including ED148 74 13.1% 30 4.6% 8.5%
Excluding ED148 74 13.1% 23 4.9% 8.2%
Pre Submissions Post Submissions Increase Decrease
Percentage of
all (total) Submissions
Number % Number %
Including ED148 22 14.2% 23 7.7% 6.4%
Excluding ED148 22 14.2% 17 5.7% 8.5%
Pre Submitters Post Submitters Increase Decrease
Percentage of
all (total) Submitters
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6.4: Extent of Participation: Submitters and Submissions – Pre and Post 
 
Table 6.30 reveals the number of submitters and their submissions into the due process over 
the research period. 
 
Table 6.30:  Overall Trends in Participation 
 Pre Post 
(Inc. D148) 
Post 
(Exc. ED148) 
Submitters 155 252 89 
Submissions 564 651  467 
No of Exposure Drafts 41 59 58 
Crude Average 14 11 8 
 
Note:  ED148 had 184 submissions of which 163 were from once only submitters. 
 
When broken down into tranches, the data reveals that 75% of all exposure drafts had fewer 
than 15 submissions each; 50% had fewer than 10 submissions and 27% had fewer than 5 
submissions. In terms of pre and post, the pre-position reveals that 41% of exposure drafts 
had in excess of 15 submissions whilst in the post position, only 14% of exposure drafts had 
in excess of 15 submissions each. 
 
Major submitters and their trends – Pre and Post 
 
Of the total submitters, 80% submitted only once suggesting that 73% of all submissions 
were made by only 20% of submitters. A breakdown of these 20% of submitters (i.e. 83 
submitters who made 891 submissions) reveals 
• 12% came from the large accounting firms who provided 27% of submissions. 
• 10% came from the professional accounting bodies and accounting organisations who 
provided 14% of submissions. 
• 31% came from business associations who provided 12% of submissions 
• 70% of the top 20 largest Australian corporations representing 17% of submitters 
provided 13% of submissions. 
 
Taken together, 80% of these submitters provided 70% of submissions. Given that the ability 
to submit is highly predicated on the costs of keeping up-to-date, and the requisite knowledge 
required to understand the proposals is high, it was generally assumed that the large 
accounting firms, professional accounting bodies, large Australian corporations and their 
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associated business organisations would be prevalent within the due process which is clearly 
evident from the above. 
 
This relationship is borne out when considering the following relationships concerning the 
100 exposure drafts examined, as can be seen in Table 6.31. 
 
Table 6.31:  Number of Exposure Drafts Submitted. 
 No of EDs submitted 
to. 
% 
Large Accounting Firms 94 94 
Professional Accounting Bodies and Organisations  82 82 
Large Australian Companies  60 60 
Business Associations 60 60 
Smaller Accounting Firms 14 14 
Consultants 22 22 
 
In terms of a pre and post position there has clearly been a decline in participation by these 
groups as is indicated in Table 6.32.  
 
Table 6.32:  Number of Exposure Drafts Submitted: Pre and Post  
 Pre (No.) Post (No.) Pre (%) Post (%) 
Large Accounting Firms 39 55 95 93 
Professional Accounting Bodies and 
Organisations 
33 49 80 83 
Large Australian Corporations 39 55 85 51 
Business Associations 38 22 93 37 
Note:  The large accounting firms would have reduced significantly had it not been for the 40 post submission 
input by Grant Thornton Australia.  
Note:  The three major professional accounting bodies now submit jointly rather than individually. 
 
Of further interest is the participation by government (federal, state and local) and 
individuals. Government participation reveals a slight increase in submitters, even if in 
relevant terms of total submitters and submissions, there has been a decline in both. Of more 
interest is the relatively high number of exposure drafts (73) to which they submitted. Of 
these, 32 were pre and 41 post. Table 6.33 reveals that most of this activity rests with the 
following participants. 
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Table 6.33: Major Government Participants – Submissions 
 
Number of Submissions Pre (No.) Post (No.) 
Heads of Treasuries Accounting & Reporting Advisory 
Committee (HOTARAC) 
16 37 
Australian Council of Auditors-General 8 14 
Treasury – NSW 4 15 
Australasian Council of Auditors-General, excluding the 
Auditor-General for South Australia (ACAG) 
0 13 
Australian National Audit Office 9 1 
Dept. of Treasury and Finance - SA 8 2 
Total 45 82 
Percentage of Total Government Submissions 40% 76% 
 
Since the initial promulgation of accounting standards affecting government, which in 
various situations cross-pollinated private sector accounting practices and principles with 
public sector financial reporting, the number of submissions by government to so many 
exposure drafts is not unsurprising. However, what is evident concerning government 
participation is that participation is concentrated in a limited set of departments and agencies 
which consolidate their constituency viewpoints and that of their political masters, much in 
line with the traditional Westminster system of executive authority and administrative 
bureaucracy.  
 
Participation by individuals offers further clarity to the demise of due process as a mechanism 
for incorporating influence on accounting standard setting by accepting the raw numerical 
data needs to be tempered with some insights of who these individuals are.  
 
In terms of the number of submitters they have remained stable at around 22 participants 
although this represents an approximate 7% decrease relevant to total submitters. However, in 
terms of total submissions made by this group there has been a significant decrease from 
around 13% of all submissions pre to a post position of just under 5%. Table 6.34 details 
some of the more significant individuals in terms of their pre and post submissions. 
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Table 6.34: Major Individual Participants – Submissions 
 
Number of Submissions Pre (No.) Post (No.) 
Ian Langfield-Smith 16 7 
Graham Pierson 11  
Keith Alfredson 9 1 
Craig Deegan 5 0 
Note: Doyens of Australian financial reporting and eminent academics. 
 
One brief observation from Table 6.34 is a major decline in submissions from these 
individuals which may be the result of various unknown external and individual reasons. On 
face value this not insignificant following the move to international accounting standard 
setting. 
 
The decline in participation by most of the identified groups is not forthcoming when 
considering the participation by consultants. Post submission activity reveals a significant 
increase in relative terms of 16%, although this is heavily negated if the ED148 effect is 
removed.  
 
6.5: Chapter Summary 
 
The quantitative findings revealed limited participation within due process, both pre and post 
acceptance of international accounting standards in 2005. This participation was identified as 
being undertaken by a limited set of self-interested knowledgeable participants, and that the 
post 2005 international standards did nothing to address this issue. In fact, despite the 
recognition of the need for due process to reflect better common law principles, new 
international accounting standards seem to have narrowed participation practice. These issues 
are addressed in terms of the two study research questions in the next chapter.   
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Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
7.1: Introduction  
 
This chapter presents a discussion of the two major research questions. Discussion on the first 
of these is drawn from the findings in Chapter Six without explicit reference or commentary 
to Chapters Two to Five. It presents trends in both submitters and submissions that are the 
outcome of due process. The second research question considers the due process itself as an 
appropriate avenue for participation within the Australian standard setting environment. 
Consequently, it draws heavily on the historical and philosophical antecedents that underpin 
the current notion of due process: how it is aspired to within modern civil society; how civil 
society incorporates such diverse notions of the common good and economic individualism 
within an economic paradigm given over to the economic nuances and consequences of 
market orientated systems. These are drawn out through the six propositions outlined in 
Section 1.4 that were discussed in Chapters Two to Five. 
 
7.2: Research Question One 
 
The first major research question associated with this research was to discern if the move to 
international accounting standards broadened participation in due process and introduced new 
voices into the Australian accounting standard setting regime. Part therein also incorporates 
the need to identify trends concerning those participating within due process. Given the 
stakeholders identified throughout this research it would be reasonable to suggest that there is 
limited and declining participation. Major declines in submissions by the large accounting 
firms, business associations and large Australian corporations could be seen as suggesting 
that due process has only limited value as an avenue of influence. These stakeholders might 
perceive other more constructive avenues to influence the standard setter. It may be also 
inferred from these results that the shift to standards now being promulgated by the IASB 
rather than by the AASB has led to less participation due to its declining influence in standard 
formulation. 
 
As outlined in Chapter Six, the findings reveal that there is limited participation within the 
due process and that this participation is undertaken by a limited set of self-interested 
knowledgeable participants. This would appear to most align with an abolitionist approach in 
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which groups of self-interested parties compete for advantage of private benefits and property 
rights.  
 
The cost and required knowledge requirements of keeping abreast of proposed standards is 
significant. The modern accounting standard environment is now awash with significant 
variations in practice and procedures which in many instances are both cross pollinated with 
each other and require sophisticated understandings of their content and relationships. 
Findings suggest that these constraints have led to a reduction in overall participation activity 
whilst at the same time, participation by the larger corporations and their associated industry 
bodies and consulting groups, which also incorporate the large accounting firms and the 
professional accounting bodies has been narrrowed. This is mirrored with respect to 
participation by government and was not unexpected given the nature of its bureaucratic 
structure and its concentration into the hands of a few significant submitters.  
 
Findings within Chapter Six clearly reveal shifts in participation from the pre to post period 
in terms of both the number of submissions and number of submitters. Disregarding ED184, 
the pre-period comprised 155 submitters making 564 submissions to 41 Exposure Drafts with 
the post period comprising of 89 submitters making 467 submissions to 59 Exposure Drafts. 
This decline in participation rates also appears when comparing the number of submissions to 
each exposure draft. Overall 75% of all exposure drafts had fewer than 15 submissions each; 
50% had fewer than 10 submissions and 27% had fewer than 5 submissions. In terms of pre 
and post, the pre-position reveals that 41% of exposure drafts had in excess of 15 submissions 
whilst in the post position only 14% of exposure drafts had in excess of 15 submissions each. 
Reference to Table 6.3 (Exposure Drafts 99-200) presents an interesting insight when 
considering the relatively small number of submission to each. This needs to be considered in 
light of Table 6.1 on the size of Australian companies and the markets they serve. 
 
Limited participation is evident with 80% of submitters submitting only once. The other 20% 
(83) of submitters made 73% (891) of all submissions. A breakdown of these 20% of 
submitters reveals that the large accounting firms made 27% of submissions; professional 
accounting bodies and accounting organisations 14% of submissions; 12% came from 
business associations and 70% of the top 20 largest Australian corporations, representing 
17% of submitters, made 13% of submissions. 
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7.3: Research Question Two 
 
The second major research question was to discern if the due process procedures employed to 
develop accounting standards provide an appropriate avenue for fair and equal participation 
by relevant stakeholders. This proposition is evaluated in terms of the Section 1.4 six 
propositions (and the relevant Chapter discussions as indicated following each query), in 
order to consider the implications that address this second research question. 
 
1. How the intermeshed principles of modern civil society are incorporated within a 
meaning of due process now seen to encompass both the competing ideologies of the 
common good and economic individualism. See Chapters Three and Four. 
2. The extent to which the setting of standards is the product of the economic consequences 
of competing constituents and fermented within a political paradigm as opposed to a 
process built around of neutrality and the quest for the common good. See: Chapter 
Three. 
 
Evident from the Renaissance and Enlightenment until today has been a paradigm shift in the 
understanding of humanity and its role in society. Two prominent observations appear in this 
shift. Firstly, a concept of ‘economics’ has evolved and emerged as the general science of 
choice concerning issues of money and business which deems markets as the central 
depository for individual interaction. Secondly, by placing the individual at the centre of 
analysis, notions of the common good now resonate more closely with ideals of individualism 
and interest-groups. This new economic individual is located within a market orientated 
environment predicated on the various nuances associated with liberalism, libertarianism, 
neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism; all of which have to some degree perpetuated a notion 
of government failure. Despite their differences, they have the assumed acceptance of the 
dominance of property rights and the principal-agent relationship which have provided the 
impetus for de-crediting government intervention in markets. 
 
Modern civil society now finds itself within a paradigm given over to the pursuit of 
individual interests which resonates within an environment heavily predicated on the 
protection of private property and contracts under the more modern interpretation of the rule 
of law. At its core, the present notion of civil society is embellished with an understanding of 
the common good as being the sum of particular interests where individual rights are 
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presented as the cornerstone of the new social contract. Moreover, the defence of individual 
rights, commonly ensured through private actions, has created a legislative framework based 
on procedures that enable and empower individuals to participate in the public sphere. 
Inherent within an understanding of civil society (set out in Section 2.3) is the recognition of 
the incommensurability of human values in that different values can be equally acceptable 
and correct, albeit in a state of conflict with each other. Modern philosophers like Berlin and 
Weber have interpretations of the common good, free expression and individual rights so 
attuned within the construct of civil society that they are best presented through principles of 
‘value pluralism’ and a ‘polytheism of values’ where “…the ends of men are many, and not 
all of them are in principle compatible with one another”277, and where “…disparate fields of 
human life … [can be] rationalised in terms of very different ultimate values and ends, [and 
where] what is rational from one point of view may well be irrational from another.”278 
 
The outcome of these nuances resonates most notably in the accounting standard setting 
environment through stakeholder behaviour, as accounting standards have economic 
consequences which are associated with wealth distributions. Inevitably, satisfaction of these 
competing consequences fail to be considered in terms of a ‘political’ process seen capable of 
accommodating various stakeholder interests. When bolstered by a liberal democratic setting, 
accepting of both political pluralism (the recognition and affirmation of diversity) and 
expressive liberty (freedom for individuals and groups to lead lives they choose), the 
inevitability of delegated responsibility from the state to a market-based mechanism appears 
self-evident. This delegated responsibility has seen the growth of regulatory agencies 
representing the modern form of state intervention and who employ the coercive power of the 
state in regulating many aspects of economic development, i.e. standard-setters. Pertinently, 
they also act as gatekeepers and as such have discretion over both the selection and direction 
of policy.  
 
Implicit within any market-based solution or outcome is the unfettered recognition of its 
inherent economic pedigree and that the delegated subordinate is publicly legitimised through 
both its accountability to constituents and its political masters and its creation and enactment 
                                                     
277 Berlin, I., (1969), “Two Concepts of Liberty”, a lecture delivered at Oxford University in 1958, Published in 
Four Essays on Liberty, (1969) Oxford: Oxford University Press, FEL 169: L 214, p.31. 
278 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (2007), Max Weber. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the 
Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University, accessed 19 August 2015, retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/#IroCagValFra. See also: Weber, M., (1920), “Author’s Introduction 
(vorbemerkung to GARS)” in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
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of rules and policies aimed at accommodating the political and economic nuances of both. 
Procedural due process can be seen as lending itself neatly to perceptions of both 
accountability and public legitimisation and by such agencies as providing a process capable 
of accommodating constituent participation in a manner that appears accountable and non-
discriminatory to the extent it could be neutral. 
 
Evident from the research material presented in the previous chapters is the conceptual 
dilemma faced by standard setters of how to incorporate and accommodate the competing 
aspects of both political and economic reality within a conceptual framework aimed at 
providing neutral standards. Not only do accounting standards have implications on the 
wealth distributions of self-interested economic individuals and interest groups but there are 
also other behavioural implications drawn from accounting itself. Given both the political 
nature and the inevitability of economic consequences resulting from the setting of standards, 
a zero-sum outcome would appear unrealistic, however interpreted within a context of 
neutrality. Any acceptable subjugation of these would need to be delineated in terms of cross 
pollinating the ideal of neutrality with a concept of neutrality premised upon it; that is, to 
provide an acceptable representation of fairness, rather than recognising neutrality as being a 
true reality. If neutrality could not ideally be delivered, it would instead need to appear to 
have been delivered. Herein lies the first ambit claim against due process applied within this 
setting as opposed to that of its historical common law antecedents. To be seen to have done 
something would appear to be a sufficient outcome within the due process of the accounting 
standard setting regime, despite the lack of democratic participation. 
 
3. The extent to which due process, as applied in the setting of accounting standards, aligns 
with the construct of due process which has developed over time through the concept of 
natural justice and the common law. See Chapter Five 
 
Previously suggested difficulties pertaining to the accounting standard setting due process are 
repeated here to enable a discussion of the comparative differences. First, participation is 
undertaken by a limited set of knowledgeable participants who participate due to self-interest. 
This would appear to most align with an abolitionist approach through which groups of self-
interested parties compete for advantage of private benefits and property rights in line with 
the modern interpretation of the public interest. Here, the common good is subsumed by 
outcomes premised on the prevailing power interests which is far distant from an ideal 
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normative concept of policy making which draws upon a notion of citizenship that goes 
beyond self-interest. Common law due process, through the use of participation, debate and 
hearing the other side, helps citizens to develop a consensus of the good of all.  
 
Second, participation within the accounting standard setting due process requires significant 
knowledge requirements and consequently these provide barriers to participation which have 
generally resulted in only the larger companies and their associated affiliate organisations 
participating. As an aside it is generally considered that the rewards to effort expended on 
participation provides larger benefits to larger corporations.   
 
Due process in the context of common law significantly differs from the above in that within 
its quest to achieve common good outcomes from the policy making process, it subordinates 
the self-interest focus that permeates the standard setting process. It does this by 
incorporating a far greater transparency of process which is more democratically inclusive in 
the manner it demands far broader participation. The very value given to participation gives 
both meaning to the outcome and is substantive in its nexus to the decision.  
 
The extent to which written submissions may influence the decisions of standard setters is at 
best conjecture, notwithstanding the extent to which it is also considered as presenting an 
appropriate level of accountability and participation; points which perhaps are not helped by 
the nature and construct of the standard setter themselves.279 There is an implied right under 
common law due process that decisions are made by a disinterested and unbiased decision 
maker and that any decisions made are based on logically probative evidence. Therein the 
decision maker must have no vested interests in the outcome or an appearance of bias in the 
decision. Accounting standard setters (i.e. gatekeepers) such as the IASB are not perceived as 
such. 
 
Exposure drafts are frequently the outcome of the monographs and discussion papers which 
precede them. Their underlying premises are often difficult to discern, and in many instances 
participants have little ability to discover the underlying reasons for the development of new 
regulations. Moreover, insights into the reasoning behind the standard setter’s decisions 
                                                     
279 Issues raised by submitters in Exposure Drafts are often treated as ‘votes’ when determining preferences for 
or against. See: ibid.; Hurst (2003), pp.118-128. 
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following the receipt of written submissions and the final promulgation of an accounting 
standard are difficult to ascertain in most instances. Alternatively, the level of evidence 
revealed under the common law due process differs significantly and the nexus between 
evidence and outcomes can be clearly identified. The nexus, between evidence and its impact 
on outcomes, is less revealed under the standard setting due process.  
 
4. How the substantive nature of due process now sits within a procedural domain said to 
incorporate democratic participation and the natural justice maxims, audi alteram partem 
(to hear the other side; no person should be judged without a hearing) and nemo iudex in 
re sua (every judge must be free from bias). See: Chapter Five. 
 
The embellishment of procedural due process with attributes of common law, substantive due 
process finds significant resonance with the inability of procedures to be challenged based on 
their effects. In this respect, the extent to which due process could not be delivered is 
ensconced, much like the aforementioned discussion on neutrality, in a delivery of 
appearance; i.e. it is provided to the extent it is seen to be provided. There are variances of 
the notion of substantive due process presented in different jurisdictions, yet they all entail an 
element of protection of society wherein private interests are balanced against those of that 
society. At its heart, substantive due process posits two key fundamental differences from 
procedural fairness or procedural due process. Firstly, in protecting societal values 
substantive due process implies a limitation of state power in what laws and regulations can 
be made and furthermore by whom they can be made by and the extent of the content within 
them. Secondly, the inherent value within substantive due process rests with the relationship 
of participation as it relates to procedures, outcomes and values. “Procedures are means, 
instruments, or mechanisms for giving effect to the values pertinent to each form of 
process.”280 This is succinctly described by Lord Denning in the Section 5.2 quotation that is 
worth repeating here: “…by ‘due process’ I do not mean rules of procedure.”281 Galligan 
expresses this same notion as an either/or dilemma: “The value is not in the procedures 
themselves but in their contribution to the right or best outcomes.”282 
 
                                                     
280 ibid.: Galligan (1996), p.50. 
281 ibid.: Lord Denning (1980), p.v. 
282 ibid.: Galligan (1996), p.72. 
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Evident from the discussions in Chapter Four concerning the rise of economic individualism 
and the demise of the common good is the inevitable collapse of substantive due process 
under the weight of a short-run new economic sophism that ignores the long-run community 
effects.283 This shift is not unsurprising considering the criticism of the common and public 
good that accompanied the shifting nuances associated with neo-liberalism. The rational 
profit maximising economic individual in a theoretical framework of private property rights, 
the principal-agent relationship, and a growing belief in government failure now sees the 
public interest in terms of economic efficiency. 
 
5. The extent to which due process, as applied in the development of the Australian 
accounting standards by the AASB, is pursuant of normative rule-making models which 
suggest the need for participant involvement in the making of rules and that such rules be 
framed with reference to the common good. See: Chapter Five. 
6. How public accountability and stakeholder participation is perceived within the new 
economic realm of economic individualism, self-interest, specific interest groups, and 
accountability in the age of delegated legislative responsibilities to private institutions. 
See: Chapter Five. 
 
One clearly observable outcome of the past century is the extent to which participation has 
changed in many administrative situations. It has become institutionalised, and the conduit 
for action only by professionals, managers, and politicians or other consultative mechanisms 
such as committees. In many instances the fundamental task of bureaucratic administrators 
has been to devise procedures which would lead to proper and accurate outcomes subject to 
conditions of efficiency and economy. The direct costs of procedures that offered 
calculability and efficiency in terms of market capitalism were set off against the social good. 
This is coupled with an emergent acceptance of procedural due process participation 
devolved to the lowest common denominator of simply either putting an argument forward or 
casting a vote. Galligan suggests that participation should “…be more active and positive, 
encouraging discussion and argument, the examination of alternatives, and the search for the 
best and most reasonable solution.”284  
 
                                                     
283 ibid.: Hazlitt (1946), p.4 (See quotation in Section 4.1). 
284 ibid.: Galligan (1996), p.157. 
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Earlier normative theories had suggested that decisions reached needed to go beyond 
particular concerns and consider a broader sense of the interests of all. With the growing 
acceptance of society being the product of groups of self-interest parties competing for 
advantage of private benefits and property rights, pluralistic approaches accommodated a 
style of participation that favoured outcomes from interest group conflict. Private agencies 
given delegated legislative powers from the state saw the application of participation as 
establishing administrative processes the main aim of which was the settlement of policy 
issues rather than consideration of the fair or otherwise treatment of individuals.  
 
It is perhaps opportune here to consider the nuances of participatory democracy. Participative 
democracy entails a civic participation and involvement in the policy making process other 
than through elected representatives. Civic participation contains two fundamental attributes. 
Firstly, there is an involvement dimension which considers a citizen's will to participate and 
secondly an integration dimension which considers the level to which society allows such 
participation. On either account, participation appears problematic and arbitrary within the 
standard setting due process. Given major constraints surrounding both the costs of keeping 
informed, and where many would-be participants feel disempowered in their ability to 
influence the outcome, participation in due process is generally low and appears to be 
declining. Further participatory involvement is also reduced by the extent to which the large 
entities and their associated business associations permeate the business press, exert 
significant economic impact on the economy and have the capacity to participate and lobby 
pre and post to obtain preferred outcomes. 
 
7.4: Chapter Summary 
 
The first of the two research questions to be answered was to discern if the move to 
international accounting standards broadened participation in the due process and introduced 
new voices into the Australian accounting standard setting regime. The second question was 
to evaluate the due process procedures employed to develop accounting standards and do 
they provide an appropriate avenue for fair and equal participation by relevant stakeholders. 
 
On the former question, there appears sufficient evidence to suggest that there has not been a 
broadening of participation which included new voices in the Australian accounting standard 
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setting regime. The findings suggest that a small set of knowledgeable participants engage 
within the due process.  
 
On the latter question, the research reveals significant differences between the historical 
common law due process mechanism, and the due process employed within the accounting 
standard setting regime. In this research, it has been contended that this is far removed from 
the procedural due process ensconced with the accounting standard setting environment in 
terms of the fundamental principles associated with substantive due process (i.e. rules of 
hearing, bias and evidence) and how participation is incorporated therein. This is perhaps not 
unsurprising to the extent that the common law due process emanated from a great movement 
associated with the development of society and its resonance within the ideal of a social 
contract. The advent of the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of the self-interested 
economic individual in the new age of private property and private benefits has seen the 
social contract privatised and the common good marketised. What could not be done had to 
be seen to be done and therein processes found fruition through procedures based on voting 
along with processes based on pure procedures with an emphasis on participation. 
 
Delegated power to privatised providers vested with memberships of self-interested groups 
competing for economic advantage now create policies in laissez free markets where the 
invisible hand has idolised the economic individuality of homo economicus and laid siege to 
government interference. Ideas of the common good and public interest have given way to 
the nuances of liberalism, libertarianism, neo liberalism and neo-conservatism. What were 
once the great maxims of due process, audi alteram partem and nem iudex in re sua are but 
footnotes to the new rationalist rhetoric of procedural fairness.  
 
On both counts discussed above, due process, firstly as an avenue for broadening 
participation, and secondly for accommodating its historical common law ancestry would 
appear to be past its use by date in the accounting standard setting environment. Perhaps the 
new age has moved beyond substantive due process to a procedural due process that 
resonates within a 21st century rationalism which encapsulates both a dilution of the public 
good and a passive acceptance of state sponsored private sector legitimisation. The next and 
final chapter outlines implications of this study.  
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Chapter Eight: Importance and Recommendations 
 
8.1: Importance of this Study 
 
The importance of this study relates to two considerations. Firstly, insights into the due 
process of accounting standard setting in Australia. These insights are arrived at 
quantitatively by identifying shifting patterns of participants spanning five years either side of 
the change to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRs) as specified by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Secondly, it considers the due process 
from a broader socio-economic, political and legal perspective, rather than many prior studies 
which have focused more on the outcome of due process in terms of the promulgation of 
accounting standards. This philosophical approach offers deep insights into the notion of 
participatory democracy and its implementation through accounting standards. 
 
The quantitative findings and philosophical analysis conducted in this study should help 
augment a better understanding of both due process as it is applied within the accounting 
standard setting environment and provide insights into who the major participants that utilise 
the due process are. 
 
8.2: Recommendations for Future Research 
  
Recommendations for future research in this area of enquiry emanate from many of the 
limitations of this study. The current research considers only participants in the due process 
for a period of five years post the implementation of international accounting standards in 
2005. In this respect, participation trends may vary from a greater longitudinal study given 
the proximity of this study to the changeover. Several suggested reasons may support this 
contention, and worthy of further investigation:  
1. The initial exposure drafts and their proposals related significantly to a number of 
adjustments needing to be undertaken to align existing Australian standards with their 
international alternative. Consequently, participation may have declined, given the 
insignificance of these exposure drafts and how they impacted on relevant stakeholders. 
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2. The proximity of the study to the introduction of the IFRS may also have an impact to the 
extent that the IASB due process and procedures were an unknown quantity as regards to 
influencing outcomes. 
3. Previous research, not considered in this study, suggests that submissions are more likely 
to be made in opposition to a proposal. Accepting this proposition, declining participation 
in this study may suggest a greater acceptance of proposals. 
4. Socio-economic environments change over time which incorporate shifts in economic 
consequences. For example, accounting standards were initially premised upon the 
private sector and then later introduced to the public sector and are now encompassing the 
third sector (not-for-profits). New participants and trends in participation may change. 
5. This study has only focused on submissions from Australian stakeholders. Given the 
internationality of the IASB, overall participation and submissions on a proposal was not 
investigated and there may have been significant overseas and external input suggesting a 
much broader participation than reported here. 
6. This study did not consider reasons why participants submitted nor investigated reasons 
that would have limited or stifled participation. 
7. A further significant shortfall herein was the inability of this research to categorise 
submissions with particular exposure drafts to identify trends in what types of issues drive 
participation. Given the proximity of this study to the introduction of IFRS, many 
exposure drafts had multi standard implications. 
 
In many ways, this study has compared an ideal concept of due process with the more 
practical version applied in today’s regulatory environment. Given such a comparison, 
this study did not consider the existing due process as a beneficial process in itself. As 
alluded to within the study, substantive due process much like the ideals of the public, 
public interest and common good may be the rhetoric of times past and relics from 
another bygone day’s Zeitgeist. Perhaps procedural due process, much like today’s 
acceptance of economic individualism, needs to be considered by itself and not compared 
in the sense subscribed to in this study. Overall a much broader study involving both 
Australian and international submissions into a select number of exposure drafts would 
enable a deeper content analysis to be undertaken. A more focused approach with 
particular emphasis on a select sample would provide a more in depth understanding of 
the adequacy or not of the due process employed.  
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Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Reporting Entity 193 Mar-10 7 
Request for Comment on IPSASB Exposure Draft 'Service Concession 
Arrangements: Grantor’ 
194 Apr-10 4 
Defined Benefit Plans (proposed amendments to AASB 119) 195 May-10 9 
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Fair Value Option for Financial Liabilities 196 May-10 10 
Exposure Draft 197 – Presentation of Items of Other Comprehensive 
Income  
197 June-10 8 
Revenue from Contracts with Customers 198  July-10 10 
Measurement Uncertainty Analysis Disclosure for Fair Value 
Measurements (Limited re-exposure of proposed disclosure 
199 July-10 5 
200A Proposals to Harmonise Australian and New Zealand Standards in 
Relation to Entities Applying IFRSs as Adopted in Australia and New 
Zealand 
200  July-10 12 
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Appendix 2: Summary of Hurst’s Study285 
To enable a systematic analysis, submissions have been broken down into the following 
categories in line with Hurst’s study of ED99 to ED141 which covered the period December 
1999 to July 2005.  
The Hurst study categories are as follows: 
• Large Accounting Firms 
• Smaller Accounting Firms 
• Professional Accounting Organisations 
• Business Associations 
• Large Australian Corporations 
• Other Corporations 
• Consultants 
• Governments Departments- Commonwealth 
• Government Departments – State 
• Local Government Departments and Councils 
• Individuals: Educational Institutions 
• Individuals: Others  
In the Hurst study, ED100 and ED104 were not considered as they were withdrawn by the 
Australian Accounting Standards Review Board.  
The tables and description that follow are from the Hurst study, and they reveal several 
insights into the submission process. 
 
Appendix 2-Table 1: Submissions to Exposure Drafts 99 – 141 
                                    (Excluding ED100 and ED104) 
 
 
                                                     
285 ibid.; Hurst (2007). 
 
Submitters Number % Submissions %
Large Accounting Firms 6 3.9% 116 20.6%
Smaller Accounting Firms 9 5.8% 10 1.8%
Professional Accounting Organisations 5 3.2% 53 9.4%
Business Associations 24 15.5% 79 14.0%
Large Australian Corporations 18 11.6% 83 14.7%
Other Corporations 22 14.2% 27 4.8%
Consultants 11 7.1% 12 2.1%
Government Departments - Commonwealth 6 3.9% 38 6.7%
Government Departments - State 19 12.3% 59 10.5%
Local Governments Departments and Councils 12 7.7% 12 2.1%
Individuals - Other 15 9.7% 54 9.6%
Individuals - Educational Departments 8 5.2% 21 3.7%
Total 155 1 564 100%
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Firstly, pockets of special interest groups are readily observable with reference to the 
business associations that submit on behalf of those interest groups. If local government 
associations are disregarded the remaining organisations represent the cream of private sector 
policy communities in the Australian business community. Considerable activity was 
observed from the Group of 100 although other associations such as the Australian 
Shareholders Association, Australian Institute of Company Directors, Australian Bankers 
Association, Securities Institute of Australia and the Institute of Actuaries for Australia were 
also prominent in submitting. 
 
Secondly, the submission activity by certain participants was quite revealing. The ability to 
submit is highly predicated on the cost of keeping abreast and the requisite knowledge 
relationships between proposals are high. Given these attributes it was generally assumed that   
the large accounting firms, professional accounting bodies, large corporations and their 
associated business organisations would submit on a regular basis which was clearly 
evidenced. This aside though, approximately 65% of participants submitted only once which 
would appear consistent with the cost, knowledge and self-interest constraints associated with 
the nature of the process.  
 
 
Clearly observable was submission activity from the big end of town who considered it 
worthwhile to make a submission aside from the more informal interactions suggested by the 
business press. Table 2 reveals that a total of 83 submissions were received from those large 
corporations currently within the top one hundred Australian listed companies. Taken 
together with the further 36 submissions made by the Group of 100, 21% of all submissions 
have been received from the big end of town. Table 2 also reveals that the combined market 
capitalisation of these firms is around $400 billion dollars which suggests significant socio-
economic and political influence within the Australian economy. 
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Appendix 2-Table 2: Submissions to Exposure Drafts 99 – 141: Large Corporations 
                                    (Excluding ED100 and ED104) 
 
 
Source: Australian Financial Review, 16/1/2006, p.18. 
 
 
Table 3 details the input by the large accounting firms whilst Table 4 documents the 
submissions by the professional accounting bodies. Contending there to be a strong 
relationship between the professional accounting bodies and the larger accounting firms the 
data reveals that 11 organisations representing 7% of the total population considered, 
submitted 169 submissions or approximately 30% of the total submissions. 
 
 
Appendix 2-Table 3: Submissions to Exposure Drafts 99 – 141: Large Accounting  
                                    Firms (Excluding ED100 and ED104) 
 
 
  
Number Market Ranking 
of Capitalisation in
Submissions $m Top 150
BHP Billiton 20 85192 2
CBA 3 56865 3
NBA 4 52303 4
Westfield Holdings Ltd 1 30708 8
Woodside Petroleum 10 27400 9
Telstra 19 23748 10
Woolworths Ltd 1 19878 11
QBE 4 15798 13
AMP Ltd 3 14716 16
Wesfarmers Ltd 1 13782 17
Suncorp Metway 1 11398 21
Fosters Group Ltd 5 11277 22
AXA Asia Pacific Holdings 3 8902 26
Australian Gas Light Company 4 7762 34
Santos 2 7438 36
Lend Lease 1 6008 40
Rural Press Ltd 1 2290 94
Corporations
Number
of
Submissions
Deloitte Touche Tomatsu 29
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 27
Ernst & Young 24
KPMG 20
Pitcher Partners 15
Arthur Andersen 1
116
Large Accounting Firms
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Appendix 2-Table 4: Submissions to Exposure Drafts 99 – 141: Professional Accounting  
                                    Bodies (Excluding ED100 and ED104) 
 
 
These exposure drafts were issued pre-introduction of international accounting standards. 
Many were however issued in the context of its preeminent introduction. Table 5 reveals a 
lessening of input by both the five large accounting firms and the three Australian 
professional accounting bodies leading up to the introduction. 
 
Appendix 2-Table 5: Submissions to Exposure Drafts 99 – 141: Professional Accounting  
                                    Bodies and Large Accounting Firms (Excluding ED100/ ED104) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number
of
Submissions
CPA Australia 27
Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAA) 21
National Institute of Accountants (NIA) 3
Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICA) - NZ 1
International Federation of Accountants (IFA) 1
53
Professional Accounting Bodies
Submissions Professional Accounting Large Accounting
Exposure Drafts Bodies Firms
121-141
[21]
99-120
[20]
Total 51 100% 115 100%
17
35
45
70
% %
33%
67%
39%
61%
